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The BookKeeper – Exploring Arsenal’s finances, transfer funds, owner debts and soaring revenues

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The BookKeeper – Exploring Arsenal’s finances, transfer funds, owner debts and soaring revenues

The Athletic has appointed Chris Weatherspoon as its first dedicated football finance writer. Chris is a chartered accountant who will be using his professional acumen as The BookKeeper to explore the money behind the game. He is starting with a series this week analysing the financial health of some of the Premier League’s biggest clubs.

You can read more about Chris and pitch him your ideas, and his first two articles exploring the books at Manchester United and Manchester City.


Arsenal’s return to the top table of English football has been a long time coming. Two decades have passed since they last won the Premier League title — few who watched their famed ‘Invincibles’ team of 2003-04 would have predicted that would be the last of Arsene Wenger’s league successes.

Yet football, and perhaps English football more than anywhere else, has changed dramatically since those days of Thierry Henry, Dennis Bergkamp and Robert Pires.

Financially, Arsenal have had to deal with the seemingly bottomless wealth of first Chelsea and then Manchester City, two rivals whose various periods of domestic dominance were at least in some part built on the back of Arsenal’s hard work, given they raided Wenger for many of his best players.

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The influx of outside money at those two clubs starkly contrasted with Arsenal’s continued efforts at sustainability. The results on the pitch were inevitable.

Another off-field factor held back Arsenal, albeit inadvertently. Moving from Highbury into a state-of-the-art stadium in the early 2000s was always going to see them bear costs that would have an impact on their ability to compete for trophies, but the arrival of oligarchical and state wealth at the same time made it a greater burden.

The Emirates Stadium remains one of the best grounds in the country but for many years, the building costs weighed heavy, leaving space for other clubs to steam in. Between 2005 and 2022, Arsenal managed just one second-place finish in the league. Wenger, once a deity among fans, left at the end of the 2017-18 season under a cloud of hostility.

Nearly two decades on from the doors of the Emirates officially opening, Arsenal are a club transformed.

Under the guidance of manager Mikel Arteta, they have risen from six seasons spent bouncing between fifth and eighth-place finishes to resuming their role as genuine title contenders. They have been pipped at the post in each of the past two completed campaigns by one of the greatest club teams in world football.

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As night follows day, so improvements on the field have been shadowed off it; Arsenal boasted football’s seventh-highest revenue figure last season, a four-place jump on three years ago and their highest ranking since 2017. With new sponsorships inked and Champions League money flowing into the club again, their income will grow again this season.


Arsenal are now regular loss-makers – so what’s their PSR position?

Despite that positive headline, Arsenal’s latest financials saw the club book another loss, with their pre-tax deficit last season totalling £17.7million ($23m).

The financial results of most Premier League clubs tumbled following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Arsenal were no exception but their loss-making actually began before then. After 16 consecutive years of profitability, they have now booked six annual pre-tax losses in succession. Across those six years, the club have lost £328.7million — almost wiping out the £385.0m surplus of the previous 16.

Again, the pandemic made its mark, especially on 2021’s club-record £127.2million loss, but the past six years have followed one particular moment: Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE) assuming full control of the club. Arsenal delisted from public ownership and re-registered as a private company in October 2018. Since then, under KSE’s sole stewardship, Arsenal have invested heavily in their squad and, in the case of last season, enjoyed significant revenue growth.

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Is the shift to repeated deficits cause for concern? Are the Kroenkes financially illiterate? Probably not. Instead, after years of constraint, KSE has sanctioned efforts to bring the club into line with Europe’s footballing elite.

Of course, utter the phrase ‘pre-tax losses’ in the game today and you’ll soon be thumped over the head with an acronym.

Where financial losses stray, soon mentions of profit and sustainability rules (PSR) must follow. Naturally, given Arsenal have been loss-making for six years, PSR is a concern for their owners and fans alike, but there’s nothing too much to worry about —even though they cannot claim losses as high as they might do.

