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Chinese lenders among top backers of “forest-risk” firms

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Chinese lenders among top backers of “forest-risk” firms

Recent data shows that Chinese banks have become the largest creditors to “forest-risk” companies, after major producing countries Brazil and Indonesia

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Key findings

  • Recent data shows that Chinese banks have become the largest creditors to “forest-risk”* companies, after major producing countries Brazil and Indonesia, with over $23 billion in financing provided from 2018 to 2024.
  • Key Chinese banks, including CITIC, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Bank of China, are among the top creditors for “forest-risk” companies such as Royal Golden Eagle Group, which has faced repeated allegations that its supply chain has driven deforestation.
  • The increasing flow of finance to “forest-risk” companies undermines China’s climate and environmental goals under the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration and national Green Finance Guidelines.
  • Meanwhile, Chinese banks rank poorly compared to their international counterparts in terms of deforestation-related policies, with four out of six major Chinese lenders scoring zero in the Forest 500 annual policy assessment.
Cattle grazing in Marabá, Pará State, one of the most deforested areas in Brazil

Cattle in Pará State of Brazil. 60% of tropical deforestation is linked to just three key products – beef, palm oil and soy. Fernanda Ligabue / Global Witness

Recommendations

  • Chinese banks and regulators must take stronger action to cut ties with deforestation-linked companies.
  • Chinese banks should publish and implement clear zero deforestation and human rights protection policies when financing “forest-risk” companies.
  • Banks should implement China’s 2022 Green Finance Guidelines by establishing due diligence processes to identify, monitor and screen out clients linked to deforestation.
  • Chinese banks should establish open communication channels to rapidly receive and address deforestation allegations from international community.
  • The Chinese banking regulator should strengthen green finance policies with clear requirements that banks cease financial support to companies with deforestation-linked supply chains.

Ranking global contributors to “forest-risk” finance: China’s rise to the top

Chinese banks became the largest creditors of “forest-risk” companies globally between 2018-2024 – excluding financial institutions based in Brazil and Indonesia – according to a new analysis by Global Witness, based on data released in September 2024 by the Forests & Finance coalition.

This marks a shift from Global Witness’s previous reporting on Chinese bank finance in 2021, which used Forests & Finance data from 2013-2020. During this period, Chinese banks were the fifth largest creditors globally of major companies producing and trading commodities at high risk of driving deforestation.

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The Forests & Finance database, compiled by Dutch research firm Profundo, tracks financial flows to over 300 “forest-risk” companies involved in agricultural supply chains such as beef, palm oil and soy production – industries that are major drivers of tropical deforestation.

Profundo’s methodology, including how it defines “forest-risk” companies, is summarised below.

The financial sectors of Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia provide a disproportionate amount of “forest-risk” financing to commodity producers in their own countries and are excluded from this analysis, which focuses on international financial flows. When including these countries, China ranked third globally overall in 2023, the final year for which full data is available.

At COP26, countries like the US, France, the Netherlands and the UK pledged to end deforestation by 2030. However, private financial institutions based in those financial centres also remain some of the biggest supporters of “forest-risk” companies.

According to the data, between 2018-2024, Chinese banks provided a total of $23 billion in credit to “forest-risk” companies.

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This figure for the seven-year period is higher than the figure provided in the seven-year period between 2014-2020 ($18 billion), indicating that the financial sector has failed to adjust lending practices to mitigate the damage some of these companies are wreaking upon global forests.

There are a handful of key Chinese banks among the top creditors providing “forest-risk” financing – CITIC, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Bank of China were the top three creditors between 2018-2024, according to the data.

The two biggest “forest-risk” recipients of this Chinese bank lending are Sinochem and Royal Golden Eagle Group (RGE), despite both RGE and its subsidiaries facing repeated deforestation allegations.

COFCO, a major Chinese agricultural trader, is the third-largest recipient. Despite the company’s multiple commitments to address deforestation, in 2024 COFCO was alleged to have sourced soybeans from illegally leased Indigenous lands in Brazil.

Just one year prior, another investigation challenged whether COFCO had done enough to ensure its soy and palm oil supply chains were indeed deforestation-free.

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In response COFCO claimed that it has not violated its own commitments, insisting that it takes numerous measures to monitor and enforce its supply chain standards.

It claimed the farmers tied to deforestation were indirect suppliers and said it was “working to increase traceability of indirect purchases, which will lead us to strengthen our controls and risk monitoring for this part of the supply chain.”

