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Originalism’s campaign finance conundrum

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Originalism’s campaign finance conundrum

Please note that SCOTUS Outside Opinions constitute the views of outside contributors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SCOTUSblog or its staff.

In a recent interview, Justice Amy Coney Barrett shared her view that “originalism became prominent as a theory” as a counterweight to the theory of “living constitutionalism” that “had become dominant” during the courts led by Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. According to Barrett, whereas the living constitutionalism of the Warren-Burger eras put the court in the position of functionally amending the Constitution by updating its meaning, originalism instead aims to understand “how those who ratified the Constitution understood the words.”

There is no doubt that decisions from the Warren and Burger courts are now open to question by a solid majority of originalist justices; the court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holding that there is no constitutional right to an abortion, is only the most noteworthy example of this. But many other precedents from that same era have not yet received comparable scrutiny, prominent among these being the court’s seminal campaign finance decision in the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo.

When the Supreme Court hears oral argument in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission this morning, Tuesday, Dec. 9, it will confront fundamental questions about the First Amendment and money in politics. But the case also presents an underappreciated puzzle: How should originalists think about Buckley, which created much of our constitutional framework around campaign finance?

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What Buckley did

In the early 1970s, Congress crafted legislation aimed at addressing the soaring cost of political campaigns and reducing the perceived influence of wealthy interests. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 passed with bipartisan supermajorities in both chambers. President Richard Nixon signed it into law, noting that “the goal of controlling campaign expenditures was a highly laudable one.” When Congress amended FECA in 1974, which, among other things, further limited the amounts that could be contributed to federal candidates, President Gerald Ford proclaimed: “The unpleasant truth is that big money influence has come to play an unseem[ly] role in our electoral process. This bill will he[l]p to right that wrong.”

Nevertheless, in Buckley – which turns 50 next month – the Supreme Court struck down most of FECA’s core provisions. The court functionally equated spending money in politics with “the freedom of speech” itself, concluding that limits on campaign spending “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” While the court upheld limits on direct contributions to federal candidates as a guard against quid pro quo corruption, it invalidated all limits on expenditures by campaigns or independent groups.

Buckley runs to a remarkable 144 pages in the U.S. Reports — the longest majority opinion the court has ever produced. Yet nowhere in those 144 pages does the court engage in any sort of originalist analysis of the core questions in the case. There’s no sustained examination of what “the freedom of speech” originally entailed, no investigation of how the founding generation would have understood campaign finance regulation, and no inquiry into which institution they expected to resolve such questions.

A methodological resemblance

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Indeed, Buckley emerged during a period when originalism was not the court’s dominant mode of constitutional interpretation, and the decision bears striking similarities to other cases that originalists have criticized for lacking grounding in the Constitution’s original meaning. Three examples are especially pertinent.

First, in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice William O. Douglas famously identified a constitutional right to privacy prohibiting states from banning contraception for married couples. He derived this from “penumbras, formed by emanations” of various Bill of Rights provisions, a move which originalists have condemned for creating rights without any clear textual foundation. Buckley took similar leaps, deriving the concept of unlimited campaign spending from the First Amendment’s “freedom of speech” without any consideration of this amendment’s original meaning.

Second is Miranda v. Arizona, decided in 1966, which prescribed specific warnings that police officers must give to individuals in custody. In that case, the court provided no textualist or originalist grounding in the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause. For that reason, originalists have long derided the decision as “inconsistent with the original understanding of the right against self-incrimination” and “a usurpation of legislative and administrative powers, thinly disguised as an exercise in constitutional exegesis[.]” Buckley likewise creates detailed rules constraining democratic choices about campaign finance without any obvious textual commands.

Last is 1973’s Roe v. Wade, which created an elaborate trimester framework that, according to originalists, resembled legislation far more than constitutional interpretation. Like Roe, Buckley constructed a detailed architecture — distinguishing contributions from expenditures, applying different levels of scrutiny to each, and creating categorical rules about corruption — that looks far more legislative than interpretive.

None of this necessarily means that Buckley – or any of the cases cited above – reached the wrong result as a matter of policy. But it does raise questions about methodology. If these forms of reasoning were problematic to originalists in Griswold, Roe, and Miranda, what makes them acceptable in Buckley?

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The “who decides” question

Recent originalist scholarship reveals an even deeper problem with Buckley, however. Stanford law professor Jud Campbell’s path-breaking research on the founding era has shown that recovering original meaning requires an understanding of not just what rights the Founders recognized, but which institution they expected to resolve disputes about those rights.