Owners can provide ‘secure funding’ (usually by way of share issues) to increase their club’s PSR loss limit, up to a maximum loss of £105million over a three-year cycle. Instead, most of KSE’s funding has been via loans, which doesn’t constitute secure funding, with the exception of a £5.4m capital contribution (which does) in 2023. Consequently, Arsenal are limited to PSR losses over the past three seasons of £20.4m — the £15m lower limit available to all clubs, plus that capital contribution. Even so, for the PSR period spanning 2021-24, we estimate that, after deductions for capital expenditure, academy, community and women’s teams costs, Arsenal booked a PSR profit of around £28m — £48m clear of a breach.

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As for the current season, The Athletic estimates Arsenal could lose up to £97million and remain compliant with the Premier League’s PSR rules. That seems a fairly remote possibility, though it’s worth highlighting that they are subject to UEFA’s financial regulations too. European football’s governing body puts limits on squad expenditure — we project, based on player wages comprising 70 per cent of the total wage bill, that Arsenal were at around 60 per cent last season against a limit of 90 per cent — and losses, which are generally lower than the Premier League’s ones.

After deductions, we again expect Arsenal to be fine, although the club are carefully managing their current and future positions.


Soaring revenues reflect their on-pitch rise

Arsenal’s revenue increase last season was, in a word, huge. The world’s biggest clubs breaking their revenue records is hardly a rarity, but the extent of the improvement in their case was remarkable: turnover hit £616.6million in 2023-24, an annual increase of £150m, nearly a third. Even with the prize money and commercial benefits of Champions League football, that is still a massive uplift for a club who already boasted the 10th-highest income in world football.

Income increased across all three main revenue streams: matchday, broadcast and commercial. Mirroring that broader club record, Arsenal hit new highs in each stream. TV money was the highest at £262.3million but there was roughly 30 per cent growth across the board.

At the Emirates, gate receipts soared. Arsenal’s home has generated a nine-figure sum for the club on several occasions but last season’s £131.7million matchday income was a big increase on 2022-23 (£102.6m).

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That was the byproduct of a couple of things.

For starters, Arsenal played one more home game last season (25) than in 2022-23. Four Europa League matches at the Emirates were replaced with five in the Champions League, enabling the club to charge higher prices for viewing a more prestigious competition. On top of that, Arsenal made ticketing changes in 2023-24, reducing the number of matches covered by a season ticket from 26 to 22 and implementing an increase in general admission season ticket prices of, on average, five per cent.

The result was Arsenal’s highest single-season gate receipts (by far) and the club leapt to second for matchday income domestically, having trailed Tottenham Hotspur in each of the last two seasons. Their matchday revenue was just £5.5million behind Manchester United’s last year, marking a significant narrowing between the two clubs: the gap had been over £30m in each of the previous two seasons. Though the Emirates may have held the club back for several years, the benefits of moving there are increasingly apparent. Since the stadium opened in 2006, Arsenal have booked combined gate receipts of £1.652bn, over four times its initial £390m build cost.

More predictable but no less important was the rise in TV money. The difference between the Europa League and the Champions League is stark. Arsenal earned £80.4million in broadcast revenue from last season’s run to the Champions League quarter-finals, over three times their takings for reaching the prior round of the Europa League in 2022-23.

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Arguably most important was a surge in Arsenal’s commercial income.

Elite clubs have increasingly turned to sponsorship and marketing deals as a plentiful source of potential revenue, and Arsenal’s £218.3million commercial income marks both a big jump for the club and them catching up to domestic rivals. That likely still places Arsenal at the bottom of England’s ‘Big Six’ commercially, but they’ve closed the gap significantly. Chelsea’s commercial income was over £40m more than Arsenal’s in 2023; the distance between them now is around £7m.