One noteworthy data highlight is that, in 2024, Chinese bank credit provision to global manufacturing conglomerate RGE spiked, despite data for 2024 only including deals made between January-July.

RGE’s sprawling network of “shadow companies” has faced multiple allegations of deforestation over the years in relation to its palm oil and pulp and paper supply chains.

RGE denies allegations of wrongdoing. In response to a July 2024 publication published by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), RGE claimed it was “local communities”, rather than one its subsidiary companies, who were responsible for clearing forests in its palm oil supply chain – despite allegedly providing no evidence to support this conclusion.

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RGE has also denied links to deforesting companies in its pulp and paper supply chains, most recently in response to an October 2024 investigation from The Gecko Project and Bloomberg.

Orangutans at the Tanjung Puting National Park in Kalimantan on the island of Borneo, Indonesia in 2001, under protection from nearby deforestation

Orangutans in the protected Tanjung Puting National Park in Kalimantan on the island of Borneo, Indonesia. Paula Bronstein / Getty Images

Over the past two years, RGE has received a series of sustainability-linked loans (SLL) supported by a consortium of banks, including Chinese banks such as Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co, Ltd and Bank of Communications (Hong Kong) Ltd.

These “sustainable” loans allow RGE to borrow under more favourable conditions, providing it hits pre-determined “linked” environmental and social targets.

For example, the $1 billion 2024 SLL (provided to two “sustainable” palm oil producers in RGE’s network of subsidiaries Asian Agri and Apical) is tied to indicators of the companies’ compliance with “anti-deforestation commitments”, as well as to independent suppliers’ traceability verification.

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However, the credibility of these “sustainable” deals was called into question in the above published by the Rainforest Action Network.

Why this matters: Chinese banks’ lack of robust deforestation policies

The rising influence of Chinese banks in “forest-risk” sectors is of particular concern given that Chinese banks persistently have some of the weakest deforestation policies in place compared with banks from other countries.

The lack of formal policy raises questions about whether and how the world’s top creditors to “forest-risk” agribusinesses are carrying out due diligence to ensure their investments do not drive deforestation.

One way of comparing the strength of banks’ policies on deforestation is via the Forest 500, prepared by Global Canopy, which ranks financial institutions based on an evaluation of their publicly available commitments to tackle deforestation and related human rights abuses, assessing factors such as if all commodities are included, as well as the transparency of their reporting against targets.

A staff member counts money at a branch of the Bank of China on August 10, 2011 in Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province of China.

Key Chinese banks, including CITIC, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Bank of China, are among the top creditors for “forest-risk” companies. VCG via Getty Images / Getty Images

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Four out of six major Chinese lenders (including CITIC, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) assessed in Forest 500’s database have policy scores of zero. Just two Chinese banks score above zero: China Construction Bank scores three points and Agricultural Bank of China scores four points.

All the banks from China in this assessment also score zero points for their approach to human rights abuses associated with deforestation, apart from Agricultural Bank of China, which scores one point only.

By comparison, the overall highest scoring financial institution in Forest 500’s ranking is Schroders, which scores a total of 58.5 points, and has a policy to eliminate “forest-risk” commodity-driven deforestation from its portfolios by 2025.

According to Forest 500, a strong deforestation policy for a bank includes clear, time-bound commitments to eliminate deforestation and associated human rights abuses from its financing, applies to all high-risk commodities across all financial services, and includes robust implementation measures such as due diligence, monitoring and transparent reporting.

Global Witness approached Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and CITIC with an opportunity to comment on the report’s findings – including their financing activities and apparent lack of deforestation policies. None of the three banks responded to this request.

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Recommendations: What should change

Chinese banks and their regulators must take their deforestation-risk portfolio seriously – the increasing financial support to the “forest-risk” companies shown by our analysis suggests a clear departure from China’s commitment and national policies.

The increasing flow of this funding, coupled with no national regulations to prevent it falling into the hands of deforesting companies, appears to contradict the commitments China has made on the international stage – such as those made under the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration, signed by China and more than 140 nations at COP26, that commits to realigning financial flows with forest protection.

Crucially, supporting companies with a track-record of causing environmental and social harm is also at odds with China’s national policies, especially those designed to guide and leverage finance to support the green and low-carbon transition.

For example, in 2022, a major overarching policy called Green Finance Guidelines set out detailed expectations for banks and insurance companies to identify, monitor, prevent and control their environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks.

