Finance
Fluent Announces First Quarter 2022 Financial Results
-
Q1 2022 income of $89.1 million, up 27% over Q1 2021
-
Web lack of $2.0 million, or $0.02 per share
-
Gross revenue (unique of depreciation and amortization) of $21.5 million, a rise of 12% over Q1 2021 and representing 24.1% of income for the three months ended March 31, 2022
-
Media margin of $26.0 million, up 4% over Q1 2021 and representing 29.1% of income for the three months ended March 31, 2022
-
Adjusted EBITDA of $4.8 million, representing 5.3% of income for the three months ended March 31, 2022
-
Adjusted web revenue of $1.1 million, or $0.01 per share
NEW YORK, Might 09, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Fluent, Inc. (NASDAQ: FLNT), a number one data-driven efficiency advertising firm, at present reported monetary outcomes for the primary quarter ended March 31, 2022.
Don Patrick, Fluent’s Chief Govt Officer, commented, “Our First Quarter outcomes symbolize the continued progress we’re making in the direction of our long-term strategic progress plan – targeted on constructing prime quality digital experiences for shoppers whereas creating simpler, environment friendly, and scalable buyer acquisition options for entrepreneurs. We proceed to lean into alternatives the place we are able to set up and leverage Fluent model credentials within the market.
We stay assured that this consumer-centric technique represents the profitable highway ahead and enhances our aggressive benefit, and in the end constructing enterprise worth for our stakeholders. It’s foundational that Fluent creates significant downstream experiences for our shoppers and increasing {our relationships} with world-class manufacturers in key business verticals; whereas efficiently positioning us as leaders in an business setting that continues to quickly evolve.”
First Quarter Monetary Abstract
-
Q1 2022 income of $89.1 million, up 27% over Q1 2021
-
Web lack of $2.0 million or $0.02 per share, in comparison with web lack of $6.3 million, or $0.08 per share, in Q1 2021
-
Gross revenue (unique of depreciation and amortization) of $21.5 million, a rise of 12% over Q1 2021 and representing 24.1% of income for the three months ended March 31, 2022
-
Media margin of $26.0 million, a rise of 4% over Q1 2021 and representing 29.1% of income for the three months ended March 31, 2022
-
Adjusted EBITDA of $4.8 million, representing 5.3% of income for the three months ended March 31, 2022
-
Adjusted web revenue of $1.1 million, or $0.01 per share
Media margin, adjusted EBITDA and adjusted web revenue are non-GAAP monetary measures, as outlined and reconciled under.
Enterprise Outlook
-
Strategic shopper relationships driving sturdy demand within the Fluent efficiency market
-
Monetization, as measured by media margin per registration, is up 50% in Q1’22 vs. Q1’21 enabled by improved high quality of visitors, enhanced CRM capabilities and investments in know-how and analytics
-
Growing media footprint whereas extending our attain into new media channels growth to supply extra related content material and presents for shoppers and our manufacturers
-
Newer income streams are producing incremental progress alternatives and enhancing lifetime worth of shoppers on our platform, decreasing reliance on visitors quantity for income progress
-
We anticipate continued progress, with enhanced shopper experiences and media optimizations yielding margin growth over time
Convention Name
Fluent, Inc. will host a convention name on Monday, Might 9, 2022, at 4:30 PM ET to debate its 2022 first quarter monetary outcomes. To hearken to the convention name in your phone, please dial (844) 200-6205 (US), (226) 828-7575 (Canada), or +1 (929) 526-1599 for worldwide callers, and use the participant entry code 796097. To entry the reside audio webcast, go to the Fluent web site at buyers.fluentco.com. Please login a minimum of quarter-hour previous to the beginning of the decision to make sure sufficient time for any downloads that could be required. Following completion of the earnings name, a recorded replay of the webcast might be obtainable for these unable to take part. To hearken to the phone replay, please dial (929) 458-6194 (US), (226) 828-7578 (Canada) or +44 204-525-0658 with the replay passcode 911823. The replay will even be obtainable for one week on the Fluent web site at buyers.fluentco.com.
About Fluent, Inc.
Fluent (NASDAQ: FLNT) is a number one data-driven efficiency advertising firm with experience in creating significant connections between shoppers and types. Leveraging our proprietary first-party database of opted-in shopper profiles, Fluent drives clever progress methods that ship superior outcomes. Based in 2010, the corporate is headquartered in New York Metropolis. For extra data, go to www.fluentco.com.
