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Sir Keir Starmer has won a huge parliamentary majority on strikingly thin support. Labour won only 34 per cent of the vote. The shift in support for the Conservatives since its big victory in 2019 also underlines the electorate’s extreme fickleness.

Perhaps most disturbing, a new report, Damaged Politics? from the National Centre for Social Research, argues that “Trust and confidence in governments are as low as they have ever been.” The details are sobering: “45 per cent would ‘almost never’ trust British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own political party”; “58 per cent would ‘almost never’ trust politicians of any party in Britain to tell the truth when they are in a tight corner”; and 71 per cent think the economy is worse off because of Brexit, the flagship policy of the Tory government.

The challenge for Labour is not just to govern well, but also to restore trust in doing so. If it fails to do both, there has to be a good chance that it will be swept out of power next time. When trust in respectable policy and conventional politics collapses a large proportion of the electorate will embrace promises from mendacious demagogues. Yet the dangers of that form of politics have been perfectly revealed in the fate of the last government.

Thus, curtailing trade with the UK’s closest neighbour and biggest market could never have made it richer. An interesting recent paper, “Levelling Up by Levelling Down”, reaches three sobering conclusions: first, the overall output losses of Brexit (relative to a synthetic counterfactual) are at least 5 percentage points of GDP; second, Brexit did reduce regional inequality, but did so by “levelling down” — that is, damaging — prosperous regions more than less prosperous ones; and, third, support for right-wing populist parties rose in regions that experienced Brexit-related output losses. Thus, the losses caused by populist lies can benefit the politicians who propound them.

Yet this has not helped the Conservatives, because they cannot play the populist card as well as a Nigel Farage can. They also need the support of people who expect a governing party to show decency, sobriety, seriousness, reliability and competence.

Now comes Starmer. The big question is whether he can restore trust by delivering results, the only way likely to work in the long run. He has gained power not only because of the evident failures of the previous government, but also because of the exceptionally poor performance of the economy since the 2007-09 financial crisis, followed by the losses caused by Brexit, the pandemic and the “cost of living crisis”. The Conservatives had no answer to the former and were battered brutally by the latter three.

Starmer’s challenge, and that of his chancellor Rachel Reeves, is quite simple: he has promised to make things better while also changing very little. This caution was self-evidently excessive and will now make it far harder to govern.

One immediate problem caused by such caution arises from the imperative to improve public services, especially the National Health Service and local government. How will this be possible in an idling economy without borrowing more or raising more than a trivial amount in extra taxes? Yes, Labour might be lucky. Maybe the passing of all the recent shocks and the appearance of a stable government will be enough to reignite growth. But what if it is not?

My colleague, Robert Shrimsley, has argued that this may be the last chance for “centrism” in the UK. Alternatively, it might be the last chance for any government that tries to deliver results, rather than just channel anger. This government then must actually deliver those results.

As former Bank of England chief economist Andy Haldane argues, they will need to take some bold steps. I would stress coming much closer to the EU, radically liberalising planning, relaxing regulations, supporting innovation, decentralising power, reforming taxation, strengthening the pension system, enabling life-long learning, rationalising immigration, and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public services and administration. They are also going to have to raise taxes, including by reforming the taxation of land and replacing fuel duty with a tax on emissions of greenhouse gases.

The difficulty is that none of this will be easy and parts of it have been ruled out in advance. But breaking promises would further worsen the lack of trust they have inherited. This then is the trap that past failures and Labour’s promises have created. It is of huge importance that Starmer finds a way out of it.

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The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a landmark decision that presidents have absolute immunity for their core constitutional powers.

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The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a landmark decision that presidents have absolute immunity for their core constitutional powers.

Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court found presidents have absolute immunity for exercising their core constitutional powers and are entitled to a presumption of immunity for other official acts. The court also ruled that presidents do not have immunity for unofficial acts.

Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Harry Litman said he was “horrified” by the opinion and added “It seems to me to restructure and reconfigure the whole relationship between the executive branch and the other branches.”

The team at NPR’s Trump’s Trials podcast broke down what this decision means and how it may affect Trump’s legal cases.

Former President Donald Trump with attorneys Todd Blanche and Emil Bove attends his criminal trial at Manhattan Criminal Court on May 29, 2024, in New York.

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1. Core constitutional powers

The Supreme Court found that presidents have absolute immunity for “core constitutional powers.” This references certain powers given to the president in Article II of the Constitution, which includes being the commander in chief of the military, the ability to pardon individuals and appointing ambassadors and judges to the Supreme Court.

This means that even if the president does something that is considered illegal while exercising those core powers, he or she cannot be prosecuted for that action.

2. Official acts and presumption of immunity

The court also ruled that Trump “is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts.”

What is an official act? It’s the parts of the president’s job that don’t fall under Article II, like holding press conferences or speaking with foreign leaders.

Then there’s the presumption of immunity. The court is basically saying the president deserves the benefit of the doubt when it comes to immunity for official acts and, therefore, the bar is really high to prove otherwise. Litman said the path to overcome the presumption of immunity is unknown “because [the court] gave such sketchy guidance.”

What is known is that if an action is deemed “official,” DOJ special counsel Jack Smith, who is leading the cases against Trump over federal election interference and classified documents, will have to prove that prosecuting said conduct does not infringe on the “authority and functions of the executive branch.”