The guidelines made it clear that banks should “strictly restrict” granting credit to clients that face significant environmental and social violations and risks (article 20) and strengthen ESG risk management in their credit and investment granting for overseas Belt and Road projects (article 25).

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In recent years, China has made efforts to decarbonise its economy and balance growth within planetary boundaries. In fact, the world is increasingly looking to China for leadership in climate and nature actions as the country explores new opportunities in the clean energy sectors.

Aerial view of rainforest being removed to make way for palm oil and rubber plantations

Rainforest being removed to make way for palm oil and rubber plantations. WhitcombeRD / Getty Images

Since the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has also introduced a series of policies aimed at greening or reducing risks associated with overseas investments.

Despite being one of the world’s largest markets for “forest-risk” commodities such as soy, beef and palm oil, China currently lacks a national policy prohibiting the import of commodities linked to deforestation.

However, China has made notable bilateral commitments with key forest country partners. For instance, in April 2023, China and Brazil pledged to collaborate on eliminating deforestation and illegal logging, while also enforcing laws to prevent illegal imports and exports.

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Major Chinese food companies and traders are piloting “deforestation-free” shipments of commodities like soy, and efforts are underway to make Brazilian beef supply chains to China more traceable.

Global Witness’ analysis suggests that Chinese banks and their regulators can do much more to reverse the environmental and social harm caused by financing deforestation-linked companies, which undermines China’s international climate and nature goals.

Global Witness calls for:

  • Chinese banks should publish and implement clear zero deforestation and human rights protection policies when financing “forest-risk” companies.
  • Banks should implement China’s 2022 Green Finance Guidelines by establishing due diligence processes to identify, monitor and screen out clients linked to deforestation.
  • Chinese banks should establish open communication channels to rapidly receive and address deforestation allegations from international community.
  • The Chinese banking regulator should strengthen green finance policies with clear requirements that banks cease financial support to companies with deforestation-linked supply chains.

Methodology

The Forests & Finance coalition dataset, produced by Profundo and analysed by Global Witness, identifies financial transactions with more than 300 company groups that are involved in the upstream segment of the beef, palm oil, pulp and paper, rubber, soy and timber supply chains in Southeast Asia, Central and West Africa and South America, collectively referred to as “tropical forest-risk sectors” as they drive most deforestation.

Profundo notes that this selection of “forest-risk companies” is “intended to be a representative sample of companies most impacting tropical forests … Factors that led to their selection include the size of the company and land area of operation, access to information on their financing, and known negative impacts of their operations on tropical forests.”

Profundo’s data is compiled from Bloomberg, Refinitiv, Orbis and other sources, along with company reports.

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The dataset captures six types of asset class and transaction, split into investments (2024; bondholding and shareholding), and credit (2010-2024; revolving credit facilities; loan issuance; bond issuance and share issuance).

Profundo applied “segment adjusters” to each company to estimate how much of a given portion of total finance could reasonably be expected to have financed the production or trade of a “forest-risk” commodity.

That means, for example, that finance provided by a Chinese financial institution to the US branch of a global conglomerate company is discounted, meaning all financing in this dataset are Profundo’s estimates of funding allocated towards commodity production in regions where deforestation occurs.

Read more information on Profundo’s methodology.

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Finance

Lawmakers target ‘free money’ home equity finance model

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Lawmakers target ‘free money’ home equity finance model

Key points:

  • Pennsylvania lawmakers are considering a bill that would classify home equity investments (HEIs) and shared equity contracts as residential mortgages.
  • Industry leaders have mobilized through a newly formed trade group to influence how HEIs are regulated.
  • The outcome could reshape underwriting standards, return structures and capital markets strategy for HEI providers.

A fast-growing home equity financing model that promises homeowners cash without monthly payments is facing mounting scrutiny from state lawmakers — and the industry behind it is mobilizing to shape the outcome.

In Pennsylvania, House Bill 2120 would classify shared equity contracts — often marketed as home equity investments (HEIs), shared appreciation agreements or home equity agreements — as residential mortgages under state law.

While the proposal is still in committee, the debate unfolding in Harrisburg reflects a broader national effort to determine whether these products are truly a new category of equity-based investment — or if they function as mortgages and belong under existing consumer lending laws.

A classification fight over home equity capture

HB 2120 would amend Pennsylvania’s Loan Interest and Protection Law by explicitly including shared appreciation agreements in the residential mortgage definition. If passed, shared equity contracts would be subject to the same interest caps, licensing standards and consumer protections that apply to traditional mortgage lending.

