The embattled former police chief of Vallejo, a San Francisco Bay Area city that has attracted national attention over police violence, has said that he endured a steady procession of racist remarks from colleagues and online harassment and threats that ultimately led him to resign.

By the time Chief Shawny Williams tendered his resignation in 2022, he said he had received a slew of threats – at his office, at his home, and in his email inbox. Most demanded he step down. But even after resigning, the threats still came by mail to his home and a second property he owned outside the state.

“They were hostile, toxic,” Williams testified in a deposition on Wednesday. “I had safety concerns.”

Williams made the statements as part of a federal civil rights lawsuit against the Vallejo police department brought by Deyana Jenkins, whom officers pulled from a car and tased during a traffic stop in 2019. The incident occurred months after six Vallejo police officers shot her uncle, Willie McCoy, a 20-year-old rapper, 55 times while he was asleep in his car. The killing attracted widespread attention and thrust a spotlight on the department’s use of force.

The deposition, first reported by the Vallejo Sun, offers a window into what Williams describes as a pattern of hostile, threatening and retaliatory behavior that ended his brief attempt to impose accountability on a department known nationally for unchecked violence and resistance to reform.

Vallejo police officers have repeatedly drawn concern over their practices, perhaps most notoriously for the ritual of “badge bending”, in which officers reportedly fold back a tip on their badges after killing someone on duty.

Williams took over the department in 2019 with a mandate to reform it. His three-year stint coincided with a national reckoning over police violence, sparked by nationwide protests over the 2020 murder of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin.

But Williams said he experienced harsh backlash for his efforts to impose accountability on the department’s use of force.

“He was our first Black police chief in a department that’s always been known as a racist police department,” Melissa Nold, the lawyer representing Jenkins in the federal case, told the Guardian. “To hear that he was run off because he was doing reform and discipline – that’s very concerning. It doesn’t seem like it should be possible that the people being reformed have that much power.”

In his deposition, Williams said a colleague made several disturbing statements, including: “This Black Jesus can’t save us.”

He described “racial hostilities or comments” made to him by a former police captain. Williams also said the city attorney threatened him, but did not describe how.

The Vallejo police department did not immediately respond to a Guardian request for comment.

Williams also received several anonymous threats, through the post and online. Three weeks before resigning in October of 2022, he received a “Halloween card threat” that said “quit today” and emitted a deafening screech that “filled the hallway” and kept blaring until the battery ran out.

A secretary opened the letter. When Williams heard it he “actually thought it was some kind of domestic violence occurring outside the building because it was so loud”.

Williams also said that he received anonymous threats, after an officer who shot an unarmed 22-year-old in 2020 later rejoined the police department.

Officer Jarrett Tonn shot and killed Sean Monterrosa after an alleged looting incident at a Walgreens during a George Floyd-inspired protest. Williams dismissed Tonn after the shooting.

But an arbitrator reinstated Tonn in 2023, after Williams left the force. Tonn was promoted to sergeant in September of this year, according to the Vallejo Sun. Afterwards, Williams said he received messages that said “some bad things were coming”.

Williams said he asked the department to investigate the threats and raised concerns to city manager Mike Malone. But the city failed to act, and Malone appeared uninterested in helping him, Williams testified.

“One of the things that I guess exacerbated my concerns was [Malone’s] statement that this is not going to stop – or ‘They’re not going to stop until I fire you or you quit,’” Williams said in the deposition. “And he said that over half a dozen times.”

By “they”, Williams said the city manager was referring to the Vallejo Police Officers’ Association (VPAO), which serves as the bargaining unit for all ranks of police officer except the chief in its negotiations with the city. The VPOA did not immediately respond to a Guardian request for comment.

“My resignation was a result of a pattern of constructive termination hostility,” Williams testified. “There was racial animus, retaliatory things that were happening that just made it unbearable or impossible for me to perform my duties in a safe environment.”

The Eaton fire was marching toward west Altadena even earlier than previously believed, a state-commissioned report confirmed this week, raising further questions about why it took L.A. County officials so long to order evacuations in the neighborhood where 18 people died.