Arsenal’s commercial revenues were driven by a kit supplier deal with Adidas (worth £75million per year), Emirates’ front-of-shirt sponsorship (£40m), Sobha Realty’s training-centre naming rights deal (£15m) and Visit Rwanda’s sleeve sponsorship (£10m).

Growth now and beyond looks certain too.

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That Emirates deal was renewed at £60million per year, starting this season, while the club are expected to improve on sleeve sponsorship takings once the Visit Rwanda contract ends this summer.


A rising wage bill — yet still at the lower end of the elite

Believe it or not, the general improvement in on-pitch performances has also helped lighten the mood inside the Emirates. Financially, it is a club’s wage bill that tends to dictate where they’ll finish in a given season, yet Arsenal have been bucking that trend — and in a good way, too.

Arsenal’s wages had hovered around the £230million mark for years, increasing just £11.5m between 2018 and 2023. That was, in part, due to their lack of Champions League football and the attendant contractual bonuses qualifying for it brings. Matters changed in 2023-24, as the return to Europe’s elite competition coincided with a £93m (40 per cent) increase in the wage bill. Squad investment and renewed terms for star players including Bukayo Saka and William Saliba pushed staff costs to a record high.

Even so, that still only served to bring Arsenal closer to their rivals. The wage bills at Manchester City and Chelsea have topped £400million in recent years, while Liverpool (£387m last season) are closing in on that mark, too. Arsenal are spending more than they ever have on salaries, yet still trail several clubs they have surpassed on the field recently.

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In the past two seasons, Arsenal under Arteta have significantly over-performed their wage bill. In 2022-23, they finished as runners-up with only the Premier League’s sixth-highest staff costs. Last year, they were second again with the fifth-highest.

That’s only a partial telling of the achievement too.

Consider that in each of those seasons, Arteta’s men provided the sole meaningful challenge to Manchester City’s domestic dominance and did so, particularly in that first year, with a wage bill that was hardly in the same ballpark as the champions’. In that treble-winning season for City, their wage bill was £188million ahead of Arsenal’s. That gap narrowed significantly last season, both as City’s staff costs fell slightly while Arsenal’s jumped, but was still £85m.

In each of those years, Arsenal had more administrative staff than City — underlining the stark difference in how much the clubs were paying their players.


From transfer misers to one of the biggest spenders

Arsenal’s spending in the transfer market has ramped up in recent years, another sign they are stepping out of the long shadow of their stadium build.

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While net spend isn’t actually all that useful a metric on its own, it is telling that in six of Arsenal’s first seven years playing at the Emirates, their net transfer spend sat in the bottom half of the Premier League. In those circumstances, continually qualifying for the Champions League year-on-year was no mean feat.

Since the 2018-19 season, with KSE assuming sole ownership, Arsenal have undertaken a clear shift in strategy, parting with a net £857.2million transfer spend. That’s the second-highest in English football, only trailing Chelsea, and not far shy of trebling the club’s net spend in the previous six years (£310.5m). On a gross basis, Arsenal have now spent £991.7m in the past five years, a sum which puts them ahead of both City (£970.3m) and neighbours United (£918.3m). Chelsea’s £1.458bn spend from 2019 to 2023 is still way off in the distance, but, at the Emirates, a club who were once relative misers in terms of transfers have considerably loosened the purse strings.

Up to the end of May last year, Arsenal’s existing squad had been assembled for £882.4million. That’s a big figure, though a look around the division helps explain why the club have felt the need to invest so heavily.

Even with the second-highest transfer outlay of recent years, Arsenal’s squad is only ranked fourth when it comes to the cost of assembling it, with each of the two Manchester clubs’ historic spending ensuring theirs were still costlier than the one at Arteta’s disposal. City and Chelsea had each spent over £1billion on their existing squads at the date of their most recent accounts, while the cost of United’s ticked over that mark in the first quarter of the current season.

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Arsenal’s transfer spending has been lofty, but they’ve also been playing catch-up.


