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Criminal; self-representation

BOTTOM LINE: Where a man did not express a desire that the trial court could reasonably conclude was a request for self-representation or to discharge counsel, it did not have an obligation to question him further to determine whether the he wanted to invoke the right to self-representation.

CASE: Goodrich v. State, No. 8, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Oct. 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, WATTS, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: After a trial by jury at which he was represented by counsel, Mr. Goodrich was found guilty of attempted second-degree murder, armed robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence and sentenced to imprisonment. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction.

Mr. Goodrich contends that he made a request to represent himself and the judge denied the request in violation of his constitutional rights and Maryland Rule 4-215. According to Mr. Goodrich, his responses to the administrative judge’s inquiry required the judge to ask additional questions of him to ascertain whether he truly wanted to represent himself, and to make a ruling under Maryland Rule 4-215(e) as to whether a request to discharge counsel was meritorious.

LAW: Under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court complied with the requirements set forth in case law concerning the constitutional right to self- representation and Maryland Rule 4-215(e).

Where a trial court has been advised by defense counsel that a defendant wants to represent himself at trial, the court is required under case law concerning the constitutional right to self-representation to conduct an inquiry to determine whether the defendant clearly and unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation and under Maryland Rule 4-215(e) to permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request to discharge counsel.

Here, in response to a court’s reasonable inquiry, a defendant does not express a desire that the court could reasonably conclude is a request for self-representation or to discharge counsel, the court does not have an obligation under case law or Maryland Rule 4-215(e) to question the defendant further to determine whether the defendant wants to invoke the right to self-representation.

In this case, where, in response to the court’s inquiry, Mr. Goodrich advised the court that he wanted an attorney and did not reasonably apprise the court of a desire for self-representation or to discharge counsel. Neither the Supreme Court’s holding in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), nor this court’s holding in Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122 (1979) or the provisions of Maryland Rule 4-215(e) required the court to question him further. Under the circumstances of the case, the court’s inquiry was reasonable and complied with case law governing assertion of the right to self-representation and Maryland Rule 4-215(e).

Judgement of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

BOTTOM LINE: Where an attorney violated multiple Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct arising out of his representation of 14 clients in the bankruptcy court, as well as conduct in connection with his own bankruptcy filings and tax matters, he was disbarred.

CASE: Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mintz, AG No. 21, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Oct. 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, BOOTH, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through bar counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial action against David B. Mintz, arising out of his representation of 14 clients in the bankruptcy court, as well as conduct in connection with his own bankruptcy filings and tax matters.

The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Mintz committed all but one of the violations alleged by the Commission. The hearing judge also determined the presence of eight aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. Neither party filed exceptions. Bar counsel recommended the sanction of disbarment, which this court imposed by per curiam order on Sept. 4, 2025, following oral argument, which Mr. Mintz did not attend. The court now explains the reasons for its order.

LAW: The hearing judge concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Mintz had committed all but one of the violations charged by the Commission. Neither Mr. Mintz nor the Commission filed any exceptions.

Based on this court’s independent review of the record and the hearing judge’s conclusions, it agrees with the hearing judge and concludes that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Mr. Mintz violated Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (a) and (b) (communication), 1.5(a) (fees), 1.16(a) (declining or terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 3.4(c) (fairness to opposing party and attorney), 8.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters) and 8.4(a), (c) and (d) (misconduct).

In accordance with Maryland Rule 19-727(e)(3), the hearing judge made findings as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The hearing judge found one mitigating factor present, which was that Mr. Mintz had no prior disciplinary history. The court concludes that the record supports the hearing judge’s finding of the single mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.

With respect to aggravating factors, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence the following: a pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses; bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; substantial experience in the practice of law; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; victim’s vulnerability; indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; and likelihood of repetition. The court agrees with the hearing judge that these aggravating factors are present.

The Commission recommended disbarment as the appropriate sanction given Mr. Mintz’s numerous violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, asserting that Mr. Mintz “completely and utterly abandoned fourteen separate clients, causing them considerable financial and emotional distress.” The Commission pointed to Mr. Mintz’s repeated failure to obey orders from the bankruptcy court, his failure to appear for hearings and complete required filings and his litigation tactics, which the Commission described as “‘gaming’ the bankruptcy system for his personal gain.”

The court agrees with the Commission that the totality of Mr. Mintz’s misconduct “demonstrates a complete indifference” to the duty owed to his clients, to the court and to the legal profession. Mr. Mintz’s neglect of clients’ cases, and his failure to communicate with his clients—all of whom were in the vulnerable and stressful process of filing for bankruptcy—and his continued failure to fully respond and participate in bar counsel’s investigation seriously undermine the integrity of the legal profession.

Mr. Mintz’s wholesale abandonment of his clients and his flagrant disregard for court orders is troubling, to say the least. Mr. Mintz’s misconduct not only harmed his clients, but also erodes basic public confidence in the legal system and the rule of law.

So ordered.