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WASHINGTON, Oct 14 (Reuters) – Western nations this week ratcheted up their criticism of China, the world’s largest bilateral creditor, as the primary impediment to transferring forward with debt restructuring agreements for the rising variety of nations unable to service their money owed.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated on Friday that top inflation, tightening financial insurance policies, foreign money pressures and capital outflows have been growing debt burdens in lots of creating nations, and extra progress was urgently wanted.
She stated she mentioned these points throughout a dinner with African finance ministers and in lots of different classes. The Group of Seven wealthy nations additionally met African finance ministers, who fear that the concentrate on the warfare in Ukraine is draining assets and a focus from their urgent considerations.
“Everybody agrees Russia ought to cease its warfare on Ukraine, and that might handle essentially the most vital issues that Africa faces,” Yellen advised reporters on the Worldwide Financial Fund and World Financial institution annual conferences in Washington.
However she stated a more practical debt restructuring course of was additionally wanted, and China had a giant position to play.
“Actually, the barrier to creating larger progress is one vital creditor nation, specifically China,” she stated. “So there was a lot dialogue of what we are able to do to deliver China to the desk and to foster a more practical answer.”
As China is the lacking piece within the puzzle of plenty of debt talks underneath means in creating markets, the Group of 20 launched in 2020 a Frequent Framework to deliver collectors corresponding to China and India to the negotiation desk together with the IMF, Paris Membership and personal collectors.
Zambia, Chad and Ethiopia have utilized to restructure underneath this new, yet-to-be examined mechanism. Sri Lanka is about to start out talks with bilateral collectors together with China after a $2.9 billion workers stage settlement with the IMF underneath the same platform. The Paris Membership creditor nations final month reached out to China and India looking for to coordinate carefully on Sri Lanka’s debt talks, however are nonetheless awaiting a reply.
The world’s poorest nations face $35 billion in debt-service funds to official and private-sector collectors in 2022, with greater than 40% of the full resulting from China, in response to the World Financial institution.
Spanish Finance Minister Nadia Calvino, who chairs the IMF’s steering committee, advised Reuters in an interview on Thursday that there was growing concern about China not collaborating absolutely in debt reduction efforts, noting that China had not despatched officers to take part in individual at this week’s IMF and World Financial institution conferences.
“China is a crucial accomplice. It is indispensable that we’ve them within the room and within the discussions in relation to debt reduction,” Calvino stated, including that many closely indebted nations have been additionally being hit onerous by inflation and local weather shocks.
German Finance Minister Christian Lindner additionally joined the rising criticism of China’s lack of well timed participation in debt restructuring for lower-income nations. China has argued it will not participate in some circumstances until the IMF and World Financial institution additionally took a haircut.
Lindner advised reporters he regretted that China had not accepted his invitation to take part within the G7 roundtable with African nations.
Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Enhancing by Paul Simao
Our Requirements: The Thomson Reuters Belief Rules.
In recent years, banks’ credit line exposure to ‘shadow banks’, or non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), has grown significantly faster than exposure to non-financial corporations. Between 2013 and 2023, bank credit lines to NBFIs tripled from $500 billion to $1.5 trillion, and in 2023 over 20% of all bank credit lines were committed to NBFIs (Acharya et al. 2024). How do the growing linkages between banks and NBFIs impact the performance and systemic stability of banks? We answer this question by studying an important leading example of a non-bank financial institution – real estate investment trusts (REITs; Acharya et al. 2025).
REITs are significant investors in commercial real estate (CRE), with over $4 trillion in investments, corresponding to 20% of the CRE market that is currently valued at $21 trillion.
Rising interest rates and an economic slowdown can therefore exert considerable pressure on the CRE sector.
Considering the vast scale of the CRE market, disruptions in the CRE sector can influence the availability of bank credit to households and businesses. Consequently, regulators and policymakers have increasingly focused on the risks associated with CRE loans in recent times. REITs, being large CRE investors, inherit these fundamental economic and financial risks.
Importantly, nearly half of all bank-originated credit lines to public NBFIs are allocated to REITs. As shown in Figure 1, REITs exhibit significantly higher utilisation rates on bank credit lines compared to other NBFIs and non-financial corporates. Moreover, their credit line usage is markedly more sensitive to aggregate market performance, as indicated by the slope coefficients in the figure. Notably, REIT utilisation rates spike during periods of market stress (such as the COVID-19 period), making credit lines to REITs a potentially significant source of systemic risk for banks.