Shareholder loans are low-interest and now top £300m – but is that the whole story?

Recent months have seen a growing focus on shareholder loans, with Premier League clubs voting in November to bring them into line with how other associated party transactions (APTs) are treated.

Clubs will be required to account for shareholder loans at fair market value (FMV), meaning those that don’t currently do so stand to take a hit in the form of increased interest costs. That will impact not only a club’s bottom lines but, by extension, their PSR calculations too.

Arsenal now owe £324.1million to KSE, with the owner having provided another £61.9m in cash loans last season.

The club would therefore seem ripe for punishment under the amended APT rules. Yet Arsenal voted in favour of the changes. Manchester City, with no shareholder loans on their books, voted against them. If that seems strange, consider the nuances of these new rules. The APT amendments — which adapted prior regulations recently struck down as ‘void and unenforceable’ — dictated that only loans drawn down from owners after November 22, 2024, are required to be recorded at FMV. Any monies drawn down before then, while potentially subject to an FMV assessment, would not require adjustments to club figures.

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Or at least they don’t right now. City’s seemingly never-ending courtroom tussles with the Premier League took on a new dimension recently, with the club seeking to have those November amendments declared null and void too.

Any further changes from that challenge remain to be seen but, at the moment, Arsenal’s existing £324.1m owing to their owners won’t incur increased costs. Any amounts drawn down since November 22 last year will have to be accounted for at FMV, but only those additional drawdowns. What could have amounted to a sizeable sum — at one point, there were suggestions that interest costs adjustments might be backdated across the entire span of the loans, something City (and any others in support of their view) are expected to push for if the November amendments are declared unlawful — getting whacked onto the club’s PSR calculation will instead be much smaller, if present at all.

If that seems unfair, then it’s worth considering what that money borrowed from KSE was actually for. Or the bulk of it at least.

The loans came on board in the 2020-21 season, but weren’t new debt. Before that season, Arsenal were already carrying £218million in debt, £187m of that being bonds related to the Emirates Stadium build. Those bonds were linked to gate revenues, which nosedived due to the pandemic. KSE stepped in and refinanced the loans, incurring a £32m break cost (the amount the club were charged for ending the loans earlier than planned) in the process, meaning just about all of Arsenal’s debt is now owed to their owners.

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Before that refinancing, KSE was already owed £15million, and the total amount due to the owners has risen from £201.6m in 2021 to £324.1m at the end of last season. That extra £122.5m has primarily gone toward squad strengthening, so there’s an argument Arsenal have gained a sporting advantage. Yet that would ignore the price of KSE restructuring those debts in 2021; the £32m in break costs is currently far more than the club would have incurred in interest if the additional amount loaned since had been recorded at FMV, though that argument will wane the longer the shareholder loans remain in place.

What’s more, the loans from KSE aren’t interest-free.

In each of the past four financial years, Arsenal have incurred interest costs on ‘Other’ items (which includes the KSE loans), with these hitting £7.8m last season. As a percentage of the average loan balance across last season, that’s an effective interest rate of 2.7 per cent. Not market rate, granted, but not a free ride either.


What next?

Despite another annual loss, Arsenal’s most recent accounts reflect a club on the up.

With revenue soaring and those losses coming down, all as the team become much more competitive on the pitch, it’s clear the Arsenal of today are some way removed from the situation when KSE first assumed full control six and a half years ago.

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Whether the relative largesse of the period since then continues remains to be seen. It is no secret that KSE, like other Premier League owners with sporting interests on both sides of the Atlantic, are keen to reach a point of sustainability. There’s little likelihood of their £324million loan being repaid any time soon, but Arsenal’s transfer activity this season points to slowing activity. They spent a net £21m in the summer, then nothing in the winter window.

