The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court docket started its first in-person day again after its lengthy COVID-19 absence Wednesday by listening to case about whether or not urine is “a grimy substance.”

In February of 2020, Angel O. Perez-Narvaez was arrested for working a car below the affect.  After his arrest, Perez-Narvaez refused to be fingerprinted and police positioned him in a holding cell after he refused to be fingerprinted. A state trooper checked on the person 5 hours later and, in keeping with courtroom paperwork, “found a multitude of moist rest room paper and urine inside and outdoors the cell.” The trooper proposed that Perez-Narvaez be criminally prosecuted for his actions.

Native prosecutors agreed and charged Perez-Narvaez with defacing a constructing below an 1851 Massachusetts state statute.

The charging regulation, which units out a penalty of as much as 5 years in jail, reads as follows:

Part 103. Whoever wilfully, deliberately and with out proper throws into, in opposition to or upon a dwelling home, workplace, store or different constructing, or vessel, or places or locations therein or thereon oil of vitriol, coal tar or different noxious or filthy substance, with intent unlawfully to injure, deface or defile such dwelling home, workplace, store, constructing or vessel, or any property therein, shall be punished by imprisonment within the state jail for no more than 5 years or in jail for no more than two and one half years or by a tremendous of no more than 300 {dollars}.

Perez-Narvaez moved to dismiss the cost earlier than trial and succeeded. The state appealed, and on attraction, the fees had been reinstated. Perez-Narvaez appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court docket, and on Wednesday, it heard oral arguments about whether or not urine is sufficiently “noxious or filthy” to fulfill the statutory necessities.

“In lots of different cultures, urine is taken into account a medicinal substance,” got here the primary remark from Justice Elspeth Cypher, who requested for background on the intent of the statute.

Throughout his portion of the 30-minute oral argument, Assistant District Andrew Covington supplied the courtroom with legislative historical past that appeared to underscore the distinction between the regulation’s authentic intent and its present use.

Covington defined that the regulation was first enacted in 1851 “in direct response to the temperance motion.” On the time, Covington mentioned, political dissenters would throw bottles crammed with coal tar or sulfuric acid (identified on the time as “oil of vitriol”) into homes of those that supported the temperance motion. These substances, defined Covington, would trigger “nice catastrophe to furnishings, rugs, objects in the home,” and, “This statute is a direct results of that.” Covington argued that the legislature then supposed to broaden the statute’s attain by together with reference to “noxious or filthy substance” —which would come with human urine.

Covington remarked that he doesn’t imagine there may be any ambiguity within the statute, and subsequently, there is no such thing as a must look again on the authentic legislative intent. Urine, Covington mentioned, is simply as “noxious and filthy” right this moment because it had been within the mid 1800s.

Justice Dalila Wendlandt appeared skeptical about Covington’s statutory interpretation. “They didn’t have urine?” Wendlandt requested about nineteenth century protesters, ostensibly to make the purpose that the legislature may need referenced that substance if it meant to criminalize it.

Covington responded that if political dissenters in 1851 had thrown bottles of urine into a house, “the statute would nonetheless get you right here.”

“Wouldn’t it trigger as a lot harm? Wouldn’t it set a home on fireplace?” pressed the decide.

Covington responded that urine might unfold viruses or micro organism. He continued and argued that human urine is “a noxious and filthy substance,” and that the statute ought to apply, as a result of Perez-Narvaez particularly supposed to injure state police property.

Justice Serge Georges Jr. raised issues concerning the statute’s broadest functions. “This can be a felony proper?” Georges requested. “May somebody be charged in the event that they had been engaged in public urination on the aspect of somebody’s home?”

Covington responded that such an instance, during which an individual was “simply relieving him or herself” would lack the particular intent required by the statute.

“What’s the proof of intent right here?” requested Georges.

“The precise intent is that he had a bathroom to make use of proper subsequent to him,” replied Covington.

“Have you ever ever been to a Patriots sport?” Justice Frank Gaziano requested in response. “If there’s a line on the port-a-potty, and somebody decides to not use one and relieves himself close to a car or one thing, is {that a} crime?”

Covington allowed that Gaziano’s instance wouldn’t be a criminal offense.

“Let the report mirror,” Gaziano joked, “that my expertise was at an Eagles sport in Philadelphia, not at a Patriots sport.”

“I’m certain it wasn’t you, although,” a fellow justice chuckled.

“No, it wasn’t me,” Gaziano affirmed.

When Rachel Rose, lawyer for Perez-Narvaez, took the rostrum, the temper within the courtroom turned markedly extra severe. Rose mentioned that the unique statute was enacted “below a political terror marketing campaign” virtually 200 years in the past, and that Covington was suggesting “a imprecise and almost limitless interpretation.”

Rose framed the difficulty earlier than the justices: “the  downside is that there’s no standardized definition as to what makes one thing ‘gross.”” “What rises to the extent of ‘disgustingly soiled’ — as anybody who has had roommates is aware of— varies significantly from individual to individual,” continued Rose.

Perez-Narvaez’s attraction is happening at a pre-trial section, which signifies that the courtroom is not going to determine whether or not the urination in query did in actual fact violate the statute. Relatively, the courtroom will determine whether or not an inexpensive courtroom might convict Perez-Narvaez below the statute.

Rose mentioned in an electronic mail to Regulation&Crime Thursday:

I and different legal professionals who’ve reached out to me are involved concerning the latest revival of this regulation, apparently dormant for over a century and now being utilized to conditions so distinct from the residential assaults utilizing harmful chemical compounds that prompted its enactment.  Whether or not the Commonwealth has the proper to cost any type of intentional property soiling as a 5-year felony impacts not solely my consumer, however all Massachusetts residents who had been below the impression they didn’t reside in a police state.

[image via Timothy A. Clary/AFP via Getty Images]

Editor’s Be aware: This piece was up to date from its authentic model to incorporate remark from counsel.

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