The D.C. Council approved a permanent youth curfew in an 8-5 vote on Tuesday. The bill grants Mayor Muriel Bowser or the D.C. police chief broad authority to establish curfew zones that can begin as early as 8 p.m. FOX 5 D.C.’s Tom Fitzgerald has the latest.

WASHINGTON – A protester remained on the Frederick Douglass Bridge on Tuesday as a multi‑day standoff entered its fifth day.

Florida activist Guido Reichstädter climbed the bridge on Friday. He said on social media he plans to come down soon, though authorities have not indicated when that might occur. He is protesting the war in Iran and calling for a global ban on artificial intelligence.

Reichstädter previously scaled the bridge in 2022 during a demonstration over the overturning of Roe v. Wade.

Police said vehicle lanes on South Capitol Street in both directions remain open. Associated closures are limited to the pedestrian walkway, and officers are directing drivers through the area.

In recent years, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a strategic bet: Republicans would be the more reliable partner and investing in them would be safer than trying to maintain a shrinking Democratic consensus.

This assumption proved correct in the short term. Republican support, especially under the Trump administration, remained consistent. At the same time, engagement with Democratic constituencies became more difficult and politically costly. These constituencies included American Reform and Conservative Jews who were put off by Netanyahu’s reliance on Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox partners.

However, that strategy created a long-term risk. Closer alignment with one party deepened the partisan divide and now threatens the U.S.–Israel alliance. This issue is no longer theoretical. Israel is heading toward elections this fall. The outcome will shape its U.S. strategy and influence U.S. policy toward Israel.

If the current approach continues, Israel will deepen its reliance on Republicans and further limit engagement with Democrats. This may remain sustainable in the short term, but it increases long-term risk.

A different coalition, based on today’s opposition and less dependent on Orthodox parties, could restore bipartisan engagement and rebuild ties with Democratic lawmakers, institutions, younger audiences, and liberal American Jewish communities. These communities still largely align with the Democratic Party, despite some shift after the October 7, 2023, attack and the wave of antisemitism that followed. Even then, change will be gradual. The erosion of support among Democrats reflects deeper ideological shifts that no Israeli government can quickly reverse.

U.S. security aid, once a pillar of the alliance, is now politically contested. Within segments of the Democratic Party, opposition to aid now signals progressive credibility.

Netanyahu has suggested that Israel could phase out its reliance on U.S. aid. He argues that Israel’s economic strength allows it, especially if continued aid damages public support in the United States. This reflects a broader logic: reducing dependency may help preserve the alliance’s political sustainability.

Some in Washington argue that tensions stem mainly from Netanyahu and will ease after he leaves office. This view is only partly correct.

On core issues—Iran, deterrence, and skepticism toward Palestinian statehood under current conditions—there is broad consensus across Israel’s political spectrum. A future prime minister is unlikely to change these positions in any meaningful way.

Where change could occur is in the political approach. A different leadership may invest more in bipartisan engagement and avoid alignment with one U.S. party. The policy will remain similar, but the political strategy may differ.

Israeli leaders also recognize that not the entire shift in American attitudes is organic. External actors amplify anti-Israel narratives. These include Iran, Qatar, Russia, and China. They exploit existing divisions in Western societies. This means the trajectory of the alliance depends on not only domestic politics, but also geopolitical competition.

At the same time, Israel is working to reduce certain dependencies on the United States. This includes aid, military supplies, and technologies. A more self-reliant Israel is also a more independent Israel.

Israel has shown that it can act pragmatically with other powers, including Russia and, to a more limited extent, China, when its interests require. If bipartisan support in Washington continues to erode, Israel will expand its room for maneuver. This does not mean a strategic shift away from the United States, but it does mean that a weakened alliance reduces U.S. influence and creates opportunities for competitors.

In the United States, the question is whether support for Israel remains a bipartisan strategic interest or becomes a partisan identity issue. In Israel, the question is whether leaders treat bipartisan support and ties with American Jewry as strategic assets that require continuous investment.

The alliance is resilient. But for the first time in decades, its main challenge comes from internal political dynamics on both sides. Preserving it will require deliberate choices not only in Washington, but also in Jerusalem.