LANDOVER, Md. — The disaster was so predictable that any seasoned New York Giants observer could see it happening in real time.

Washington’s Austin Ekeler broke through a crowd and darted into the open field on Sunday’s opening kickoff of the Giants’ 21-18 loss. The long return forced Giants kicker Graham Gano to give chase, which ended in disaster.

Gano pulled his hamstring as Ekeler blew past him into the end zone. The touchdown was called back due to a holding penalty, but Gano was left writhing in pain on the field.

Losing the kicker on the first play of the game would have merely joined the list of bad breaks to plague the Giants during their interminable run of incompetence if there wasn’t a sense that it could have been avoided. But Gano had been added to the injury report Saturday with a groin injury, and he experienced enough discomfort during pregame warmups that he disrupted his typical routine to retreat to the locker room to get his groin wrapped.

So the Giants had plenty of notice to deploy a contingency plan for their hobbled 37-year-old kicker. The most obvious solution was elevating kicker Jude McAtamney from the practice squad on Saturday to have a ready-made insurance policy.

But even when the Giants elected not to elevate McAtamney, they still could have added a safeguard after Gano’s disjointed warmup routine. Punter Jamie Gillan could have filled in on kickoffs to preserve Gano for field goals and extra points, thus eliminating any chance of chasing any returners for 40 yards.

Because it’s the Giants, those decisions came back to haunt them in the worst way imaginable. Gillan, who had made 1-of-2 field goal attempts in his six-year career, missed the extra point following the Giants’ first touchdown, so coach Brian Daboll elected to attempt 2-point conversions after the team’s final two scores. Daboll also eschewed a 40-yard field goal on fourth-and-4 with just over two minutes remaining in a tie game.

Both 2-point attempts failed, and rookie wide receiver Malik Nabers’ lone lowlight from a monster 10-catch, 127-yard, one-touchdown performance came with a drop on the fourth down. The Commanders drove down after Nabers’ drop and kicked the game-winning field goal. In a cruel poetic twist, Austin Seibert, whom Washington signed Tuesday, went 7-for-7 on field goals Sunday.

So in a game decided by three points, the Giants failed on three extra-point attempts because of Gano’s injury, and they bypassed a potential go-ahead field goal because Daboll didn’t trust Gillan.

“We thought Graham would be OK,” Daboll said. “He got hurt chasing down a (runner). It was a hamstring. He didn’t hurt his groin.”

These are the types of catastrophes that lead to a coach getting asked about his future two games into his third season. Daboll was asked if he’s concerned about his job security if the results don’t change.

“I’ve done this for a long time. My focus is on our football team,” Daboll said before directing an extended glare at the reporter who asked the question.

Brian Daboll is asked if he’s concerned about his job status:

“My focus in on our football team” pic.twitter.com/YmxGs7YGqU

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— Giants Videos (@SNYGiants) September 15, 2024

That was Daboll’s lone testy moment in his news conference that he opened by praising his team’s competitiveness, the play of quarterback Daniel Jones and improvements made after a 28-6 loss to the Vikings in Week 1. Daboll clearly had calmed down after slamming his headset to the ground as Seibert’s 30-yard game-winning field goal split the uprights as time expired.

It’s remarkable how quickly things have turned for Daboll. He was named coach of the year 18 months ago after his surprisingly successful debut season. But the Giants are 6-13 since the start of last season and 9-18-1 since the midpoint of Daboll’s first season.

Whatever touch he had during his first season has disappeared. Instead, there have been too many missteps, with personnel blunders like the Gano mismanagement becoming an alarming trend.

Incredibly, the Giants have put themselves in this situation before with Gano. The kicker was dealing with a left knee injury early last season, but he continued to kick until he missed two field goals in a 13-10 overtime loss to the Jets in Week 8. Gano was shut down after that game and underwent season-ending knee surgery.

There was a similar snafu last week with returner Gunner Olszewski, who suffered a groin injury in practice before the second preseason game. Olszewski was limited in practice leading into Week 1 but was deemed ready to play. He then reinjured his groin in pregame warmups and will miss at least four weeks after being placed on injured reserve on Saturday.