Even so, it seems unlikely they won’t invest in the squad again for next season. Football is increasingly an arms race, so it would make little sense for KSE and Arsenal to spend as much as they have in the past half-decade only to then turn the taps off completely. For all the club’s growth, they’ve still not won top honours at home or abroad, outside the 2019-20 FA Cup; reining in spending would make that task rather more difficult, and you can be sure their competitors wouldn’t follow suit.

Promisingly, Arsenal’s day-to-day operating cash flow has ballooned recently, increasing the likelihood the first team can remain competitive even if KSE chooses to slow its own input. The club’s £176.1million cash generated from operations in 2023-24 might well be a Premier League high for that season, and takes them past the most recent figures at historically strong cash-generators Tottenham (£131.2m) and Manchester United (£121.2m).

Much of that increased cash came via their Champions League return. Arsenal’s upcoming two-leg quarter-final against Real Madrid might not be viewed with much envy, but getting to the last eight is estimated to have made the club at least another €100million (£84m/$109m) in prize money. Get past the reigning champions and they’ll bank a further €15m for reaching the semis, with €18.5m on offer for a spot in May’s final and a further €6.5m if they were to win it all.

Even if they go out against Madrid next month, this season looks to be the most lucrative European campaign in Arsenal’s history. Their estimated prize money from UEFA competition over the past two seasons, £164.4million, is almost as much as the previous six combined (£165.8m).

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Arsenal fans might ask why the club didn’t invest in much-needed striking options in the winter transfer window.

It’s a valid question but they have spent sizeably in recent years. Perhaps no deal made financial sense in the winter. Those supporters can expect more spending from their club this summer.

(Top photos: Getty Images; design: Eamonn Dalton)

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Finance

San Diego County finances teetering toward structural deficit, watchdog study finds

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San Diego County finances teetering toward structural deficit, watchdog study finds

Days before the San Diego County Board of Supervisors is scheduled to adopt its multibillion-dollar budget for the year that begins July 1, a government watchdog group is ringing alarm bells over the fiscal health of the nation’s fifth-largest county.

Most concerning, according to an analysis by the San Diego County Taxpayers Association, is a 2026-27 spending plan that is balanced on paper but drifting steadily toward a structural deficit like the one that haunts the city of San Diego.

The driving force behind the worsening budget scenario is a 28% increase in the number of employees over the past decade and a half.

The 23-page analysis also pointed to escalating public health and social services costs, declining investments in capital improvements and an outsized reliance on state and federal tax dollars as drivers of the county’s diminishing financial health.

“The county spends more every year to grow its workforce while the infrastructure that supports operations is allowed to crumble,” said Mark Kersey, president and chief executive officer of the San Diego County Taxpayers Association.

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“More than half of the general fund comes from Sacramento and Washington – dollars the county cannot control – yet it has not prepared for cuts already scheduled,” he said.

A spokesperson for San Diego County said the proposed budget reflects thorough, year-round planning and careful consideration of community priorities and input.

“This ensures long-term fiscal stability while managing a consistently changing environment and meeting the needs of the community,” spokesperson Tammy Glenn said by email. “The analysis of San Diego County’s Taxpayers Association is lacking additional context and details that would provide an accurate representation of the county’s fiscal health and stability.”

Glenn also noted that San Diego County enjoys Triple A credit ratings from all three major rating agencies.

The county Board of Supervisors on Thursday is scheduled to consider adoption of the proposed $9.2 billion budget for the 2026-27 fiscal year that starts July 1. Two Republican supervisors worry that the spending plan relies on reserves; the Democratic majority said the budget is fundamentally sound.

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Now more than 80 years old, the San Diego County Taxpayers Association is a nonprofit, non-partisan government watchdog organization. It regularly produces research and policy analysis in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness among elected officials.

The taxpayers’ review of county financial practices follows a similar – and more scathing – analysis of San Diego city spending the organization released in April.

Like the evaluation of city finances, the latest study noted that the public payroll increased at a rate that was notably higher than the population within its jurisdiction. For San Diego County, the growth in its workforce was nearly four times the rate of residential growth.