The legislation was introduced by Rep. Arvind Venkat after constituent Wendy Gilch — a fellow with the consumer watchdog Consumer Policy Center — brought concerns to his office. Gilch has since worked with Venkat as a partner in shaping the proposal.

Gilch initially began examining the products after seeing advertisements describe them as offering cash with “no debt,” “no interest” and “no monthly payments.”

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“It sounds like free money,” she said. “But in many cases, you’re giving up a growing share of your home’s equity over time.”

Breaking down the debate

Shared equity providers (SEPs) argue that their products are not loans. Instead of charging interest or requiring monthly payments, companies provide homeowners with a lump sum in exchange for a share of the home’s future appreciation, which is typically repaid when the home is sold or refinanced.

The Coalition for Home Equity Partnership (CHEP) — an industry-led group founded in 2025 by Hometap, Point and Unlock — emphasizes that shared equity products have zero monthly payments or interest, no minimum income requirements and no personal liability if a home’s value declines.

Venkat, however, argues that the mechanics look familiar and argues that “transactions secured by homes should include transparency and consumer protections” — especially since, for many many Americans, their home is their most valuable asset. 

“These agreements involve appraisals, liens, closing costs and defined repayment triggers,” he said. “If it looks like a mortgage and functions like a mortgage, it should be treated like one.”

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The bill sits within Pennsylvania’s anti-usury framework, which caps returns on home-secured lending in the mid-single digits. Venkat said he’s been told by industry representatives that they require returns approaching 18-20% to make the model viable — particularly if contracts are later resold to outside investors. According to CHEP, its members provide scenario-based disclosures showing potential outcomes under varying assumptions, with the final cost depending on future home values and term length.

In a statement shared with Real Estate News, CHEP President Cliff Andrews said the group supports comprehensive regulation of shared equity products but argues that automatically classifying them as mortgages applies a framework “that was never designed for, and cannot meaningfully be applied to, equity-based financing instruments.”

As currently drafted, HB 2120 would function as a “de facto ban” on shared equity products in Pennsylvania, Andrews added.

Real Estate News also reached out to Unison, a major vendor in the space, for comment on HB 2120. Hometap and Unlock deferred to CHEP when reached for comment. 

A growing regulatory patchwork

Pennsylvania is not alone in seeking to legislate regulations around HEIs. Maryland, Illinois and Connecticut have also taken steps to clarify that certain home equity option agreements fall under mortgage lending statutes and licensing requirements.

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In Washington state, litigation over whether a shared equity contract qualified as a reverse mortgage reached the Ninth Circuit before the case was settled and the opinion vacated. Maine and Oregon have considered similar proposals, while Massachusetts has pursued enforcement action against at least one provider in connection with home equity investment practices.

Taken together, these developments suggest a state-by-state regulatory patchwork could emerge in the absence of a uniform federal framework.

The push for homeowner protections

The debate over HEIs arrives amid elevated interest rates and reduced refinancing activity — conditions that have increased demand for alternative equity-access products. 

But regulators appear increasingly focused on classification — specifically whether the absence of monthly payments and traditional interest charges changes the legal character of a contract secured by a lien on a home.

Gilch argues that classification is central to consumer clarity. “If it’s secured by your home and you have to settle up when you sell or refinance, homeowners should have the same protections they expect with any other home-based transaction,” she said.

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Lessons from prior home equity controversies

For industry leaders, the regulatory scrutiny may feel familiar. In recent years, unconventional home equity models have drawn enforcement actions and litigation once questions surfaced around contract structure, title encumbrances or consumer understanding.

MV Realty, which offered upfront payments in exchange for long-term listing agreements, faced regulatory action in multiple states over how those agreements were recorded and disclosed. EasyKnock, which structured sale-leaseback transactions aimed at unlocking home equity, abruptly shuttered operations in late 2024 following litigation and mounting regulatory pressure.

Shared equity investment contracts differ structurally from both models, but those episodes underscore a broader pattern: novel housing finance products can scale quickly in tight credit cycles. Just as quickly, these home equity models encounter regulatory intervention once policymakers begin examining how they fit within existing law — and the formation of CHEP signals that SEPs recognize the stakes.

For real estate executives and housing finance leaders, the outcome of the classification fight may prove consequential. If shared equity contracts are treated as mortgages in more states, underwriting standards, return structures and secondary market economics could shift.

If lawmakers instead carve out a distinct regulatory category, the model may retain more flexibility — but face ongoing state-by-state negotiation.