Secure Harbor Assertion Below the Personal Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
The issues contained on this press launch could also be thought-about to be “forward-looking statements” inside the which means of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Change Act of 1934. These statements embrace statements relating to the intent, perception or present expectations or anticipations of Fluent and members of our administration crew. Components at the moment identified to administration that would trigger precise outcomes to vary materially from these in forward-looking statements embrace the next:
-
Compliance with a major variety of governmental legal guidelines and laws, together with these legal guidelines and laws relating to privateness and knowledge;
-
The result of litigation, regulatory investigations or different authorized proceedings during which we’re concerned or could change into concerned; failure to safeguard the non-public data and different knowledge contained in our database;
-
Failure to adequately defend mental property rights or allegations of infringement of mental property rights;
-
Unfavorable world financial circumstances, together with on account of well being and security considerations across the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic;
-
Dependence on our key personnel;
-
Dependence on third-party service suppliers;
-
Administration of the expansion of our operations, together with worldwide growth and the mixing of acquired enterprise models or personnel;
-
The influence of the Visitors High quality Initiative, together with our means to exchange decrease high quality shopper visitors with visitors that meets our high quality necessities;
-
Means to compete and handle media prices in an business characterised by rapidly-changing web media and promoting know-how, evolving business requirements;
-
Regulatory uncertainty, and altering consumer and shopper calls for; administration of unfavorable publicity and damaging public notion about our business;
-
Failure to compete successfully towards different on-line advertising and promoting firms;
-
The competitors we face for net visitors;
-
Dependence on third-party publishers, web search suppliers and social media platforms for a good portion of tourists to our web sites;
-
Dependence on emails, textual content messages and phone calls, amongst different channels, to achieve customers for advertising functions;
-
Legal responsibility associated to actions of third-party publishers;
-
Limitations on our or our third-party publishers’ means to gather and use knowledge derived from consumer actions;
-
Means to stay aggressive with the shift to cellular functions;
-
Failure to detect click-through or different fraud on commercials;
-
The influence of elevated success prices;
-
Failure to fulfill our purchasers’ efficiency metrics or altering wants;
-
Compliance with the covenants of our credit score settlement; and
-
The potential for failures in our inner management over monetary reporting.
These and extra elements to be thought-about are set forth below “Threat Components” in our Annual Report on Kind 10-Okay for the fiscal yr ended December 31, 2021 and in our different filings with the Securities and Change Fee. Fluent undertakes no obligation to replace or revise forward-looking statements to mirror modified assumptions, the incidence of unanticipated occasions or modifications to future working outcomes or expectations.
FLUENT, INC. |
||||||||
March 31, |
December 31, |
|||||||
ASSETS: |
||||||||
Money and money equivalents |
$ |
28,944 |
$ |
34,467 |
||||
Accounts receivable, web of allowance for uncertain accounts of $368 and $313, respectively |
65,023 |
70,228 |
||||||
Pay as you go bills and different present property |
2,138 |
2,505 |
||||||
Complete present property |
96,105 |
107,200 |
||||||
Property and tools, web |
1,298 |
1,457 |
||||||
Working lease right-of-use property |
6,369 |
6,805 |
||||||
Intangible property, web |
34,938 |
35,747 |
||||||
Goodwill |
166,180 |
165,088 |
||||||
Different non-current property |
1,905 |
1,885 |
||||||
Complete property |
$ |
306,795 |
$ |
318,182 |
||||
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY: |
||||||||
Accounts payable |
$ |
12,782 |
$ |
16,130 |
||||
Accrued bills and different present liabilities |
28,823 |
33,932 |
||||||
Deferred income |
701 |
651 |
||||||
Present portion of long-term debt |
5,000 |
5,000 |
||||||
Present portion of working lease legal responsibility |
2,228 |
2,227 |
||||||
Complete present liabilities |
49,534 |
57,940 |
||||||
Lengthy-term debt, web |
39,147 |
40,329 |
||||||
Working lease legal responsibility |
5,213 |
5,692 |
||||||
Different non-current liabilities |
726 |
811 |
||||||
Complete liabilities |
94,620 |
104,772 |
||||||
Contingencies (Notice 10) |
||||||||
Shareholders’ fairness: |
||||||||
Most well-liked inventory — $0.0001 par worth, 10,000,000 Shares licensed; Shares excellent — 0 shares for each intervals |
— |
— |
||||||
Frequent inventory — $0.0005 par worth, 200,000,000 Shares licensed; Shares issued — 83,983,587 and 83,057,083, respectively; and Shares excellent — 79,683,435 and 78,965,260, respectively (Notice 7) |
42 |
42 |
||||||
Treasury inventory, at price — 4,300,152 and 4,091,823 Shares, respectively (Notice 7) |
(11,171 |
) |
(10,723 |
) |
||||
Further paid-in capital |