Based on this understanding, and as relevant to Buckley, a key question isn’t merely whether political speech was valued at the founding (it certainly was) – but whether courts were expected to micromanage legislative efforts to address corruption or preserve electoral integrity. And Campbell’s research demonstrates that there was no such view. Instead, the Founders believed that representative institutions could regulate liberty in the public interest – speech included – provided that the people consented through their elected representatives. As Campbell has explained, there is “no evidence that the Founders denied legislative authority to regulate expressive conduct in promotion of the public good — a principle that runs contrary to countless modern decisions.”

Of course, the Founders did expect courts to enforce some constitutional limits. But they expected judges to defer to legislative judgments unless a constitutional violation was clear beyond dispute. Aggressive judicial review using heightened scrutiny is a 20th-century innovation, not a founding-era practice.

But Buckley considered none of this.

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Citizens United and beyond

In 2010, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission extended Buckley’s framework, holding that corporations and other entities have a First Amendment right to make unlimited independent expenditures in elections. In doing so, the court struck down longstanding federal restrictions on corporate campaign spending and overruled precedents upholding such limits. The reasoning was pure Buckley: vigorous judicial review, equation of spending with speech, and dismissal of legislative concerns about corruption unless narrowly defined as quid pro quo arrangements. For this reason, Citizens United has also been critiqued as a non-originalist decision.

The court has only continued this pattern. When Montana sought to apply its century-old ban on corporate expenditures – a law rooted in the state’s particular history with corporate domination of politics – the court summarily reversed in a one-paragraph, unsigned opinion. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the majority struck down aggregate limits on individual contributions. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, the court invalidated Arizona’s public financing scheme. Each decision further entrenched the court as the nation’s primary campaign finance regulator, with democratic bodies relegated to implementing the court’s commands.

The contrast with other constitutional areas is striking. In economic regulation, national security, and countless other domains, the court defers to legislative fact-finding and policy judgments. But campaign finance is apparently different. Here the court insists on its own assessment of empirical questions: What constitutes corruption? When does money create the appearance of improper influence? Will such appearance “cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy”?

Implications for NRSC v. FEC

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As the court considers NRSC v. FEC, it once again faces a choice about how seriously to take originalism when it comes to campaign finance. The case involves federal contribution limits and party coordination rules – specifically, whether limits on how much political parties can spend on campaign advertising that is coordinated with the party’s candidate for office are consistent with the First Amendment. These are technical questions, but they are rooted in the same framework as Buckley.

An originalist approach would ask not only what the understanding of free speech was at the time of the founding (as Buckley failed to do), but whether campaign finance was understood to be an area of vigorous judicial oversight or legislative primacy. As for the latter concern, the founding generation’s answer seems clear. They valued political speech but expected elected representatives to make judgments about how to structure democratic processes.

Defenders of Buckley might respond that political speech occupies a unique constitutional position, or that judicial protection is essential regardless of original understanding. These are serious arguments. But they represent a departure from originalist methodology rather than an application of it. They prioritize judicial assertiveness over the founding generation’s institutional assumptions.

The question, then, is whether originalism’s principles apply consistently across subject areas, or whether campaign finance represents a special case in which other considerations override originalist constraints. If the latter, the court should say so explicitly rather than leaving the tension implicit.

This doesn’t prejudge how NRSC should come out. The court might conclude (unlike in Dobbs) that stare decisis counsels retaining Buckley despite originalist doubts concerning it. Or it might begin the process of unwinding Buckley’s framework, returning campaign finance to democratic processes while maintaining a limited judicial role. Or it might articulate why campaign finance truly is exceptional in ways the Founders would have recognized. But it is high time that the court confronts this tension directly rather than allow Buckley to further distort its approach to such a vital area of the democratic process.

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Disclosure: American Promise filed an amicus brief in support of neither party in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission.  

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Africa’s climate finance rules are growing, but they’re weakly enforced – new research

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Africa’s climate finance rules are growing, but they’re weakly enforced – new research

Climate change is no longer just about melting ice or hotter summers. It is also a financial problem. Droughts, floods, storms and heatwaves damage crops, factories and infrastructure. At the same time, the global push to cut greenhouse gas emissions creates risks for countries that depend on oil, gas or coal.

These pressures can destabilise entire financial systems, especially in regions already facing economic fragility. Africa is a prime example.

Although the continent contributes less than 5% of global carbon emissions, it is among the most vulnerable. In Mozambique, repeated cyclones have destroyed homes, roads and farms, forcing banks and insurers to absorb heavy losses. Kenya has experienced severe droughts that hurt agriculture, reducing farmers’ ability to repay loans. In north Africa, heatwaves strain electricity grids and increase water scarcity.

These physical risks are compounded by “transition risks”, like declining revenues from fossil fuel exports or higher borrowing costs as investors worry about climate instability. Together, they make climate governance through financial policies both urgent and complex. Without these policies, financial systems risk being caught off guard by climate shocks and the transition away from fossil fuels.