The fire erupted Jan. 7 at 6:18 p.m., fueled by hurricane-force Santa Ana winds that pushed flames into neighborhoods with great speed. Within about an hour, the county issued evacuation orders for many of the foothill communities near the fire’s origin, including the eastern side of Altadena. But as The Times first reported in January, evacuation orders were not issued for west Altadena until after 3 a.m., well after the fire had threatened the area. Evacuation warnings for the area never went out.

All but one of the Eaton fire’s 19 deaths occurred in west Altadena.

The Fire Safety Research Institute report, released Thursday morning, doesn’t analyze why alerts were delayed, but provides the most detailed timeline yet of the night of the fire, including new timestamps that show there were signs the fire was moving toward west Altadena almost six hours before the area received any evacuation alert.

The report notes that there was “fire spread to the west” as early as 9:30 p.m. on Jan. 7, pointing to several spot fires west of the fire origin.

By 10:22 p.m., and through the next hour, there were multiple radio calls reporting the fire was spreading west toward North Lake Avenue, the report said. Just before 11 p.m., as The Times has previously reported, there were signs of flames in west Altadena — more than four hours before officials issued evacuation orders for that area.

The report states that winds shifted just after 11 p.m., which “could have assisted in spreading flames that had reached the foothills and the northeastern section of Altadena to the south and west throughout Altadena in the earlier hours of Jan. 8, 2025.”

Between 11:18 p.m. and 12:17 a.m., the document identified at least 10 fire reports on the western flank of the blaze, showing its advance toward Lake Avenue.

Why the county did not evacuate west Altadena earlier has been a subject of great concern among residents, and a question the county has still not fully addressed.

A county report on fire evacuations last month found that there was a recommendation to issue more widespread evacuations to the west around midnight, but for unknown reasons it was not heeded. It would be another three hours before incident commanders would order additional evacuation orders.

Though the new state report doesn’t provide new details about that midnight recommendation, it does offer new insights into how fast the fire moved, particularly how early the ember cast from the Eaton fire blew into west Altadena, ultimately ravaging the community.

The highly anticipated state report is the first of two from the nonprofit safety research organization. It provides the most exhaustive examination yet into how and when fire officials responded to the Eaton and Palisades fires.

Although the document doesn’t provide much analysis, focusing on the facts of the conditions, preparations and response, the findings were clear that “the ember cast contributed to the rapid expansion,” Derek Alkonis, one of the authors, said at a news conference on Wednesday, ahead of the report’s release.

The delayed evacuations have prompted scrutiny from public officials and Altadena residents about the L.A. County Fire Department’s handling of the wind-driven inferno.

Michael Gollner, an associate professor of mechanical engineering at UC Berkeley who leads its Fire Research Lab, said the timeline provided in the report is an important starting point to understand what happened during the fire response.

But he noted there was still little information about some crucial details: What was the chain of command on the first day of the Eaton fire? How was information being shared? What other issues were incident commanders dealing with at the same time that could have affected evacuation decisions?

“That’s what’s really important, how that information was passed on and how much they knew that [the fire] was spreading into this area,” Gollner said. “There’s a lot more to come and a lot more we need.”

Other already released reports about the fires conducted by Los Angeles County and the city were met with criticism from residents for being limited in scope and findings.

Last month, a report commissioned by Los Angeles County found that a general lack of planning, poor communication, understaffing and chaotic conditions contributed to untimely evacuation orders as the Eaton fire tore through Altadena. But the report was widely criticized for not answering key questions around evacuation failures, including why county officials didn’t send evacuation alerts to west Altadena until 3:25 a.m. or later.

Details in the state report shed some more light on what ultimately caused county fire officials to expand evacuations to include western Altadena.

At 10:50 p.m., a resident called in to say that fire was visible from her home on East Calaveras Street in west Altadena. Almost exactly an hour later, a Los Angeles County battalion chief reported a structure fire at Glenrose Avenue and West Loma Alta Drive, even farther into west Altadena, according to the report.

Shortly before 2 a.m., an official drove west toward Lake Avenue on East Altadena Drive, trying to get to Fair Oaks Avenue in west Altadena to “investigate the extent of fire spread” and found intense conditions, the report said.

“He could not continue as he encountered zero visibility, intense heat, and had serious concerns of becoming trapped,” the report said.

Around the same time, county fire officials were defending structures on East Mount Curve Avenue near Lake Avenue. They were forced to leave after 30 minutes because of danger from the erratic winds.