San Diego County now employs 6.15 people per 1,000 residents, up from 5.07 full-time workers per 1,000 residents in 2011, the study said. In inflation-adjusted dollars, personnel costs have climbed by 53%, to $3.5 billion, it added.

Labor now accounts for almost 41% of county spending – up from the 32.5% it accounted for in 2011, the report said.

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The growth in payroll was due in part to rising costs for food stamps, health care and other state and federal programs – all efforts that are vulnerable to legislation such as the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” passed by Republicans in 2025 that slashed Medicaid and Medi-Cal payments, the study said.

“The county is obligated to deliver service levels that follow caseload and eligibility rules set in Sacramento and Washington,” it said. “But the county retains meaningful discretion over how it administers those programs, and also controls fiscal levers that are entirely local.”

The consequences of the county’s fiscal practices are most visible in the region’s declining investments in infrastructure, the taxpayers’ association report said.

“The county’s capital-improvement program has collapsed to $45.8 million in Fiscal Year 2026 – the lowest in the 16-year data set and only 0.5% of the budget,” the report said.

“The county has published no facilities condition assessment for its 7.6 million square feet of buildings, even as the deferred Vista Detention Facility replacement alone nears a projected $1 billion.”

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In 2011, San Diego County dedicated some $289 million to capital projects, the taxpayers’ study noted, 4.1% of overall spending. The sharp decline in spending on long-term projects shows that elected officials are willing to put off difficult spending decisions, the authors said.

“The volatility itself is a finding,” researchers said. “It indicates that the county treats capital investment as discretionary rather than a planned, lifecycle-based obligation.”

While county officials have yet to create a structural budget deficit – where annual obligations regularly exceed revenues and services fluctuate widely from year to year – expected changes in demographics may worsen current conditions, the study said.

The taxpayers’ group said the number of people aged 65 and older is expected to grow by 244,000 over the next two decades-plus, driving up demand for the most expensive services while the working-age tax base shrinks.

“Every one of these pressures – the federal cost-shifts, the aging population, the maintenance backlog – is knowable and already on the calendar,” said Mike McLaughlin, the San Diego County Taxpayers Association chairman.

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“The county’s job is to build a budget that can absorb them,” McLaughlin said. “Instead, the data shows it drawing down reserves and leaning on one-time money in the very year it was warned about the cliff.”

The study also criticized San Diego County for providing limited insight into the specific outcomes of many local programs.

For example, researchers said, a 2024 assessment by the accounting giant Deloitte singled out the county’s escalating spending on efforts to prevent homelessness.

In all, that review found that the county operates 46 homelessness programs funded by 28 different sources. It also identified critical gaps in case-management tools and inconsistencies in its data collection across various programs.

Even though “rent-voucher programs showed better-than-national-average success rates at keeping people housed, the fragmentation of funding and programming makes it difficult for the county – or taxpayers – to evaluate cost-effectiveness or track year over year progress against measurable goals,” the study said.

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Robinhood Is Becoming a Full-Service Financial Platform. Is the Stock a Buy? | The Motley Fool

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Robinhood Is Becoming a Full-Service Financial Platform. Is the Stock a Buy? | The Motley Fool

Founded in 2013, Robinhood (HOOD +2.80%) changed the brokerage industry with its free trading model. Today, the broker’s product lineup has expanded well beyond stocks to include products like cryptocurrencies and prediction markets. With a focus on smaller investors, Robinhood is living up to its goal to “democratize finance for all.” But is becoming a full-service financial platform enough to make the stock a buy?

Robinhood is growing quickly

Although it was founded in 2013, Robinhood didn’t go public until 2021. In its first earnings release in the second quarter of that year, it had $102 billion in custody. In the first quarter of 2026, roughly five years later, that figure had grown to $307 billion, and it is now called total platform assets, given the broadening of the company’s business. The company has rapidly become a major player in the finance industry, building off its early success in attracting younger traders interested in stocks.