420,285 |
419,059 |
||||||
Accrued deficit |
(196,981 |
) |
(194,968 |
) |
||||
Complete shareholders’ fairness |
212,175 |
213,410 |
||||||
Complete liabilities and shareholders’ fairness |
$ |
306,795 |
$ |
318,182 |
FLUENT, INC. |
||||||||
Three Months Ended March 31, |
||||||||
2022 |
2021 |
|||||||
Income |
$ |
89,063 |
$ |
70,170 |
||||
Prices and bills: |
||||||||
Value of income (unique of depreciation and amortization) |
67,562 |
50,990 |
||||||
Gross sales and advertising |
3,852 |
2,961 |
||||||
Product improvement |
4,556 |
3,434 |
||||||
Basic and administrative |
11,287 |
11,699 |
||||||
Depreciation and amortization |
3,307 |
3,373 |
||||||
Write-off of intangible property |
128 |
— |
||||||
Complete prices and bills |
90,692 |
72,457 |
||||||
Loss from operations |
(1,629 |
) |
(2,287 |
) |
||||
Curiosity expense, web |
(384 |
) |
(1,008 |
) |
||||
Loss on early extinguishment of debt |
— |
(2,964 |
) |
|||||
Loss earlier than revenue taxes |
(2,013 |
) |
(6,259 |
) |
||||
Earnings tax profit |
— |
1 |
||||||
Web loss |
$ |
(2,013 |
) |
$ |
(6,258 |
) |
||
Fundamental and diluted loss per share: |
||||||||
Fundamental |
$ |
(0.02 |
) |
$ |
(0.08 |
) |
||
Diluted |
$ |
(0.02 |
) |
$ |
(0.08 |
) |
||
Weighted common variety of shares excellent: |
||||||||
Fundamental |
80,889,052 |
81,892,593 |
||||||
Diluted |
80,889,052 |
81,892,593 |
FLUENT, INC. |
||||||||
Three Months Ended March 31, |
||||||||
2022 |
2021 |
|||||||
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES: |
||||||||
Web loss |
$ |
(2,013 |
) |
$ |
(6,258 |
) |
||
Changes to reconcile web loss to web money (utilized in) supplied by working actions: |
||||||||
Depreciation and amortization |
3,307 |
3,373 |
||||||
Non-cash mortgage amortization expense |
68 |
202 |
||||||
Share-based compensation expense |
988 |
1,231 |
||||||
Non-cash loss on early extinguishment of debt |
— |
2,198 |
||||||
Non-cash accrued compensation expense for Put/Name Consideration |
— |
1,746 |
||||||
Write-off of intangible property |
128 |
— |
||||||
Provision for dangerous debt |
81 |
(99 |
) |
|||||
Modifications in property and liabilities, web of enterprise acquisition: |
||||||||
Accounts receivable |
5,127 |
4,764 |
||||||
Pay as you go bills and different present property |
451 |
(868 |
) |
|||||
Different non-current property |
(13 |
) |
(196 |
) |
||||
Working lease property and liabilities, web |
(42 |
) |
(45 |
) |
||||
Accounts payable |
(3,348 |
) |
5,792 |
|||||
Accrued bills and different present liabilities |
(6,251 |
) |
(7,393 |
) |
||||
Deferred income |
(174 |
) |
562 |
|||||
Different |
(85 |
) |
(32 |
) |
||||
Web money (utilized in) supplied by working actions |
(1,776 |
) |
4,977 |
|||||
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES: |
||||||||
Capitalized prices included in intangible property |
(1,071 |
) |
(816 |
) |
||||
Enterprise acquisition, web of money acquired |
(971 |
) |
— |
|||||
Acquisition of property and tools |
(7 |
) |
(20 |
) |
||||
Web money utilized in investing actions |
(2,049 |
) |
(836 |
) |
||||
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES: |
||||||||
Proceeds from issuance of long-term debt, web of debt financing prices |
— |
49,624 |
||||||
Repayments of long-term debt |
(1,250 |
) |
(41,736 |
) |
||||
Train of inventory choices |
— |
934 |
||||||
Prepayment penalty on debt extinguishment |
— |
(766 |
) |
|||||
Taxes paid associated to web share settlement of vesting of restricted inventory models |
(448 |
) |
(624 |
) |
||||
Web money (utilized in) supplied by financing actions |
(1,698 |
) |
7,432 |
|||||
Web (lower) improve in money, money equivalents and restricted money |
(5,523 |
) |
11,573 |
|||||
Money, money equivalents and restricted money at starting of interval |
34,467 |
22,567 |
||||||
Money, money equivalents and restricted money at finish of interval |
$ |
28,944 |
$ |
34,140 |
||||
Definitions, Reconciliations and Makes use of of Non-GAAP Monetary Measures
The next non-GAAP measures are used on this launch:
Media margin is outlined as that portion of gross revenue (unique of depreciation and amortization) reflecting variable prices paid for media and associated bills and excluding non-media price of income. Gross revenue (unique of depreciation and amortization) represents income minus price of income (unique of depreciation and amortization). Media margin can be introduced as proportion of income.
Adjusted EBITDA is outlined as web (loss) revenue excluding (1) revenue taxes, (2) curiosity expense, web, (3) depreciation and amortization, (4) share-based compensation expense, (5) loss on early extinguishment of debt, (6) accrued compensation expense for Put/Name Consideration, (7) goodwill impairment, (8) write-off of intangible property, (9) acquisition-related prices, (10) restructuring and different severance prices, and (11) sure litigation and different associated prices.
Adjusted web revenue is outlined as web (loss) revenue excluding (1) share-based compensation expense, (2) loss on early extinguishment of debt, (3) accrued compensation expense for Put/Name Consideration, (4) goodwill impairment, (5) write-off of intangible property, (6) acquisition-related prices, (7) restructuring and different severance prices, and (8) sure litigation and different associated prices. Adjusted web revenue can be introduced on a per share (primary and diluted) foundation.