The Giants didn’t have an experienced returner on hand despite Olszewski dealing with the groin injury for three weeks, so wide receiver Darius Slayton was pressed into punt return duty. Slayton failed to cleanly field his first return and then fumbled the ball, but it was recovered by a teammate.

What’s so troubling about these mistakes is that they’re almost entirely in the hands of Daboll and general manager Joe Schoen. They’re not the same as allowing the Commanders, led by rookie quarterback Jayden Daniels, to convert 50 percent of their third downs or to rush for 215 yards. Those are disappointing results, but there’s a variety of factors involved.

But setting the game day lineup is something every fantasy football owner can manage. And it wasn’t a complicated puzzle to assemble to have McAtamney active, either.

The Giants used their two practice squad elevations on linebackers Ty Summers and Tomon Fox. That duo didn’t play a defensive snap but was on the field for every kickoff, kickoff return and punt return. Could the Giants have used other players already on the active roster for those 13 plays? Sure, but even that wasn’t necessary.

The Giants had only 52 players on their 53-man roster after placing Olszewski on IR on Saturday. So they could have signed Summers to the 53-man roster and used an elevation on McAtamney, an undrafted rookie signed out of Rutgers.

The Giants then would have needed to make one more player inactive. They likely would have survived without their No. 5 defensive tackle Jordon Riley playing a handful of snaps, especially at the expense of not having a backup plan for Gano.

“All the decisions that are made are mine,” Daboll said, before later adding that roster decisions are a collective process with Schoen.

“I can’t tell you that he’s going to get hurt chasing a 100-yard kickoff return that was called back”

Brian Daboll with more on the Graham Gano situation: pic.twitter.com/7ZEqqkueJz

— Giants Videos (@SNYGiants) September 15, 2024

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These types of miscues are emblematic of an overall sloppy operation. The benefit of the doubt from this regime’s unexpected Year 1 success has faded. Now Daboll needs to figure out how to pull the team out of this spiral.

The first two games of the season were supposed to be the easy part of the schedule. No matter how bleak things have gotten for the Giants during this wretched decade-long stretch, they had at least been able to count on beating Washington. With even that off the table, it’s hard to see where wins will come from.

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Daboll is tasked with finding that answer. Games like Sunday erode the faith in his ability to do so.

(Photo: Tim Nwachukwu / Getty Images)

On October 28, at the Theatre du Chatelet in Paris, there will be a new winner of the Ballon d’Or, the highest individual accolade in men’s football.

By common consent, the leading contenders are Brazilian winger Vinicius Junior, who scored in Real Madrid’s Champions League final victory, and Spanish midfielder Rodri, who excelled in triumphant campaigns for both Manchester City and his national team.

Should Vinicius Jr, 24, win the award, he will be the first player born in the 21st century to do so. More remarkably, Rodri would be the first winner born in the 1990s. Either would be the first winner to be born since December 1987. Such was the dominance of Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo, who have respectively won eight and five of the last 15 Ballon d’Or titles, a run punctuated only by victories for two of their contemporaries: Luka Modric in 2018 and Karim Benzema in 2022.

Messi, Ronaldo, Modric and Benzema were all born in the mid-to-late 1980s. All were regarded as prodigious talents in their teens. All have excelled deep into their thirties and only now, in the twilight years of their careers, have they begun to wind down: Messi, 37, in Major League Soccer with Inter Miami, and Ronaldo, 39, and Benzema, 36, in the Saudi Pro League with Al Nassr and Al Ittihad. Modric, 39, is still going strong at Real Madrid.

The brilliance of Messi and Ronaldo often overshadowed that of a group of players now in their early-to-mid thirties that includes Neymar, Toni Kroos, Kevin De Bruyne, Mohamed Salah, Virgil van Dijk, Harry Kane, Antoine Griezmann and the retired duo of Eden Hazard and Gareth Bale.

A new generation of superstars, proven or potential, has emerged, including Kylian Mbappe, Vinicius Jr, Erling Haaland, Jude Bellingham, Phil Foden, Jamal Musiala and Lamine Yamal. Of this group, Mbappe is the oldest at 25. The rest were all born since the turn of the century (as late as 2007, in the case of Yamal, the prodigiously talented Barcelona winger).