Image source: Getty Images.

There’s no question that management deserves a great deal of credit for what Robinhood has achieved. But that alone doesn’t make the stock worth buying. Notably, Robinhood is being afforded a premium valuation, with a price-to-earnings ratio of 45x, compared to P/Es of 39x for Interactive Brokers (IBKR +0.96%) and 18x for Charles Schwab (SCHW 2.97%). A growth investor may be able to justify Robinhood’s valuation, but a value investor likely wouldn’t be interested.

What’s going on with Robinhood’s customer base?

There’s another issue to consider here as well. With a focus on new investors, Robinhood may be taking on more risk than its long-established peers, such as Charles Schwab. This potential risk was highlighted in Robinhood’s solid first quarter 2026 results. Risk-taking is the big issue.

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While Robinhood’s transaction-based revenue jumped 7% year-over-year in the quarter, that growth was largely driven by prediction markets, which boosted “other” revenue by 320%. Cryptocurrency-related revenue, however, fell by 47%. This is notable because it suggests that aggressive investors shifted to what is the current hot trading idea.

Robinhood Markets Stock Quote

Today’s Change

(2.80%) $2.95

Current Price

$108.15

The problem is that Robinhood has never lived through a deep market downturn, such as the dot-com crash or the bear market associated with the Great Recession. Until it has, it is hard to know what its customers will do when every market seems to be heading lower, and losses are piling up. In other words, what will its customers do when there’s no new hot investment idea to jump on? There is a very real possibility that fear drives less experienced investors to get out of the market and stay out. Risk-averse investors will likely want to wait for Robinhood to be stress-tested before buying it.

Robinhood is not a bad company, but it is still quite young

None of this is meant to suggest that Robinhood is a bad company. It has done incredible things in a very short period of time. But that short period of time is a problem because the vast majority of it has been good for the stock market and investing. Robinhood’s stock is expensive, and the company has yet to face a deep, prolonged market downturn. Only the most aggressive growth investors will likely be interested in it for now.

Charles Schwab is an advertising partner of Motley Fool Money. Reuben Gregg Brewer has no position in any of the stocks mentioned. The Motley Fool has positions in and recommends Interactive Brokers Group. The Motley Fool recommends Charles Schwab and recommends the following options: long January 2027 $43.75 calls on Interactive Brokers Group, short January 2027 $46.25 calls on Interactive Brokers Group, and short June 2026 $97.50 calls on Charles Schwab. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.

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Personal Finance: SpaceX IPO bends the rules | Chattanooga Times Free Press

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Personal Finance: SpaceX IPO bends the rules | Chattanooga Times Free Press

Elon Musk made history again this month with the largest public offering of a company in the history of the known universe. Space Exploration Technologies, better known as SpaceX, began trading June 12 on the Nasdaq exchange under the ticker symbol SPCX. In the first three days, the stock soared by 50%, blasting the rocketeer past Amazon into fifth place among America’s largest companies.

While the public liftoff was impressive for its size and the hype surrounding it, what truly set this transaction apart was how Musk used his leverage to succeed in changing the rules during the final countdown and advance his own interest at the expense of shareholders.

Space Exploration Technologies is a truly intriguing collection of assets with a history of big accomplishments and even bigger ambitions. At its core is Starlink, a profitable satellite internet and data transmission operation. In the offering document, Musk imagines a network of massive orbiting data centers, which is not entirely crazy and is likely to face less political opposition from nearby residents.

SpaceX also includes the familiar rocket launch enterprise and an artificial intelligence startup called xAI with its Grok AI assistant. While private investors and Starlink have provided operating cash flows to fund the space operations, SpaceX needs substantial additional funding to support its galactic expansion plans. That requires selling shares of this privately held company to the public in an initial public offering.

