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‘Lone wolf’ or JI?: Jemaah Islamiyah confusion after Malaysia attack

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‘Lone wolf’ or JI?: Jemaah Islamiyah confusion after Malaysia attack

Medan, Indonesia – Malaysia has been the target of a rare deadly attack after a man armed with a machete struck a police station in southern Johor state, killing two police officers and injuring a third.

Initially, Malaysian police said they suspected Friday’s incident was linked to the hardline group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and was probably an attempt to steal weapons. Speaking to the media after the attack in the town of Ulu Tiram, Inspector General of Police Razarudin Husain said police raided the suspect’s house and discovered “JI-related paraphernalia”.

Five members of his family were arrested, including the suspect’s 62-year-old father, who police said was a “known JI member”. Two other people, who were in the police station making a report at the time of the attack in the early hours of Friday morning, were also detained.

But on Saturday, Malaysia’s Minister of Home Affairs Saifuddin Nasution Ismail appeared to backtrack on the JI connection, describing the attacker as a “lone wolf” who was “driven by certain motivations based on his own understanding because he rarely mixed with others”.

Former members of JI in Indonesia told Al Jazeera that an attack by the group on Malaysian soil seemed unlikely.

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Speaking from prison in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta, where he is serving a life sentence for his role in JI’s 2002 Bali bombing, which killed more than 200 people, Ali Imron told Al Jazeera that JI’s profile in Malaysia did not seem to fit the police station attack.

“There have never been any JI members in Malaysia who agreed to commit acts of violence like this,” he said. “Before the Bali bombing, there were attacks in Malaysia, but these were committed not by JI but Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia [KMM].”

KMM, a hardline group linked to JI, carried out small-scale attacks in Malaysia in the early 2000s.

Rueben Dass, a senior analyst at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, noted that JI had never previously mounted attacks in Malaysia.

“Malaysia was always considered an economic region for JI, not the focus of attacks,” he told Al Jazeera. “The Malaysian authorities were always vigilant and aware, particularly after KMM became active. They have been on their toes and carried out a wave of arrests in the early 2000s of JI members.”

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Since then, he said, JI had maintained a low profile.

“To see them coming up again is a little surprising,” he added.

Indonesia, which saw a spate of JI attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s – including attacks on churches on Christmas Eve 2000, the Bali bombings and the 2003 attack on Jakarta’s JW Marriott Hotel – has also been largely successful in clamping down.

In 2003, with funding and training from the United States and Australia, it established the Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), and later set up a National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

Indonesian authorities have also pioneered a range of deradicalisation programmes, using former members of hardline groups including JI, with recidivism rates at about 11 percent, according to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, a Jakarta-based think tank.

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History of JI

JI was founded by Indonesian Muslim scholar Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar in 1993, with a mission to establish an Islamic caliphate across Southeast Asia.

The group has historically been linked to al-Qaeda, from which it reportedly received funding and training in the 1990s and early 2000s. It has had members in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and the Philippines.

JI was officially banned in Indonesia in 2007, leading to the group splintering. Some members focused on dakwah or proselytisation, while others continued to plot violent attacks. Arrests have continued across the region with members accused of stockpiling weapons and bomb-making equipment.

According to open source data, between 2021 and 2023, out of 610 people arrested In Indonesia, 42 percent were JI and 39 percent were from other hardline groups – including Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and other pro-Islamic State groups.

The majority of JI senior figures have been either executed, shot dead in police raids or jailed.

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The 2002 attack in Bali, which killed more than 200 people, shocked Southeast Asia [File: AP]

Both Bashir and Sungkar lived in Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s, in addition to senior members such as Indonesian Encep Nurjaman (alias Hambali) and Malaysians Noordin Mohammed Top and Azahari Husin. Ali Ghufron (alias Mukhlas), Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Imam Samudra, the masterminds of the Bali bombing, also spent time in Malaysia.