However, despite these factors, the significant exposure of large banks to the CRE sector via their credit lines to REITs is often underappreciated. It is commonly assumed that disruptions in the CRE sector mainly affect smaller banks. Figure 2 illustrates the on-balance-sheet exposure in the form of CRE loans as a proportion of total equity over the past decade for three types of banks: community banks (assets under $10 billion), regional banks (assets between $10 billion and $100 billion), and large banks (assets exceeding $100 billion). The exposure of regional and community banks, when scaled by equity, is approximately four and five times greater, respectively, than that of large banks. As per this exposure measure, there has been a notable increase over the past decade in CRE loan exposure among regional and, especially, community banks, but not among large banks. This might suggest that the CRE stress does not pose systemic risk to the largest banks in the economy.
Figure 1 Average credit line utilisation by borrower group
However, these figures ignore loans and credit lines provided by banks to REITs. The primary conclusion that emerges from our empirical analysis is that to get a complete picture of bank exposure to CRE risks, it is important to focus not just on the direct CRE exposure of banks but also on the provision of credit, especially by large banks, to REITs. Once the indirect exposure of banks via term loans and credit lines to REITs is accounted for, CRE exposures are concentrated not only in the portfolios of smaller banks but also among the largest US banks. Figure 3 illustrates this fact. In this figure, we categorise bank exposure into direct CRE exposure, indirect exposure via term loans to REITs, and indirect exposure through credit lines to REITs. For large banks, indirect exposure constitutes about a third of their total exposure, whereas for regional banks, the indirect exposure through REITs is considerably smaller, and for community banks, it is practically negligible.
Figure 2 Total on-balance-sheet exposure to the commercial real estate market
Figure 3 Total exposure of banks to commercial real estate
What, then, are the underlying mechanisms through which credit-line exposure of banks to REITs might pose a system-wide risk? In summary, there is a higher utilisation rate of credit lines by REITs relative to other NBFIs and non-financial corporates, especially when the performance of the underlying real estate assets declines and particularly during periods of aggregate economic stress. This behaviour is associated with a notable decrease in stock returns for banks more heavily exposed to undrawn credit lines extended to REITs, consistent with capital encumbrance imposed by credit line drawdowns impeding banks’ future intermediation activities.
We first tease out why REITs have higher utilisation rates on credit lines, especially during stress. By regulation, REITs are required to pay out at least 90% of their income in the form of dividends, restricting the amount of cash REITs can accumulate.
This leads to a disproportionately large dependence of REITs on bank credit lines for liquidity during stress periods. For example, Blackstone REIT (BREIT) and SREIT (managed by Starwood Capital) relied on their lines of credit during 2022 and 2024 respectively, nearly exhausting their credit line capacity to satisfy investor withdrawal requests.
We show that the findings in these case studies generalise to a broader setting in which we find significant positive correlations between redemptions and credit line drawdowns for all REITs in our sample. We also find that REITs increase investments and dividend payouts and reduce cash in the four quarters after a drawdown. This seems to indicate that they use both their cash and the liquidity from credit lines to acquire properties and pay out dividends. During crises (Global Crisis and COVID-19) however, we find that REITs start building cash buffers and they discontinue investing, i.e. acquiring properties. In fact, 72 cents of each dollar drawn is used to increase cash holdings. In other words, REITs use bank credit lines like ‘working capital’ for business activities in normal times, but to hoard cash during stress times.
We next investigate the impact of higher credit line utilisation by REITs on banks. Unlike term loan exposures that banks report on their balance sheet and fund with capital, and whose potential risks they manage through loan loss provisions, credit lines are off-balance-sheet and funded with equity capital to a much lesser extent until drawn down. Moreover, the risk of simultaneous drawdowns by borrowers during widespread market stress may suddenly constrain bank capital and/or liquidity, thereby reducing the banks’ ability to intermediate effectively. Consistent with these channels, we find that banks with higher undrawn credit line commitments to REITs experience lower stock returns during crises (controlling for banks’ total credit line commitments).
Finally, we document that credit lines to REITs substantially increase banks’ capital requirements during aggregate stress periods. We estimate an expected (market-equity-based) capital shortfall under aggregate market stress (e.g. -40% correction to MSCI Global Index) vis-à-vis a benchmark capital requirement (e.g. 8% of market equity relative to market equity plus non-equity liabilities), by incorporating REIT and non-REIT credit lines in stress test scenarios. We compare three models: one treating all borrowers uniformly, one distinguishing REITs by their unique drawdown behaviour, and one considering direct on-balance-sheet CRE exposure. As of Q4 2023, we estimate that the incremental capital requirement for publicly traded US banks rises by approximately 20% — from $180 billion to $217 billion — primarily due to REIT drawdowns, while CRE exposures add only $2 billion. Notably, over 90% of this additional capital burden falls on large banks. These results highlight the systemic risks posed to banks, and in turn to the real economy, by REIT credit lines, underscoring the need for careful regulatory scrutiny.