But what of those who came after Neymar, De Bruyne, Salah et al but before Mbappe? When it comes to the group born in the mid-1990s — a group who, logically speaking, should be around its collective peak — there is a gap, not necessarily in talent, but certainly in profile, recognition and, upon deeper analysis, representation in top-level football in Europe.

Nobody would describe the Ballon d’Or as the perfect barometer of individual performance, but take a look at this graphic that illustrates top-20 rankings by age group since 2008.

Away from the clustered centre of the graphic, what jumps out is that red area containing just a handful of dots. Selected findings include:

• Rodri finishing fifth in last year’s vote is the only top-five place for a player born between 1994 and 1997
• Beyond that, the only player in that age group to have earned a top-10 placing is Rodri’s Manchester City’s team-mate Bernardo Silva (ninth in 2019 and 2023)
• The only other top-20 placings in that age group have been Frenkie de Jong (11th in 2019), Raheem Sterling (12th in 2019 and 15th in 2021), Sebastien Haller (13th in 2022), Luis Diaz (18th in 2022) — none of whom was nominated this time — and Lautaro Martinez (20th in 2023)
• By contrast, from the younger age group, Mbappe has already recorded six consecutive top-10 placings while Haaland (twice), Vinicius Jr (twice) and Victor Osimhen have also finished in the top 10
• Of this year’s 30-man Ballon d’Or longlist, Rodri is one of just seven players born between 1994 and 1997. The other six are Ruben Dias, Hakan Calhanoglu, Artem Dovbyk, Alejandro Grimaldo, Ademola Lookman and Martinez, of whom only Dias and Martinez have been nominated previously.

Admittedly that is just the Ballon d’Or, an award voted for by journalists, drawing on subjective evaluations and, almost inevitably, coloured to some extent by players’ profiles as well as their performance. As a barometer of individual excellence, it is far from perfect — even if its less prestigious rival, the ‘Best’ FIFA award, has produced broadly similar results.

But it certainly tells you something about the way footballers are projected and valued. And when it comes to that group born in the mid-1990s, there is certainly a deficit.

In the cases of Rodri and Bernardo, highly sophisticated players who excel in understated roles at a club that lacks the media profile of the traditional superpowers, that has long seemed more a question of image than of quality. We will come back to that issue.

But there is more to this. Taken more broadly, that mid-1990s age group seems to be struggling for recognition — not just by fans or the media but within the game.

Bernardo Silva, born in 1994 and 1996’s Rodri have been key to City’s successes (Jacques Feeney/Offside/Offside via Getty Images)

When the FIFA technical study group, led by former Arsenal manager Arsene Wenger, published its report on the 2022 World Cup, it briefly mentioned the tournament had been “defined by the performances of young talents and experienced masters”.

Wenger cited the technical prowess, physical strength and mental fortitude of Musiala, Bellingham and Saka at one end of the spectrum and, at the other end, of the enduring quality of players in their mid-to-late thirties such as Messi, Ronaldo, Modric and Olivier Giroud.

“In the modern game the young players are ready to perform earlier on the biggest stage,” he said before turning his mind to a generation of players who had continued to excel well into their thirties. “This,” said Wenger, referring to the latter group, “did not happen 20 years ago, so it looks like there is an extension of the career at the highest level.”

What Wenger and the technical study group did not address was the relative lack of impact made on the tournament by players in the in-between age group.

That was reflected in the age distribution of players at that World Cup. Of the 832 players called up for the tournament, the highest representations by birth year were for 1997 (ie, aged 25) and 1992 (ie, aged 30). Those born in 1994, who might logically have been at the optimum age for a World Cup held in 2022, came in at seventh.

That might be a mere statistical quirk rather than anything deeper, but there follows a graph illustrating the number of minutes played in the Premier League from 2018-19 to 2020-21. The findings are mostly as you would expect: the dominant group is the one born between 1991 and 1994 — those who were between 23 and 27 when that cycle began and between 26 and 30 when the cycle finished. Think of it as the De Bruyne, Kane, Salah generation.

There is a significant drop in the number of Premier League minutes in that time by players born in 1995, i.e. those aged between 23 and 27 over the period in question.

Again it could just be a wrinkle, indicative of nothing much. You would expect that age group to become more dominant over the next three-year period.