Hambali was arrested in Thailand in 2003 and is currently awaiting trial at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, while Samudra, Amrozi and Mukhlas were executed in 2008. The two Malaysians were shot in separate police raids in Indonesia in 2005 and 2009.

Before his death, Noordin ran the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic boarding school in Malaysia, which was founded by Bashir and Sungkar and was in Ulu Tiram, close to the home of the suspect of Friday’s attack.

Malaysia closed the school in 2002 amid suspicions it was being used to recruit people to JI.

Style of attack

While the profile of the suspect’s father, and the proximity to Luqmanul Hakiem, might have suggested a JI connection, Imron cautioned against such an analysis.

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“If the son followed his father, there is no way he would have committed this act, so there is a strong possibility that he was inspired by ISIS [ISIL],” Imron said, suggesting the Malaysian authorities had “jumped to that conclusion.”

Umar Patek, who was released from prison in 2022 after serving 11 years of a 20-year sentence for mixing some of the chemicals used in the Bali Bombing, told Al Jazeera that he “did not believe” that the attacker was a member of JI and agreed that the attack appeared to have the hallmarks of another group.

“I am very doubtful,” he said. “I don’t understand it, especially carrying out a violent attack. It is impossible in my view that it was JI, but it is possible that it was ISIS.”

The style of the attack has added to the scepticism, as the targeting of a police station and Muslim police officers is inconsistent with JI’s attacks in Indonesia. There, it has been ISIL-inspired hardline groups, including JAD, that have attacked police stations, seeing them as representative of the state.

Soldiers walking through the jungle in Indonesia. They are armed. There is dense foliage around.
Indonesia and Malaysia cracked down on the group after a spate of deadly attacks in the early 2000s [File: Suparta/AFP]

Judith Jacob, the head of Asia for the risk analysis and intelligence company Torchlight, told Al Jazeera that the most unusual aspect of Friday’s attack was the location.

“While Malaysian militants have been key figures in JI and Philippine-based groups, there are few indications of sophisticated plots targeting Malaysia specifically in recent years,” she said.

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However, while Malaysia and Indonesia have not seen anything like the levels of violence of the early 2000s, attacks have not been completely eradicated – with a pattern of more opportunistic and low-level violence emerging.

“The attack in Malaysia remains squarely within the wheelhouse of regional Islamist militant groups – that is to say, it is a relatively unsophisticated assault,” Jacob said.

“Indonesian groups, in particular, have been largely unable to conduct the large-scale attacks or coordinated bombings that were a hallmark of JI in its heyday in the 2000s. Militant groups in the Philippines are more capable, but they too have been unable to conduct sophisticated bombings beyond the southern islands.”

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Reuters: Iran toughens negotiating stance amid mediation efforts

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Reuters: Iran toughens negotiating stance amid mediation efforts
Iran’s negotiating posture has hardened sharply since the war began, with the Revolutionary ‌Guards exerting growing influence over decision-making, and it will demand significant concessions from the United States if mediation efforts lead to serious negotiations, three senior sources in Tehran said.

In any talks with the U.S., Iran would not only demand an end to the war but concessions that are likely red lines for U.S. President Donald Trump – guarantees against future military action, compensation for wartime losses and formal control of the Strait of Hormuz, the sources said.


Iran would also refuse to negotiate any limitations to its ballistic missile programme, they said, an issue that had been a red line for Tehran during the talks that were taking place when the U.S. and Israel launched their attack last month.

Reuters

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Who actually runs Iran right now? The key power players as Trump claims talks to ‘top’ official

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Who actually runs Iran right now? The key power players as Trump claims talks to ‘top’ official

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“Nobody knows who to talk to,” President Donald Trump said Tuesday at the White House, describing what he portrayed as both chaos and opportunity inside Iran’s leadership. “But we’re actually talking to the right people, and they want to make a deal so badly.” 