3. Unofficial acts

The court did say there are actions that can be prosecuted, they just have to be unrelated to the president’s official duties. This likely won’t be a cut-and-dried situation when it comes to parsing out which of Trump’s actions were official or unofficial. To make matters more complicated, Litman explained:

“One big problem here is the court has said when you’re deciding — even if it’s an unofficial act — you cannot take into account any evidence of conduct that would be an official act.”

Meaning that even if the act is deemed unofficial and therefore open for prosecution, Smith will not be allowed to use certain evidence if that evidence is of an official nature. The court also ruled, “courts may not inquire into the President’s motives,” so the reasoning behind any potential criminal act conducted by a president doesn’t matter and cannot be presented in a trial.

“Even things that seem very clearly unofficial could be hard to prove that they are and could always give rise to an argument that they are [official],” Litman said.

4. How this applies to Trump’s legal cases

The court’s decision is a legal win for Trump. It further delays his federal election interference case, ensuring it will not go to trial this year. It also complicates the work of prosecutors in D.C., Florida and Georgia who are working on the other pending criminal cases he is facing. They will have to go through their cases and determine whether Trump does or does not have immunity related to 54 criminal counts he faces in the three remaining cases.

“For Jack Smith’s two cases [federal election interference and classified documents case], they’re hurting, but not certainly dead,” said Litman.

This decision is also impacting Trump’s conviction in the New York hush money case. Trump was scheduled to be sentenced on July 11 after being found guilty on 34 criminal charges. But that sentencing is now delayed until Sept. 18 at the earliest.

The bulk of the criminal actions in the hush money case did take place before Trump was president, but Litman, who attended parts of the trial, said some of the evidence against Trump is from actions after he became president. Trump’s defense team can now potentially argue that evidence should be thrown out because of the court’s ruling.

“I don’t think Judge [Juan] Merchan will credit those arguments enough to say there should be a new trial,” Litman said, speaking of the judge in that case.

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Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.

“Our victory is only postponed.” Marine Le Pen put a brave face on the defeat for her far-right Rassemblement National party in France’s parliamentary election on Sunday. In reality, third place for the RN, according to provisional results, is a bitter disappointment. The party thought it would finally have the opportunity to show the French people it could govern, giving the party a springboard for the more important 2027 presidential election. But French voters turned out in droves to stop them.

One reason was that the RN proved to be not so detoxified, fielding candidates with extremist backgrounds or a record of racist and antisemitic statements. But more importantly, France’s so-called republican front — the willingness of its centrist and leftwing parties to join forces to thwart the far-right’s rise to power — proved resilient. The RN depicts this as a cynical game by the political establishment to lock it out of power. Voters, though, went along with it.

That alone will allow President Emmanuel Macron to argue that his election gamble (his allies prefer to call it a rational strategy worthy of Descartes) in the end paid off. He can say he broke the populist fever gripping the country, interrupting the far-right’s seemingly inexorable rise. Furthermore, his Ensemble alliance of centrist parties has performed considerably better than expected, coming in a strong second place. That keeps the centrists in the political game when at one stage they appeared to be heading for a rout.

However, Macron wanted a snap election with a lightning three-week campaign to be a moment of political “clarification” for France. It has provided anything but. Voters showed what they were against but not what they were for. The country now faces months, possibly years, of political uncertainty and unstable government. That in itself is bad news for France and its European partners.

France seems to be turning the clock back to the 4th Republic, the politically volatile postwar period when the presidency was weaker and a raucous parliament was supreme. In the past few weeks power has drained away from the Elysée palace to the National Assembly. A hitherto micromanaging president has been relegated to a back-seat role — symbolically, he made no appearance on Sunday night, instead issuing a statement saying he would await the “structuring” of forces in parliament before taking the “necessary decisions”.

Furthermore, Sunday’s vote was above all a victory for the leftwing Nouveau Front Populaire, formed in four days behind a radical tax-and-spend programme after Macron’s shock dissolution of parliament. It was the left that spearheaded an electoral pact to bar the far-right, which saved scores of seats for the centrists. After the first round it swiftly withdrew its third-placed candidates from three-way contests in seats across the country to prevent a split in the anti-RN vote, while the leaders of Macron’s alliance prevaricated (although their candidates did mostly follow suit).

As the largest bloc, the NFP will lay claim to the premiership and the right to form a government. That will be enough to unnerve markets, given its planned massive spending increases financed, in theory, by swingeing tax rises on the wealthy. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the belligerent leader of the far-left La France Insoumise, the biggest of the four parties in the NFP, said there could be no compromise on the left’s programme. But the NFP will fall well short of a governing majority. Suggestions on Sunday that it could implement its plans by decree smack of election night exuberance.

Macron’s camp is hoping that the left will eventually fragment under the strain of Melénchon’s intransigence and that it could then try to assemble some sort of coalition with the socialists, greens and other moderates. This could take weeks if not months. Even if the numbers add up, and it looks a stretch, the centre-left are likely to ask a high price — such as reversing Macron’s rise in the pension age from 62 to 64 or reimposing a wealth tax on financial assets — and will want the government under their control.

If there is no path to a majority, Macron may have to install a caretaker premier with a minimal mandate until fresh elections can be called in one-year’s time. With three more or less evenly sized political blocs unwilling to work with each other, France seems ungovernable. Throughout the forthcoming turmoil we can expect Le Pen and her number two Jordan Bardella to present themselves as the only alternative offering order and stability. Sunday’s defeat may then only look like a temporary setback.