Under is a reconciliation of media margin from web loss, which we imagine is probably the most immediately comparable GAAP measure.
Three Months Ended March 31, |
||||||||
2022 |
2021 |
|||||||
Income |
$ |
89,063 |
$ |
70,170 |
||||
Much less: Value of income (unique of depreciation and amortization) |
67,562 |
50,990 |
||||||
Gross revenue (unique of depreciation and amortization) |
$ |
21,501 |
$ |
19,180 |
||||
Gross revenue (unique of depreciation and amortization) % of income |
24 |
% |
27 |
% |
||||
Non-media price of income (1) |
4,449 |
5,690 |
||||||
Media margin |
$ |
25,950 |
$ |
24,870 |
||||
Media margin % of income |
29.1 |
% |
35.4 |
% |
(1) Represents the portion of price of income (unique of depreciation and amortization) not attributable to variable prices paid for media and associated bills.
Under is a reconciliation of adjusted EBITDA from web loss, which we imagine is probably the most immediately comparable GAAP measure.
Three Months Ended March 31, |
||||||||
2022 |
2021 |
|||||||
Web loss |
$ |
(2,013 |
) |
$ |
(6,258 |
) |
||
Earnings tax expense (profit) |
— |
(1 |
) |
|||||
Curiosity expense, web |
384 |
1,008 |
||||||
Depreciation and amortization |
3,307 |
3,373 |
||||||
Share-based compensation expense |
988 |
1,231 |
||||||
Loss on early extinguishment of debt |
— |
2,964 |
||||||
Accrued compensation expense for Put/Name Consideration |
— |
1,746 |
||||||
Write-off of intangible property |
128 |
— |
||||||
Acquisition-related prices (1) |
558 |
— |
||||||
Sure litigation and different associated prices |
1,402 |
668 |
||||||
Adjusted EBITDA |
$ |
4,754 |
$ |
4,731 |
(1) Contains compensation expense associated to the non-competition agreements entered into on account of an acquisition.
Under is a reconciliation of adjusted web revenue and adjusted web revenue per share from web (loss) revenue, which we imagine is probably the most immediately comparable GAAP measure.
Three Months Ended March 31, |
||||||||
(In hundreds, besides share knowledge) |
2022 |
2021 |
||||||
Web loss |
$ |
(2,013 |
) |
$ |
(6,258 |
) |
||
Share-based compensation expense |
988 |
1,231 |
||||||
Loss on early extinguishment of debt |
— |
2,964 |
||||||
Accrued compensation expense for Put/Name Consideration |
— |
1,746 |
||||||
Write-off of intangible property |
128 |
— |
||||||
Acquisition-related prices (1) |
558 |
— |
||||||
Sure litigation and different associated prices |
1,402 |
668 |
||||||
Adjusted web revenue |
$ |
1,063 |
$ |
351 |
||||
Adjusted web revenue per share: |
||||||||
Fundamental |
$ |
0.01 |
$ |
0.00 |
||||
Diluted |
$ |
0.01 |
$ |
0.00 |
||||
Weighted common variety of shares excellent: |
||||||||
Fundamental |
80,889,052 |
81,892,593 |
||||||
Diluted |
80,889,052 |
84,144,209 |
(1) Contains compensation expense associated to the non-competition agreements entered into on account of an acquisition.
We current media margin, as a proportion of income, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted web revenue and adjusted web revenue per share as supplemental measures of our monetary and working efficiency as a result of we imagine they supply helpful data to buyers. Extra particularly:
Media margin, as outlined above, is a measure of the effectivity of the Firm’s working mannequin. We use media margin and the associated measure of media margin as a proportion of income as main metrics to measure the monetary return on our media and associated prices, particularly to measure the diploma by which the income generated from our digital advertising providers exceeds the associated fee to draw the shoppers to whom presents are made by means of our providers. Media margin is used extensively by our administration to handle our working efficiency, together with evaluating operational efficiency towards budgeted media margin and understanding the effectivity of our media and associated expenditures. We additionally use media margin for efficiency evaluations and compensation choices relating to sure personnel.
Adjusted EBITDA, as outlined above, is one other main metric by which we consider the working efficiency of our enterprise, on which sure working expenditures and inner budgets are primarily based and by which, along with media margin and different elements, our senior administration is compensated. The primary three changes symbolize the standard definition of EBITDA, and the remaining changes are objects acknowledged and recorded below GAAP particularly intervals however is likely to be considered as not essentially coinciding with the underlying enterprise operations for the intervals during which they’re so acknowledged and recorded. These changes embrace sure litigation and different associated prices related to authorized issues exterior the unusual course of enterprise, together with prices and accruals associated to the Tax Division, NY AG and FTC issues. Gadgets are thought-about one-time in nature if they’re non-recurring, rare or uncommon and haven’t occurred previously two years or aren’t anticipated to recur within the subsequent two years, in accordance with SEC guidelines. There have been no changes for one-time objects within the intervals introduced.