While we have focused on publicly traded REITs, this raises broader questions about the growing linkages between banks and NBFIs. Acharya et al. (2024) document that NBFI drawdowns have risen from 25% in 2013 to over 50% post‐COVID, with private NBFIs accounting for nearly 60% of drawdowns by private firms (compared to 30% for public ones). Additionally, credit lines to NBFIs such as business development companies (BDCs) and collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) have increased from 28% to 42% of total bank credit to NBFIs between 2013 and 2023. Given that private NBFIs generally exhibit higher credit line utilisation rates than REITs, stress in their funding conditions could similarly affect banks via the credit line channel. In essence, as NBFIs continue to expand their role in credit intermediation, their continuing reliance on banks for contingent liquidity highlights a critical channel through which risks may be transmitted back to the banking system.
Acharya, V V, N Cetorelli and B Tuckman (2024), “Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?”, NBER Working Paper.
Acharya, V V, M Gopal, M Jager and S Steffen (2025), “Shadow Always Touches the Feet: Implications of Bank Credit Lines to Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries”, NBER Working Paper No. w33590.
Gupta, A, V Mittal and S Van Nieuwerburgh (2022), “Work from home and the office real estate apocalypse”, Working Paper, NYU Stern School of Business.
Hardin III, W and M Hill (2011), “Credit line availability and utilization in REITs”, Journal of Real Estate Research 33: 507–530.
Jiang, E X, G Matvos, T Piskorski and A Seru (2023), “Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility”, NBER Working Paper.
Mei, J and A Saunders (1995), “Bank risk and real estate: an asset pricing perspective”, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 10: 199–224.
Hong Kong’s finance chief has predicted the economy to post solid growth in the first quarter, while pledging to press on with plans to control government spending to maintain the city’s competitiveness.
Financial Secretary Paul Chan Mo-po gave his forecast on Sunday in the lead-up to this week’s announcement of gross domestic product (GDP) figures for the quarter.
He said the economy had benefited from the increase in tourist arrivals and exports between January and March, but warned of uncertainties in the global outlook amid an ongoing trade war.
“Driven by these positive factors, the advance estimates on GDP for the first quarter of 2025 to be released this week are expected to be robust,” he said in his weekly blog.
“But looking ahead, the bullying acts and the unilateral protectionism of the United States will continue to haunt the global economic outlook.”
Chan said the number of tourist arrivals in the first quarter had increased by 9 per cent year on year to 12.2 million, thanks to a series of mega-events and large-scale international meetings that boosted the performance of the retail and catering sectors.
Viewing insider transactions for Manx Financial Group PLC’s (LON:MFX ) over the last year, we see that insiders were net buyers. This means that a larger number of shares were purchased by insiders in relation to shares sold.
While insider transactions are not the most important thing when it comes to long-term investing, we would consider it foolish to ignore insider transactions altogether.
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The CEO & Director Douglas Grant made the biggest insider purchase in the last 12 months. That single transaction was for UK£245k worth of shares at a price of UK£0.15 each. So it’s clear an insider wanted to buy, even at a higher price than the current share price (being UK£0.14). Their view may have changed since then, but at least it shows they felt optimistic at the time. We always take careful note of the price insiders pay when purchasing shares. As a general rule, we feel more positive about a stock when an insider has bought shares at above current prices, because that suggests they viewed the stock as good value, even at a higher price. Douglas Grant was the only individual insider to buy during the last year.
The chart below shows insider transactions (by companies and individuals) over the last year. If you want to know exactly who sold, for how much, and when, simply click on the graph below!
See our latest analysis for Manx Financial Group
Manx Financial Group is not the only stock insiders are buying. So take a peek at this free list of under-the-radar companies with insider buying.
I like to look at how many shares insiders own in a company, to help inform my view of how aligned they are with insiders. Usually, the higher the insider ownership, the more likely it is that insiders will be incentivised to build the company for the long term. It appears that Manx Financial Group insiders own 36% of the company, worth about UK£6.1m. This level of insider ownership is good but just short of being particularly stand-out. It certainly does suggest a reasonable degree of alignment.
The fact that there have been no Manx Financial Group insider transactions recently certainly doesn’t bother us. But insiders have shown more of an appetite for the stock, over the last year. Insiders do have a stake in Manx Financial Group and their transactions don’t cause us concern. So these insider transactions can help us build a thesis about the stock, but it’s also worthwhile knowing the risks facing this company. Every company has risks, and we’ve spotted 3 warning signs for Manx Financial Group you should know about.
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