But they didn’t. As it transpired, that 1995 age group got barely more playing time between 2021-22 and 2023-24, a period during which they were between the ages of 26 and 29. The minutes played by those born in the early 1990s fell, as you would expect, but so did the numbers for those born in 1993, 1994 and 1995, who might otherwise have expected to become the dominant groups over that period.

Instead, the dominant age groups now were those born in 1996 and 1997 — those aged between 24 and 25 when the cycle began and 26 and 27 when the cycle ended. Those born in 1995 were drastically underrepresented. Even those born in 2001 (players aged between 20 and 23 over the period in question) came close to the total playing time of those born in 1995.

To put some names to the numbers, think of it in similar terms to England’s Euro 2024 squad selection, where players in their mid-to-late twenties such as Sterling (born in 1994), Kalvin Phillips and Jack Grealish (1995), Ben Chilwell and James Maddison (1996) and Marcus Rashford (1997) found themselves usurped by younger players such as Anthony Gordon (born in 2001), Cole Palmer (2002) and Kobbie Mainoo (2005)

It seems to reflect a wider trend. Using the same three-year cycles, the dominant age group in terms of playing time across Europe’s ‘big five’ leagues (Premier League, Bundesliga, La Liga, Serie A and Ligue 1) has shifted from those born in the early 1990s to those born from 1997 onwards. Again the mid-’90s group that theoretically should have been in the ascendancy over the past few seasons has been overtaken by a younger group.

Jose Chieira, who has been a scout for more than two decades at clubs such as Sporting Lisbon, Porto and Panathinaikos, considers the question before declaring, “I don’t believe in generational gaps” — at least not in terms of talent and quality.

But he believes market forces have created a gap. “In the last six or seven years, the strategies of the dominant forces in the market are increasingly based on a different logic,” he tells The Athletic. “It is increasingly a trading business — a typically American trading culture.

“Clubs don’t (today) go looking for players who were born before 2000. We’re already filtering for players under 23 years old. Any older and it’s not a good deal, it’s not attractive. And that has consequences for the way the market has evolved in terms of the talents or the profile of the players who dominate the game.”

As Chieira suggests, there has been a decisive shift as many clubs’ business models have moved towards developing and selling young players to those clubs higher up the food chain.

Of the 50 biggest transfers to Premier League clubs this summer, according to Transfermarkt, only eight involved players aged 26-plus (Tottenham Hotspur’s Dominic Solanke, West Ham United’s Max Kilman and Niclas Fullkrug, Arsenal’s Mikel Merino, Fulham’s Joachim Andersen and Sander Berge, Southampton’s Aaron Ramsdale and Newcastle United’s Odysseas Vlachodimos). Ten years earlier, in the summer of 2014, that age bracket accounted for eight of the 25 biggest deals. The market for players in their mid-to-late twenties is nothing like it was.

Tottenham bucked a trend by paying big money this summer for the then-26-year-old Dominic Solanke (Catherine Ivill – AMA/Getty Images)

Real Madrid’s Champions League-winning squad last season was dominated by a cluster of players born in the 1980s and early 1990s (Thibaut Courtois, Dani Carvajal, Nacho, Antonio Rudiger, David Alaba, Lucas Vazquez, Modric and Kroos) and a group of young stars born in the late 1990s and early 2000s (including Federico Valverde, Eduardo Camavinga, Aurelien Tchouameni, Vinicius Jr, Rodrygo and Bellingham). Again, that mid-1990s group was barely present: just backup goalkeeper Kepa Arrizabalaga (1994) Ferland Mendy (1995) and Dani Ceballos (1996). When Nacho and Kroos moved on this summer, the incoming players were much younger, notably Mbappe (1998) and Brazilian prodigy Endrick (2006).

It is similar at Barcelona: a handful of players born either in the late 1980s (Robert Lewandowski) and early 1990s (Inigo Martinez and Marc-Andre ter Stegen) and a core of players born in from the late 1990s onwards. Between Ter Stegen (1992) and Dani Olmo (1998), there are just three players: Andreas Christensen and Raphinha (both 1996) and De Jong (1997).