Adjusted web revenue, as outlined above, and the associated measure of adjusted web revenue per share exclude sure objects which are acknowledged and recorded below GAAP particularly intervals however is likely to be considered as not essentially coinciding with the underlying enterprise operations for the intervals during which they’re so acknowledged and recorded. We imagine adjusted web revenue affords buyers a distinct view of the general monetary efficiency of the Firm than adjusted EBITDA and the GAAP measure of web (loss) revenue.
Media margin, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted web revenue and adjusted web revenue per share are non-GAAP monetary measures with sure limitations relating to their usefulness. They don’t mirror our monetary ends in accordance with GAAP, as they don’t embrace the influence of sure bills which are mirrored in our condensed consolidated statements of operations. Accordingly, these metrics aren’t indicative of our general outcomes or indicators of previous or future monetary efficiency. Additional, they don’t seem to be monetary measures of profitability and are neither supposed for use as a proxy for the profitability of our enterprise nor to indicate profitability. The way in which we measure media margin, adjusted EBITDA and adjusted web revenue is probably not akin to equally titled measures introduced by different firms and is probably not an identical to corresponding measures utilized in our varied agreements.
Contact Info:
Investor Relations
Fluent, Inc.
(212) 785-0431
InvestorRelations@fluentco.com
Finance
COP29: Trillions Of Dollars To Be Mobilized For Climate Finance
World leaders are gathered in Baku, Azerbaijan, for the COP 29 on Climate Change. As the conference enters its final day tomorrow, the atmosphere is charged with anticipation. Will the leaders be able to conclude discussions on critical issues?
A document released by the UN this morning hints at progress in discussions on climate finance: while the exact figure remains undisclosed, it is mentioned that it will be in trillions of dollars. The decision on trillions of dollars is a positive step, as many experts have expressed concerns that a few billion dollars will be insufficient and will fall short of necessary action to address the urgency of climate change.
By the end of COP 29 , the world will hopefully get a new number. A lot has gone into deciding this number: 12 technical consultations and three high-level ministerial meetings. The final leg of the consultations is happening in Baku. It is worthwhile to take a look at the key items that came out of the draft document on finance today and the discussions that led to those decisions. Much of this document can be expected to feed into the final decision that comes out of COP 29.
A Decision On Trillions Of Dollars – The Quantum
What is a good number for a finance goal? Should the number be in billions or trillions? The draft text released today mentions that the amount will be in trillions. Although the exact number is unspecified.
One of the key outcomes expected from this year’s COP is this exact number which will become the new collective quantified goal, popularly referred to as NCQG. There is a high expectation that countries will be able to reach a consensus on a quantified number, which can be the North star to mobilize funds to address the urgency of climate change. It was during the COP in Copenhagen in 2009 that the earlier goal of mobilizing 100 billion per year was decied– an amount pledged by developed countries to support developing countries in addressing climate change by 2020. There are questions about whether that target was successfully met, with views from some countries that it was not met. The decision that came out today relfects this disagreement.
A few billion dollars would be unacceptable, according to Illiari Aragon, a specialist in UN Climate Negotiations, who has closely followed NCQG negotiations since they started. Many developing countries would be unsatisfied if a number of billions were proposed. In earlier talks, some numbers in billions were also floating around. Most estimations however point towards trillions. A number of at least 5 trillion, was estimated as being needed based on the Standard Committee of Finance of the United Nations as part of an assessment of needs proposed by countries in their Nationally Determined Contribution.
A Decision On The Contributor Base And Mandatory Obligations
Another key topic of discussion has been who contributes to the financial goal that comes out of COP 29. Some developed countries suggested expanding the donor base to also include countries like China and India. However, that was an unacceptable proposition, with media from India, based on interviews with experts, particularly reporting it would be unacceptable.
The new text released today goes away from the mandatory approach and adds flexibility to better reflect needs of developed and developing countries. The text states that it invites developing country Parties willing to contribute to the support mobilized to developing countries to do so voluntarily, with the condition that this voluntary contribution will not be included in the NCQG.
The document released today also states that it has been decided that there will be minimum allocation floors for the Least Developing Countries and Small Island developing countries of at least USD 220 billion and at least USD 39 billion, respectively. Deciding such a minimum allocation floor is a big step as these countries are particularly vulnerable to the extreme impacts of climate change. In March 2023, Malawi, in the African continent, was devastated by a tropical cyclone. Africa, according to some estimates, contributes to only 4% of global warming, but is particularly vulnerable to climate cahnge.
Some Decisions On Structure- What should be included?
The question regarding what types of finance will be classified as finance has been a key topic of discussion. The type of finance is crucial because it determines what kind of finance can really be aggregated to reach the big quantum goal.
In the negotiations so far, some countries suggested requiring funds to be channeled from the private sector as well. However, some parties questioned whether the private sector could be obligated to contribute to a goal and be made accountable for this goal. There were also discussion on grants versus loans. Many countries called for more grants and financing with higher concessional rates, reducing the repayment burden.