The process involves a syndicate of investment banks that facilitates the sale of shares held by the company’s founders or private investors at a specific price, the proceeds of which allow early investors to cash out and provide a large injection of capital. Once the shares are sold to public buyers, they change hands on a market exchange at a price determined by supply and demand.

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The prospect of the largest initial offering ever ignited a frenzy of interest. It also allowed Elon Musk to leverage the buzz of a monster IPO to convince Wall Street to bend the rules.

To win the listing, the Nasdaq stock exchange agreed to substantial waivers of its own listing rules. While new companies must typically wait at least three months before they become eligible for inclusion in the popular Nasdaq 100 index, Nasdaq jettisoned this “seasoning” period and allowed SpaceX to enter the index after only 15 days. This tech-heavy index serves as the benchmark for over $1.4 trillion in fund assets that will now be required to sell other holdings to make room for SpaceX in their portfolios. Estimates range from $8 to $15 billion in forced purchases that will create artificial demand for the stock. It also means that many passive investors in retirement funds will end up owning the stock, like it or not.

Nasdaq also waived its own liquidity rules. Ordinarily, at least 10% of the company’s shares must be offered to the public, called the “float,” or percentage, of the total stock value that trades publicly. SpaceX floated only 4.3% of its stock, with private shareholders retaining 95.7%. Using some arithmetic legerdemain, Nasdaq created a “multiplier,” triple-counting the float for companies in the top 40 by total market value. Presumably for firms whose founders’ initials are E.M.

To its credit, S&P Global Inc. considered but ultimately refused to loosen its own standards for joining the S&P 500 index, concerned about the potential reputational damage. The S&P 500 is the benchmark for $20 trillion in assets and opted to retain its 12-month seasoning period as well as a four-quarter profitability hurdle. SpaceX may one day dock with the S&P 500, but the countdown has not started.

Aside from eliciting waivers and exceptions for index inclusion, SpaceX massively advantages its visionary but mercurial founder. In its surprisingly entertaining prospectus, the company boosted Musk’s control far beyond his ownership stake. The shares issued to the public are called Class A shares, and each carries one vote on matters of corporate governance. However, Musk’s stake resides in so-called Class B shares, each with 10 votes, giving Musk 84% voting control.

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There are a few other little gems. The prospectus requires that any disputes between shareholders and the company must be settled privately through arbitration. Lawsuits, including the type of class action suits that tend to hold management’s feet to the fire, are expressly prohibited. And speaking of fire, Musk may only be fired by himself.

Some of these more restrictive provisions have been used before. For instance, in its initial offering, Google essentially pioneered the idea of multiple share classes that vested voting control with the founders. SpaceX propels contempt for shareholder rights into a higher orbit.

Separate from the structural disadvantage to public shareholders is the question of valuation. SpaceX lost nearly $5 billion in 2025 and another $4 billion just last quarter. The initial offering of loss-making companies is hardly new, especially in technologically emerging fields. SpaceX has reached the stratosphere.

With no profits to measure, a useful metric is the ratio of the total value of all the company’s stock divided by last year’s revenues, called the price to sales ratio. When the unprofitable Amazon went public in 1996, its total market value was three times its 1995 sales. Google’s 2004 offering priced at 15 times sales, Facebook at a hefty 28 times, and even Musk’s own Tesla launched at a multiple of 15 times sales. SpaceX cleared the tower at an otherworldly 95 times sales, soaring to 130 by the end of day two as the frenzy intensified. During the first full trading day, it comprised 75% of all stock purchases by individual investors. In the prospectus, Musk expatiates on his plan to colonize Mars. He’s halfway there.

There is no precedent for a public offering of this size, with such a long and speculative arc toward profitability and so few shareholder protections. SpaceX is a pure play wager on a precocious space cadet with interstellar aspirations astride a solid rocket booster. Enjoy the ride.

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Christopher A. Hopkins, CFA, is a co-founder of Apogee Wealth Partners in Chattanooga.

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