An extreme example concerns Chelsea, whose strategy over the past couple of years has appeared to exclude almost any player born before 1997. Their squad last season comprised primarily of Thiago Silva (born 1984), Sterling (1994), Chilwell (1996) and a vast core of younger players, the majority of them born since the turn of the century. Sterling and Chilwell found themselves frozen out completely before this season began: big earners in their late twenties, said to be incompatible with the technical demands of new coach Enzo Maresca.

“This tendency to focus on trading in the talent market has been decisive in creating this apparent gap,” Chieira says. “It will become increasingly difficult to find players in that exact age range — between the ages of 24 and 30, say — who can be true standout players and reference points like Bernardo Silva and others are today. More and more clubs don’t really want to ‘waste time’ working with players over the age of 24 because there’s a commercial logic that tells from that, from 25 or 26, the player will lose value. Therefore the effort and financial resources are directed towards younger players.”

That has certainly appeared true of Chelsea. But there are notable exceptions.

One is Bayern Munich, whose core group includes Leon Goretzka, Joshua Kimmich, Joao Palhinha and Serge Gnabry (all born in 1995) and Leroy Sane, Kingsley Coman and Kim Min-jae (1996).

And there are the Premier League champions, Manchester City, who have John Stones, Mateo Kovacic and Bernardo (all born in 1994), Nathan Ake, Manuel Akanji and Grealish (1995), Rodri (1996) and Dias (1997).

In some ways, that seems instructive when it comes to the profile — technical and otherwise — of the more successful players in that age group.

Since calling time on a playing career that took him from Port Vale to Luton Town, Leicester City and Fleetwood Town, Joe Davis has launched a digital marketing agency that supports professional footballers and athletes build their brand.

He has studied that subject in depth from a commercial and a sporting perspective. “The Messi-Ronaldo era is unique,” he says. “They created this unrealistic expectation of what it means to be a football megastar. They redefined the ceiling, which has overshadowed much of the incredible talent that came next.”

Davis feels it is only as Messi and Ronaldo have begun to wind down, away from the intensity of the European football spotlight, that “we have allowed ourselves to recognise the talent of players like Haaland and Mbappe. It was the in-between group that, with Messi and Ronaldo in their prime, were overlooked for so long”.

Joe Davis competing with Adebayo Akinfenwa in 2012 (Pete Norton/Getty Images)

With his marketing head on, Davis wonders whether there was a commercial aspect to this, talking about the “immaturity of athlete branding” through much of the 2010s. The opportunities for the modern players to promote themselves are far greater, he says, which is one reason why “this new wave of young talent” — Mbappe, Haaland, Vinicius Jr, Bellingham, Musiala, Yamal and so on — “has become so big so soon”.

The word “wave” is apposite. Whether it is music, film, sport or just about anything else, we are conditioned to see such phenomena in those terms. Sometimes it takes one band, one star or athlete to force a way through and blaze a trail for others to follow. Sometimes there is a desperation to anoint new stars. Sometimes it is the opposition: a desperate refusal to look beyond the zeitgeist and its leading characters.

Did the long peak of Ronaldo and Messi overshadow the generation that came after them? (Ben Stanshall/AFP via Getty Images)

But away from off-pitch image and profile, Davis suggests another factor that has played into the hands of the new wave: a subtle shift in playing styles which he says has been “arguably more accommodating to ‘luxury’ players” — or at least to those such as Haaland and Mbappe, whose goalscoring talents are so extreme that, breaking into elite-level football, they were not encumbered with as many out-of-possession demands as, say they might have been had they been born five years earlier.

Davis cites his experience as a 20-year-old defender for Port Vale, playing against an 18-year-old Grealish, who was on loan to Notts County. “He was everywhere: tracking back, covering the full-back, pressing our winger, then getting back out to the byline to receive the ball,” Davis says. “At that time, making it wasn’t just about talent; it was also about hard work and discipline, that, ‘Don’t let us down’ mentality. You see it with Bernardo Silva as well — tremendous quality and intelligence but defensive intensity and adaptability as well.

“That era — my era — possibly had different values instilled in them during their breakthrough years, which is probably why they play their game a little more under the radar and in a more structured and workmanlike way. That naturally takes the limelight off them and places it on the more exciting, carefree, creative players — those that immediately capture the imagination of the casual fan.”