The document that came out today clarified both the above concerns. It states that the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will be mobilized through various sources, including public, private, innovative and alternative sources, noting the significant role of public funds. The decision to include the private sector is a significant step, as it provides an entry door for the private sector to be more actively involved in climate action. On grants and loans, the decision text states that a reasonable amount will be fixed in grants to developing countries, with significant progression in the provision. The decision on this allocation floor for grants, is also an essential consideration as it helps these countries to avoid being tied up in debt.
The decisions on climate finance published today during COP 29, which will act feed into the final decisions from COP 29, can add significant momentum to what is available for climate finance and action. They can also help build trust among many vulnerable countries in the power of multilateral decision-making process, showing that the world is indeed united in addressing global warming.
Finance
Unlocking Opportunities in the Age of Digital Finance
Emerging technologies like big data, AI and blockchain are reshaping finance. New products, such as platform finance, peer-to-peer lending and robo-advisory services, are examples of this transformation. These developments raise important questions: How concerned should traditional financial institutions be? What strategies can fintech and “techfin” (technology companies that move into financial services) disruptors adopt to secure their place in this evolving landscape?
There are two main threats to the traditional finance industry. The first comes from fintech companies. These firms offer specialised services, such as cryptocurrency-trading platforms like Robinhood or currency exchange services like Wise. Their strength lies in solving problems that traditional banks and wealth managers have yet to address or have chosen not to address given their cost and risk implications.
The second threat comes from techfin giants like Alibaba, Tencent and Google. These companies already have vast ecosystems of clients. They aren’t just offering new technology – they are providing financial services that compete directly with traditional banks. By leveraging their existing customer bases, they are gaining ground in the financial sector.
A common problem for traditional players is their belief that technology is simply a tool for improving efficiency. Banks often adopt digital solutions to compete with fintech and techfin firms, thinking that faster or cheaper services will suffice. However, this approach is flawed. It’s like putting an old product in new packaging. These disruptors aren’t just offering faster services – they’re solving needs that traditional banks are overlooking.
Evolving client expectations
One area where traditional players have fallen short is meeting the needs of investors who can’t afford the high entry costs set by banks. Fintech and techfin companies have successfully targeted these overlooked groups.
A prime example is Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao. It revolutionised stock market participation for millions of retail investors in China. Traditional banks set high transaction thresholds, effectively shutting out smaller investors. Yu’e Bao, however, saw the potential of pooling the contributions of millions of small investors. This approach allowed them to create a massive fund that allowed these individuals to access the markets. Traditional banks had missed this opportunity. The equivalent of Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao in a decentralised ecosystem is robo-advisors, which create financial inclusion for otherwise neglected retail investors.
These examples show that disruptors aren’t just using new technologies. They are changing the game entirely. By rethinking how financial services are delivered, fintech and techfin firms are offering access, flexibility and affordability in ways traditional institutions have not.
What can traditional players do?
For traditional financial institutions to remain competitive, they need to change their strategies. First, they should consider slimming down. The era of universal banks that try to do everything is over. Customers no longer want one-stop-shops – they seek tailored solutions.
Second, instead of offering only their own products, banks could bundle them with those of other providers. By acting more as advisors than product pushers, they can add value to clients. Rather than compete directly with fintech or techfin firms, banks could collaborate with them. Offering a diverse range of solutions would build trust with clients.
Finally, banks must stop demanding exclusivity from clients. Today’s customers prefer a multi-channel approach. They want the freedom to select from a variety of services across different platforms. Banks need to stop “locking in” clients with high exit fees and transaction costs. Instead, they should retain clients by offering real value. When clients feel free to come and go, they are more likely to stay because they know they’re receiving unbiased advice and products that meet their needs.
This would require taking an “open-platform” approach that focuses more on pulling customers in because they are attracted by the benefits of the ecosystem than locking them in or gating their exit. It is akin to Microsoft’s switch from a closed-source to an open-source model.
Do fintech and techfin have the winning formula?
While traditional players face their own challenges, fintech and techfin companies must also stay sharp. Though they excel at creating niche services, these disruptors often lack a broader understanding of the financial ecosystem. Many fintech and techfin firms are highly specialised. They know their products well, but they may not fully understand their competition or how to position themselves in the larger market.
For these disruptors, the key to long-term success lies in collaboration. By learning more about traditional players – and even partnering with them – fintech and techfin companies can position themselves for sustainable growth. Whether through alliances or by filling service gaps in traditional banks, fintech and techfin firms can benefit from a better understanding of their competitors and partners.
Learning from disruption
In a world of rapid technological change, financial professionals are seeking structured ways to navigate this evolving landscape. Programmes like INSEAD’s Strategic Management in Banking (SMB) offer a mix of theory and practical experience, helping participants understand current trends in the industry.