This is where climate-related financial policies come in. They provide the tools for banks, insurers and regulators to manage risks, support investment in greener sectors and strengthen financial stability.

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Regulators and banks across Africa have started to adopt climate-related financial policies. These range from rules that require banks to consider climate risks, to disclosure standards, green lending guidelines, and green bond frameworks. These tools are being tested in several countries. But their scope and enforcement vary widely across the continent.

My research compiles the first continent-wide database of climate-related financial policies in Africa and examines how differences in these policies – and in how binding they are – affect financial stability and the ability to mobilise private investment for green projects.

A new study I conducted reviewed more than two decades of policies (2000–2025) across African countries. It found stark differences.

South Africa has developed the most comprehensive framework, with policies across all categories. Kenya and Morocco are also active, particularly in disclosure and risk-management rules. In contrast, many countries in central and west Africa have introduced only a few voluntary measures.

Why does this matter? Voluntary rules can help raise awareness and encourage change, but on their own they often do not go far enough. Binding measures, on the other hand, tend to create stronger incentives and steadier progress. So far, however, most African climate-related financial policies remain voluntary. This leaves climate risk as something to consider rather than a firm requirement.

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Uneven landscape

In Africa, the 2015 Paris Agreement marked a clear turning point. Around that time, policy activity increased noticeably, suggesting that international agreements and standards could help create momentum and visibility for climate action. The expansion of climate-related financial policies was also shaped by domestic priorities and by pressure from international investors and development partners.

But since the late 2010s, progress has slowed. Limited resources, overlapping institutional responsibilities and fragmented coordination have made it difficult to sustain the earlier pace of reform.

Looking across the continent, four broad patterns have emerged.

A few countries, such as South Africa, have developed comprehensive frameworks. These include:

  • disclosure rules (requirements for banks and companies to report how climate risks affect them)

  • stress tests (simulations of extreme climate or transition scenarios to see whether banks would remain resilient).

Others, including Kenya and Morocco, are steadily expanding their policy mix, even if institutional capacity is still developing.

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Some, such as Nigeria and Egypt, are moderately active, with a focus on disclosure rules and green bonds. (Those are bonds whose proceeds are earmarked to finance environmentally friendly projects such as renewable energy, clean transport or climate-resilient infrastructure.)

Finally, many countries in central and west Africa have introduced only a limited number of measures, often voluntary in nature.

This uneven landscape has important consequences.

The net effect

In fossil fuel-dependent economies such as South Africa, Egypt and Algeria, the shift away from coal, oil and gas could generate significant transition risks. These include:

  • financial instability, for example when asset values in carbon-intensive sectors fall sharply or credit exposures deteriorate

  • stranded assets, where fossil fuel infrastructure and reserves lose their economic value before the end of their expected life because they can no longer be used or are no longer profitable under stricter climate policies.

Addressing these challenges may require policies that combine investment in new, low-carbon sectors with targeted support for affected workers, communities and households.

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Climate finance affects people directly. When droughts lead to loan defaults, local banks are strained. Insurance companies facing repeated payouts after floods may raise premiums. Pension funds invested in fossil fuels risk devaluations as these assets lose value. Climate-related financial policies therefore matter not only for regulators and markets, but also for jobs, savings, and everyday livelihoods.

At the same time, there are opportunities.

Firstly, expanding access to green bonds and sustainability-linked loans can channel private finance into renewable energy, clean transport, or resilient infrastructure.

Secondly, stronger disclosure rules can improve transparency and investor confidence.

Thirdly, regional harmonisation through common reporting standards, for example, would reduce fragmentation. This would make it easier for Africa to attract global climate finance.

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Looking ahead

International forums such as the UN climate conferences (COP) and the G20 have helped to push this agenda forward, mainly by setting expectations rather than hard rules. These initiatives create pressure and guidance. But they remain soft law. Turning them into binding, enforceable rules still depends on decisions taken by national regulators and governments.

International partners such as the African Development Bank and the African Union could support coordination by promoting continental standards that define what counts as a green investment. Donors and multilateral lenders may also provide technical expertise and financial support to countries with weaker systems, helping them move from voluntary guidelines toward more enforceable rules.

South Africa, already a regional leader, could share its experience with stress testing and green finance frameworks.

Africa also has the potential to position itself as a hub for renewable energy and sustainable finance. With vast solar and wind resources, expanding urban centres, and an increasingly digital financial sector, the continent could leapfrog towards a greener future if investment and regulation advance together.

Success stories in Kenya’s sustainable banking practices and Morocco’s renewable energy expansion show that progress is possible when financial systems adapt.

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What happens next will matter greatly. By expanding and enforcing climate-related financial rules, Africa can reduce its vulnerability to climate shocks while unlocking opportunities in green finance and renewable energy.

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