That makes perfect sense. That group of players now in their mid-to-late twenties broke into senior football when demands were changing due to an increased emphasis on the type of work they did off the ball — not just “tracking back” but closing down in a structured, organised way. Through the 2010s, the role of the traditional centre-forward seemed to be under threat, which is perhaps why, beyond Martinez, there are so few “pure” goalscorers in that age group.

Lautaro Martinez: a rare born-in-the-mid-1990s goalscorer? (Valerio Pennicino/Getty Images)

There is a strange paradox. In terms of profile and projection, the cult of the individual has grown over the past decade like never before, such has been the explosion of social media and global branding. At the same time, the cult of the individual on the pitch has diminished. In the past, leading teams might have been able to carry a “luxury” player or two. That changed Pep Guardiola and Jurgen Klopp built teams whose commitment to creative football came with non-negotiable physical and tactical demands on every player. It is easy to imagine that, if they were five years older or five years younger, Bernardo and Valverde might have been deployed as mercurial wingers or No 10s rather than cerebral, multi-functional midfielders.

But individualism seems to be back in vogue. So does what might be termed ‘main-character energy’. Mbappe, Haaland, Vinicius Jr, Bellingham, Musiala, Yamal… this is a generation of leading players who are encouraged to “do their thing” and play to their enormous strengths — which, in the cases of Mbappe and Haaland, has meant scoring goals at an extraordinary rate rather than worrying unduly about the structure of their team’s pressing game.

They are players whose rare talents merit indulgence — and all of the hype and adulation that comes with their exploits.

The brilliance of Kylian Mbappe

Maybe the story is less complicated than that. Maybe the development of top-class athletes is analogous to wine production. Some years, for reasons that can be hard to explain, yield better crops than others.

To put it in blunt terms, 1987 was a vintage year that brought Messi, Benzema and Luis Suarez; 1992 brought Neymar, Salah, Courtois, Son Heung-min and Sadio Mane; 1998 brought Mbappe, Osimhen, Trent Alexander-Arnold, Valverde and Martin Odegaard; 2000 brought Haaland, Vinicius Jr, Foden, Julian Alvarez and Aurelien Tchouameni.

By comparison, the mid-1990s age group is strangely underwhelming. Transfermarkt’s most valuable footballer born in 1995 is Ollie Watkins, whose career has been a slow-burner, coming up through the leagues with Exeter City and Brentford before establishing himself as a proven goalscorer in the Premier League with Aston Villa in his mid-twenties. The second-most valuable player born in 1996, behind Rodri, is Maddison, who, as he approaches his 28th birthday, has seven caps for England and is yet to play in the Champions League.

Ollie Watkins – 1995’s finest? (Neville Williams/Aston Villa FC via Getty Images)

It is fascinating to look back at the list of winners of the Golden Boy award, established by Italian football newspaper Tuttosport to recognise the best player under the age of 21 in each calendar year.

Early winners of the award include Wayne Rooney, Messi and Cesc Fabregas. The past four editions have been won by Bellingham, Haaland and the Barcelona duo of Gavi and Pedri. Before that, it was Joao Felix, Matthijs de Ligt and Mbappe.

For the 2014, 2015 and 2016 editions, which covered the age group we have been talking about, the winners were Sterling (then at Liverpool), Anthony Martial (then at Manchester United) and Renato Sanches (then at Bayern Munich) — exciting talents certainly, but even at that stage of their careers they did not command the same hype or expectation as a young Rooney, Fabregas or Bellingham, let alone a teenage Mbappe or Messi.

Neither did the other names who featured in the top three for the Golden Boy over those years: Rashford, Divock Origi, Marquinhos, Kingsley Coman and Hector Bellerin.

They have had long and successful careers; Marquinhos is captain of Paris Saint-Germain and has won 91 caps for Brazil; Coman has won the Champions League with Bayern Munich and played for France in the 2022 World Cup final; Origi scored for Liverpool in a Champions League final.

But even if Martial, Renato Sanches, Rashford and Origi can be accused of falling short of their potential, we are not being wise after the event to suggest they were exciting teenagers whose promise was pockmarked with inconsistencies, rather than dead certs to thrive at elite level. Maybe, for reasons that defy explanation, these were just non-vintage crops.