For example, SMB includes simulations that reflect real-world challenges. In one, participants work through a risk-management scenario using quantitative tools. In another, they engage in a leadership simulation that focuses on asking the right questions and understanding the numbers behind a buy-over deal. These experiences help bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical application.
Equally important are the networks built through such programmes. With participants coming from traditional banks, fintech and techfin firms, the environment encourages collaboration and mutual understanding – both of which are crucial in today’s interconnected financial world.
The next big wave in finance
Looking ahead, the next wave of disruption is unlikely to come from more advanced technology. Instead, it will likely stem from changing relationships between banks and their clients. The competitive advantage of traditional institutions will not come from technology alone. While price efficiencies are necessary, they are not enough.
What will set successful banks apart is their ability to connect with clients on a deeper level. Technology may speed up transactions, but it cannot replace the trust and human connection that are central to financial services. As behavioural finance continues to grow in importance, banks can move beyond managing money to managing client behaviour. Helping clients overcome biases that hinder their financial decisions will be key.
In the end, it’s not just about how fast or how efficient your services are. The future of finance lies in blending innovation with the timeless principles of trust, advice and human insight. Both traditional players and disruptors will need to find that balance if they hope to thrive in this new era.
Finance
U.S. Housing Finance Support At A Crossroads
If the incoming Trump Administration picks up where it left off, the last unfinished business of the 2008 financial crisis may soon be addressed. That business? Reforming a housing finance system that has been stuck in a sort of high-functioning limbo for more than 16 years.
Housing received considerable attention in the recent election, but that focus was on increasing supply, lowering prices, and providing downpayment help. Absent was a discussion about the federal agencies and programs that ensure ready access to loans for homeownership.
The U.S. housing finance system has largely recovered from the 2008 financial crisis, when the housing market collapsed. Contributing factors in the years leading up to the crisis included unsustainable home price increases, relaxed lending requirements, and an influx of subprime mortgages. Loosened lending was enabled by an increasingly sophisticated set of finance tools—mortgage-backed securities and related derivative products—used by lenders and Wall Street firms. That dynamic led to an expansion of mortgage availability that drove unsustainable house price increases.[1]
Rising prices led to a belief they would continue to rise, further inflating prices. All was well until prices peaked, and then declined, as high-risk borrowers found it difficult to refinance or sell to settle mortgage debts. Falling prices accelerated as default-driven homes for sale flooded the market. Weakened mortgage lenders then began defaulting on their own lines of credit. Wall Street quickly lost its appetite for risky mortgages and credit markets began to freeze. By late 2008, the seismic impacts of the U.S. housing downturn were being felt across the global economy.
In Washington D.C., policymakers authorized and executed on a series of legislative, regulatory, and operational reforms—often intended as triage-like treatments to stabilize the system—to ensure continued strong mortgage market liquidity. A complete market meltdown was prevented.
Since then, however, the system has progressed without a cohesive and comprehensive reconsideration. Instead, mortgage guarantee agencies and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have adapted their operations and processes to meet evolving market circumstances, but only on the margin. That could change if the incoming administration decides to continue efforts the first Trump Administration initiated in 2019 to overhaul the system.
Beyond addressing housing finance, there is also a need to expand the supply and affordability of housing by making it easier to provide more types of housing in places where people want to live. A common thread through the nation’s housing affordability crisis is the fact that the supply of homes built has been insufficient to keep up with demand. While a healthy finance system is critical, that alone is insufficient to expand the nation’s supply of housing to meet current and future needs. That said, the rest of this essay focuses on housing finance.
Is A Bigger FHA Here To Stay?
Many of the stabilization measures enacted in response to the 2008 crisis (such as the Troubled Assets Relief Program) were wound down as the economy recovered. But that was not the case at the Federal Housing Administration, the main U.S. agency that guarantees loans made by lenders to homebuyers. FHA dramatically expanded its role as private lending rapidly receded, precisely the countercyclical role envisioned for the agency at its founding in 1934. In fact, FHA’s market share jumped from less than 4% in 2006 to a quarter of all home purchases during the crisis.
Today, the agency continues to back mortgages at elevated, though moderated, levels. Its portfolio of loan guaranties continues to grow and, according to a 2023 report issued by Arnold Ventures (which I authored), rose 171% in inflation-adjusted terms from 2007 to 2023. While a growing portfolio poses potential risks to taxpayers, loans originated since the crisis have performed much better than those made previously. FHA has improved its lending guidelines and adopted improvements such as risk-based underwriting.
Budgetarily, FHA’s single family mortgage insurance programs were projected to result in savings each year from 2000 to 2009. Premium revenues were forecast to far exceed payments on claims. However, after the 2008 crisis, it became clear loans made in those years cost (rather than saved) billions of dollars. Making matters worse, those savings that never materialized were spent elsewhere (showing the danger of mixing cash and accrual budgeting concepts).
Since then, and even with substantial increases in lending volumes, performance has been more in line with forecasts and has, at times, exceeded expectations. Based on supplemental data contained in the 2025 Budget, increasingly reliable forecasts have reflected more in savings than were realized before the crisis. Nevertheless, risks remain that could impact taxpayers in a significant economic downturn.