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Finance

Cornell Administrator Warren Petrofsky Named FAS Finance Dean | News | The Harvard Crimson

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Cornell Administrator Warren Petrofsky Named FAS Finance Dean | News | The Harvard Crimson

Cornell University administrator Warren Petrofsky will serve as the Faculty of Arts and Sciences’ new dean of administration and finance, charged with spearheading efforts to shore up the school’s finances as it faces a hefty budget deficit.

Petrofsky’s appointment, announced in a Friday email from FAS Dean Hopi E. Hoekstra to FAS affiliates, will begin April 20 — nearly a year after former FAS dean of administration and finance Scott A. Jordan stepped down. Petrofsky will replace interim dean Mary Ann Bradley, who helped shape the early stages of FAS cost-cutting initiatives.

Petrofsky currently serves as associate dean of administration at Cornell University’s College of Arts and Sciences.

As dean, he oversaw a budget cut of nearly $11 million to the institution’s College of Arts and Sciences after the federal government slashed at least $250 million in stop-work orders and frozen grants, according to the Cornell Daily Sun.

He also serves on a work group established in November 2025 to streamline the school’s administrative systems.

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Earlier, at the University of Pennsylvania, Petrofsky managed capital initiatives and organizational redesigns in a number of administrative roles.

Petrofsky is poised to lead similar efforts at the FAS, which relaunched its Resources Committee in spring 2025 and created a committee to consolidate staff positions amid massive federal funding cuts.

As part of its planning process, the committee has quietly brought on external help. Over several months, consultants from McKinsey & Company have been interviewing dozens of administrators and staff across the FAS.

Petrofsky will also likely have a hand in other cost-cutting measures across the FAS, which is facing a $365 million budget deficit. The school has already announced it will keep spending flat for the 2026 fiscal year, and it has dramatically reduced Ph.D. admissions.

In her email, Hoekstra praised Petrofsky’s performance across his career.

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“Warren has emphasized transparency, clarity in communication, and investment in staff development,” she wrote. “He approaches change with steadiness and purpose, and with deep respect for the mission that unites our faculty, researchers, staff, and students. I am confident that he will be a strong partner to me and to our community.”

—Staff writer Amann S. Mahajan can be reached at [email protected] and on Signal at amannsm.38. Follow her on X @amannmahajan.

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Finance

Where in California are people feeling the most financial distress?

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Where in California are people feeling the most financial distress?

Inland California’s relative affordability cannot always relieve financial stress.

My spreadsheet reviewed a WalletHub ranking of financial distress for the residents of 100 U.S. cities, including 17 in California. The analysis compared local credit scores, late bill payments, bankruptcy filings and online searches for debt or loans to quantify where individuals had the largest money challenges.

When California cities were divided into three geographic regions – Southern California, the Bay Area, and anything inland – the most challenges were often found far from the coast.

The average national ranking of the six inland cities was 39th worst for distress, the most troubled grade among the state’s slices.

Bakersfield received the inland region’s worst score, ranking No. 24 highest nationally for financial distress. That was followed by Sacramento (30th), San Bernardino (39th), Stockton (43rd), Fresno (45th), and Riverside (52nd).

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Southern California’s seven cities overall fared better, with an average national ranking of 56th largest financial problems.

However, Los Angeles had the state’s ugliest grade, ranking fifth-worst nationally for monetary distress. Then came San Diego at 22nd-worst, then Long Beach (48th), Irvine (70th), Anaheim (71st), Santa Ana (85th), and Chula Vista (89th).

Monetary challenges were limited in the Bay Area. Its four cities average rank was 69th worst nationally.

San Jose had the region’s most distressed finances, with a No. 50 worst ranking. That was followed by Oakland (69th), San Francisco (72nd), and Fremont (83rd).

The results remind us that inland California’s affordability – it’s home to the state’s cheapest housing, for example – doesn’t fully compensate for wages that typically decline the farther one works from the Pacific Ocean.

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A peek inside the scorecard’s grades shows where trouble exists within California.

Credit scores were the lowest inland, with little difference elsewhere. Late payments were also more common inland. Tardy bills were most difficult to find in Northern California.

Bankruptcy problems also were bubbling inland, but grew the slowest in Southern California. And worrisome online searches were more frequent inland, while varying only slightly closer to the Pacific.

Note: Across the state’s 17 cities in the study, the No. 53 average rank is a middle-of-the-pack grade on the 100-city national scale for monetary woes.

Jonathan Lansner is the business columnist for the Southern California News Group. He can be reached at jlansner@scng.com

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