The ‘lost generation’ phenomenon is far starker and far more unambiguous in men’s tennis. The dominance of the ‘Big Three’ of Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal and Novak Djokovic was so extreme that they won 53 out of the 61 Grand Slam tournaments held between June 2005 and June 2020.

There were break-out victories for Andy Murray and Stan Wawrinka (three majors each) and Juan Martin Del Potro and Marin Cilic (one apiece), but all four of those players were in roughly the same age bracket as Nadal and Djokovic.

How Federer, Nadal, and Djokovic reconfigured tennis

The real lost generation in men’s tennis was the one that that came later and, sharing the circuit with players whose genius was matched by their powers of endurance, found there was no way through. Austria’s Dominic Thiem (born in 1993) and Daniil Medvedev (1996) are the the only men born between 1989 and 2000 to have won a Grand Slam.

The latest ATP rankings tell a story: beyond Djokovic (1987) in fourth place, Bulgaria’s Grigor Dimitrov (1991) is the only player in the top 20 who was born between 1988 and 1995. It is Carlos Alcaraz (2003) and Jannik Sinner (2001) who are leading men’s tennis into the post-Big Three era.

Federer, Nadal and Djokovic (Julian Finney/Getty Images for Laver Cup)

The idea of a lost generation is certain to be far hazier in a team sport such as football, where individual performance is so much harder to quantify. The term does not truly fit when a) we are talking about a period spanning four years or so and b) almost every top-level game you watch features high-performing players from that age group, one of whom, Rodri, would have a claim to be considered the most influential player in world football over the past three or four years.

But it seems unarguable that, as a collective, the players born in the mid-1990s have been overshadowed by the group that went before and, increasingly, by the group that has emerged since. The Ballon d’Or rankings will never tell the whole story but they help illustrate the deficit of big personalities and show-stopping talents that command the greatest attention and recognition.

The absence of a Ronaldo/Messi figure is entirely normal, but it is also a group that is strangely short of A-list goalkeepers, central defenders, wingers and centre-forwards. Almost without exception, the best players in that age group are sophisticated, adaptable ‘system players’ rather than marauding box-to-box dynamos and mercurial playmakers.

Beyond that, market forces have begun to conspire against them as the focus has switched decisively towards youth. What might have expected to be the pre-eminent age group in 2024 has begun to struggle for playing time and to be squeezed out, particularly where wages or wage demands are deemed excessive. Adrien Rabiot, 29, has been unable to find a new club since leaving Juventus in June. Memphis Depay, 30, found numerous avenues in Europe closed and ended up joining Brazilian club Corinthians. It is not clear where Sterling, 29 and surplus to requirements at Chelsea, would have ended up had Arsenal not offered him a lifeline on transfer deadline day

And Sterling, while his returns have diminished over recent seasons, has certainly been one of the standout performers in his age group: a Golden Boy winner as a teenager at Liverpool, four times a Premier League champion at Manchester City, 82 England caps and, yes, a couple of top-20 finishes in the Ballon d’Or rankings, which is more than almost any other player in that mid-1990s age group.

Should his former Manchester City team-mate Rodri be crowned the best player in men’s football in 2024, it would represent a departure in terms of profile, playing style but also age. In many ways, Rodri would be the perfect choice, the quietly brilliant standard-bearer of an age group that has largely gone unheralded.

Unshowy, undemonstrative and, this sudden, long-overdue wave of Rodri appreciation notwithstanding, largely unheralded — fanfare, at last, for football’s jilted generation.

(Top photos: Getty Images; graphic: Meech Robinson)

Enjoy the next three years of watching Sidney Crosby play for the Pittsburgh Penguins. Breathe it in. Cherish it. Get a little sentimental, if necessary.

Never in your lifetime will you see his kind again.

I’m not talking about the hockey, the backhand, the vision, the power, the tenacity — you know, all of the stuff that has made him one of the greatest hockey players of all time.

No, this is about Crosby the person, an unselfish figure at a time when sports is infiltrated with such greed that professional athletes are even further from reality.

Oh, sure, Crosby will make more money next season than the vast majority of us will ever see in our lives. He’s not living in a studio apartment anytime soon. His new contract, however, illustrates so much about Crosby the person and Crosby the captain.