Despite all these signs of increasing fire activity in west Altadena, it would still take more than an hour before the evacuation order went out.

Gov. Gavin Newsom commissioned the Fire Safety Research Institute to conduct an investigation about a month after the Palisades and Eaton fires killed 31 people and destroyed 16,000 structures across Los Angeles County. Researchers and engineers from the institute — which also conducted the post-incident analysis for the state of Hawaii after the 2023 Maui fire — deployed to Southern California to gather evidence to “build a comprehensive timeline of events and conditions that will inform the analysis of efficacy of the response.”

Thursday’s report provides a timeline of how the fires progressed and looks at state and local officials’ actions, weather conditions, the emergency response and fire suppression. It also includes a review of 10 other fires that occurred in Southern California the same month as the Eaton and Palisades fires.

The report further captures the chaos and erratic nature of the wind-driven Eaton fire and the challenges crews on the ground faced battling the inferno. Not only was the fire moving west earlier than previously reported, but it was also spreading east simultaneously, according to the report.

Just before 1 a.m., crews at different ends of the fire requested more resources, asking for help both to the east and west of the fire’s origin. Similar accounts of the severity of the fire came in from law enforcement from 1:11 a.m. to 3:13 a.m., reporting houses on fire in north Sierra Madre, as well as in east and west Altadena.

The ember cast transformed what started as a wildfire into a full-blown urban conflagration. This likely made evacuations more difficult, experts have said.

When fire officials are considering evacuations, they generally look at wind speed and direction, topography and fuel type to help guide them, said Matt Rahn, the founding director for the wildland urban interface program at Cal State San Marcos and the research director for the Wildfire Conservancy.

But in a rapidly moving inferno where embers are casting miles from the head of the blaze and igniting spot fires, it “makes it very difficult to evacuate communities and predict where an evacuation should occur,” Rahn said.

“When all of the sudden you have spot fires start literally miles away from the fire front itself, it creates this whole new challenge,” Rahn said. “You’re not just worried about what’s happening here, you’re worried about other incidents that may grow into larger fires or, in the case of the Eaton fire, an urban conflagration. They’re very hard to predict and they’re becoming more common in the kinds of fires we experience.”

The second phase of the report, expected to be released in mid-2026, will draw on information contained in the first report to provide analysis and details on the effectiveness of officials’ efforts to prevent the fires and alert residents. The reports will not delve into the cause of the fires.

Art Botterell, former senior emergency services coordinator for the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, said the timeline was a necessary first step. But although the timeline approach can be useful, Botterell said, it also has limitations.

Botterell said trends and variations in demographics, urban planning, workforce development, and infrastructure development and maintenance might be harder to spot in a series of snapshots from a relatively short period.

“New data is always helpful, but usually the blind spots lie in the questions we don’t ask,” Botterell said. “Much will depend on the depth, perspective, and independence of the analysis that follows.”

Times staff writer Jenny Jarvie contributed to this report.

Federal regulators say Apple violated hazardous waste laws at one of its Silicon Valley facilities, leading to a settlement after inspections revealed lapses in handling and storage practices.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency said Tuesday that the tech giant’s Santa Clara site failed to properly identify, store and label hazardous waste, among other violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

Apple agreed to pay a $261,283 penalty and has since come into compliance, the EPA said.

Inspections were conducted in August 2023 and January 2024 after the agency received a tip from the public.

“Hazardous waste regulations serve as critical safeguards for facility workers, communities, and the environment,” Amy Miller, director of the EPA’s Pacific Southwest Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division, said in a statement. “EPA’s actions will protect human health and the environment in the community of Santa Clara from the risk of hazardous waste.”

According to the EPA, Apple’s violations included failing to maintain a permit to store hazardous waste for more than 90 days, to control air emissions from a solvent waste tank and to perform daily inspections of waste containers. 

The EPA said its inspections were prompted by a “tip and complaint from the public.”

The inspections followed a June 2023 complaint from former Apple employee Ashley Gjøvik, who said she alerted regulators after observing chemical emissions venting into the air from an Apple facility near her Santa Clara home, where she said she had become sick from the fumes. 

The case adds to Apple’s history of environmental enforcement in California. 

In 2016, the company agreed to pay penalties and increase inspections after state regulators found hazardous waste violations at facilities in Sunnyvale and Cupertino.