But FHA’s role in the housing finance system has proven beneficial during and after the financial crisis. While there is no compelling need for reform, legislative efforts to refresh the GSEs could pull FHA (and its sister agency Ginnie Mae) into the fray to ensure roles are harmonized.
Will Fannie/Freddie Conservatorship End?
The primary function of the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is to facilitate liquidity in the U.S. mortgage finance system. They purchase home loans made by banks and other lenders—known as conforming loans since they must meet strict size and underwriting standards— and pool those loans into mortgage-backed securities, which are then sold to investors. Those securities are favored because the GSEs guarantee full principal even if the underlying mortgages default. The GSEs typically finance more than half of all mortgages originated.
The GSEs are private companies created by the U.S. government. During the financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie were placed into conservatorship by their then-newly created regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. While not at that point insolvent, their earnings and capital were deteriorating as house prices fell and their capacity to absorb further losses was in doubt. A driving concern was that if they failed due to substantial defaults on their insured mortgage portfolios or an inability to issue debt to finance themselves, the crisis would have escalated dramatically.
Conservatorship is an odd legal place for any organization to reside for an extended period—with a third party (in this case FHFA) in operational control. Conservatorship was expected to last only a short time. Then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson dubbed the move a “time out” to give policymakers an interval to decide their future. But the GSEs have remained there for more than 16 years, with occasional changes to conservatorship terms. In recent years, the Biden Administration has shown little interest in resolving the matter.
If actions during the first Trump presidency are any indicator, the incoming administration will be more assertive in tackling the issue. A memorandum issued by President Trump on March 27, 2019, stated that “The lack of comprehensive housing finance reform since the financial crisis of 2008 has left taxpayers potentially exposed to future bailouts, and has left the Federal housing finance programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development potentially overexposed to risk and with outdated operations.” The memo goes on to point out that reforms are needed “to reduce taxpayer risks, expand the private sector’s role, modernize government housing programs, and make sustainable home ownership for American families our benchmark of success.”
The Treasury Secretary was directed to develop a plan to end the conservatorship, facilitate competition in housing finance, operate the GSEs in a safe and sound manner, and ensure the government is properly compensated for any backing. Under the direction of then-Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Treasury published such a plan in September 2019 proposing both legislative and administrative reforms. FHFA and Treasury then began carrying out the parts of the plan that could be done administratively.
Former FHFA Director Mark Calabria wrote about those actions in his 2023 book Shelter from the Storm. Plans were being made “to bring the conservatorships to an end, restructure the balance sheets, and end the illegal line of credit, while preserving stability in the mortgage market.” But those plans were pushed until after the election to avoid any market disruptions that might occur, particularly given risks posed to the economy by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Consequently, some key actions were completed while others remained on the drawing board. The GSEs were allowed to build capital by retaining earnings and, in a related move, FHFA established a post-conservatorship minimum capital rule. The outgoing administration left a blueprint for reform to end the conservatorship, compensate taxpayers, and allow the GSEs to raise third-party capital.[2]
The Need For Congressional Action
While the new administration can take steps to reform and release the GSEs from conservatorship, a transformed and well-coordinated housing finance system will require legislative action as well. The activities of housing finance agencies like FHA and the GSEs should complement each other. Roles need to be clearly defined, overlap avoided, and taxpayer risks minimized.
The new Congress and incoming administration must explicitly determine those roles. While objectionable levels of risk have accrued in the past, the housing finance system has operated much more soundly in recent years. Legislation should be structured to lock in the operational and financial improvements since the financial crisis and to codify reforms to further strengthen the system.
The nation’s housing market depends on a robust and dynamic housing finance system. While maintaining the status quo follows a path of least political resistance, it will be interesting to see if a second Trump Administrations picks up its past pursuit of comprehensive reform.
[1] For a fuller explanation of the conditions that led to the crisis, see Subprime Mortgage Crisis, by John V. Duca, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November 22, 2013.
[2] For a detailed explanation of events during and after conservatorship see: The GSE Conservatorships: Fifteen Years Old, With No End in Sight, by former Freddie Mac CEO Donald H. Layton, September 5, 2023.
-
News1 week ago
Herbert Smith Freehills to merge with US-based law firm Kramer Levin
-
Business1 week ago
Column: OpenAI just scored a huge victory in a copyright case … or did it?
-
Health1 week ago
Bird flu leaves teen in critical condition after country's first reported case
-
Business4 days ago
Column: Molly White's message for journalists going freelance — be ready for the pitfalls
-
World1 week ago
Sarah Palin, NY Times Have Explored Settlement, as Judge Sets Defamation Retrial
-
Politics3 days ago
Trump taps FCC member Brendan Carr to lead agency: 'Warrior for Free Speech'
-
Science2 days ago
Trump nominates Dr. Oz to head Medicare and Medicaid and help take on 'illness industrial complex'
-
Technology3 days ago
Inside Elon Musk’s messy breakup with OpenAI