By signing a two-year contract that kicks in after this season on Monday, Crosby once again turned down more money to remain compensated at his regular salary-cap hit of $8.7 million per season. While his countless superstitions are the stuff of legend, we make far too much out of them. More than anything, he isn’t greedy and cares about the fortunes of this franchise.

Kyle Dubas had no leverage. The Penguins general manager and president of hockey operations is very well compensated and just as powerful, but he’s not more powerful than Crosby.

It wouldn’t be like that in other cities and on other teams, but this is different. In Pittsburgh, the hockey stars are bigger than the franchise. And Crosby isn’t just another star. He’s one of the most important hockey players of this century and one of the best. He’s still going strong and easily could have commanded many more millions annually. Dubas would have given him whatever he wanted. He had no choice.

Crosby never chooses Crosby, though. His kind and unselfish persona illustrates the real person. There is nothing phony or insincere about him. Winning is the only thing that drives him, which has been the case since he emerged as a 17-year-old 20 summers ago.

By my estimation, Crosby has left roughly $43M on the table taking $8.7M every season since 2008-09. https://t.co/JRn4vKFkLO

— dom 📈 (@domluszczyszyn) September 16, 2024

The contract’s two-year term is every bit as noteworthy as the money.

This deal will take Crosby through his age-39 season, a couple of months shy of his 40th birthday. Is this the final contract of Crosby’s career? Maybe. Forty is a nice, round number, and by that time, more than half of his life will have been spent as Penguins captain. That will also mark the conclusion of his 22nd NHL season. That’s a lot of hockey, and it’s not like he has anything left to accomplish.

The two-year term has some implications. Let’s break it all down:

• At a minimum, you get to watch Crosby for at least three more seasons. That should provide great comfort for those of you dreading his retirement.

• The Penguins are not going into a “full rebuild” for at least three more years. As Dubas has noted, they’re unlikely to be a bottom-five team at any point with Crosby still on the roster because he’s too good. We’ll see a mini-rebuild or a reload instead.

• Crosby could have asked for more years. The Penguins would give the captain as many years as he wanted. He opted against it because he didn’t want to hamstring the team. What if he had signed to play for five more years, but after the first couple of years, realized his passion for the game had evaporated? Or maybe his play will decline. That seems like a foreign concept because he’s the most consistently great superstar in the history of the sport. He appears to be ageless. But I assure you, he is not. He’ll turn human at some point. Crosby knows that and doesn’t want to negatively impact the Penguins if it happens soon.

The worst-case scenario is that Crosby will play in a Penguins uniform for three more years, the team doesn’t make the playoffs, Crosby retires in 2027 and Dubas has a boatload of money — and young assets — to give him the freedom to turn the Penguins into a winner in a hurry.

So, at worst, you get to see Crosby until the very end. You get to enjoy his farewell tour. And all the while, you’ll know a new wave of Penguins players is learning to be a pro from one of the greatest captains in hockey history.

That’s the beauty of the two-year contract: It’s long enough to enjoy him for a few more years but not so long to paint himself and the Penguins into a corner.

If he’s still great at 39 and wants to play longer, well, that’s even better. No one has to show Crosby the door. And by then, the Penguins might be ready to win. Dubas is doing what he’s supposed to be doing. He’s fiercely committed to developing talented young players, nothing like the occasional call-up from Wilkes-Barre that we’ve seen over the past few seasons.

The best-case scenario would be if Crosby, who is still one of the five or 10 best players in the league, can maintain that level of play for a few more years, just as all of these young assets suddenly blossom.

Crosby’s final act with the Penguins could be special if those two possibilities converge. Watching him make a final run or two at a championship with a bunch of kids who will carry the torch would be something.

It’s hardly unimaginable. Much of this will be made possible by the deal he signed. It saved the franchise significant money to spend on other players and assets. It keeps Crosby in everyone’s life for a while, but not for too long, just in case the time to retire is near. If he’s still great and hungry at 39, he’ll sign another short-term deal. Why not?

It’s so practical, unselfish and intelligent. It’s so Crosby.

He will rightfully receive enormous amounts of love from all of Pittsburgh and Penguins fans around the globe. It’s deserved.

But with this deal, Crosby reciprocates all of that affection right back.

He really is one of a kind.

(Photo: Steph Chambers / Getty Images)