His remarks come as the U.S. claims it is engaged in talks with a “top” Iranian figure, even as Tehran publicly denies negotiations are taking place.

The question now is not just whether talks are happening, but whether anyone in Tehran has the authority to deliver. With strikes on senior Iranian leadership and growing internal fractures, Iran appears to be operating less like a centralized theocracy and more like a wartime system run by overlapping power centers, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at its core.

Here’s who matters now.

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TRUMP’S MIDDLE EAST ENVOY REVEALS WHAT LED TO BREAKDOWN IN IRAN TALKS BEFORE OPERATION EPIC FURY

A State Department Rewards for Justice poster offers up to $10 million for information on key leaders tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Asghar Hejazi, Yahya Rahim Safavi, Ali Larijani, Eskandar Momeni and Esmail Khatib. (State Department / Rewards for Justice)

The IRGC: The real power behind the state

Across intelligence assessments and recent reporting, one conclusion is consistent: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has emerged as the dominant force in Iran’s political system.

Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the current moment is accelerating a long-standing trend. 

“No doubt both the 12-Day war and this current conflict have trimmed the commanding heights of the Islamic Republic’s political and military leadership,” he said.  “But it has also expedited the trend lines inherent in Iranian politics, which is the dominance of the security forces and the ascendance of the IRGC.”

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“Yes, there is more IRGC control over the state than ever before, but the state is weaker than ever before and more of a national security rump state than ever before,” he said. 

“It shouldn’t particularly preoccupy Washington, who is and isn’t offering negotiations,” Ben Taleblu added, “The preeminent preoccupation of Washington has to be working toward a military win at a political win, and that does not come by working with the IRGC, but actually beating them on the battlefield and supporting the forces’s most arrayed against them in Iran, which are the Iranian people.”

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military personnel are walking along Enghelab (Revolution) Avenue as an Iranian Kheibar Surface-to-Surface missile is being unveiled during the Ela Beit Al-Moghaddas (Al-Aqsa Mosque) military rally in Tehran, Iran, on November 24, 2023. The IRGC is unveiling two new missiles during the rally.  (Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

The command room: Supreme National Security Council

If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the power in Iran, the Supreme National Security Council appears to be the mechanism through which that power is exercised.

The Supreme National Security Council is Iran’s top forum for coordinating military and foreign policy, bringing together senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and government officials under the authority of the supreme leader. It was established after the 1979 revolution and has played a central role in managing major crises, from nuclear negotiations to wartime operations.

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Iran appointed Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, as secretary of the council, reinforcing its central role in coordinating military and political decisions, Reuters reported Tuesday.

A Middle Eastern official source with knowledge of the system described the structure:

“Right now, the power is in the hands of the IRGC,” the source said. “The Supreme National Security Council makes the decisions, of course, with the backing of the majority of IRGC commanders.”

A mourner holds a poster depicting Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, right, the successor to his late father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, left, as supreme leader, during the funeral procession for senior Iranian military officials and civilians killed during the campaign in Tehran, Iran, March 11, 2026. (Vahid Salemi/AP Photo)

Mojtabā Khamenei: The supreme leader in name

Formally, Iran’s system centers on Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. But his actual grip on power remains uncertain.

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Khamenei inherited the position’s sweeping authority following his father’s death, but “lacks the automatic authority enjoyed by his father,” the Middle Eastern official said.

Moreover, he has not appeared publicly since taking power and only has issued written statements, raising questions about both his health and his ability to govern, after reportedly being injured in the initial Feb. 28 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed his father and other senior Iranian leaders.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, suggested his role may currently be limited: “For the time being, since Mojtaba has been injured, it seems he’s a hologram and not holding power. However, if Mojtaba recovers, he will be involved in ruling Iran. He is not just a figurehead. But anyhow, for the time being, the control of Iran is in the hands of the revolutionary guards.”

WITH DOGS, DANCE AND UNCOVERED HAIR, IRANIANS DEFY ‘UNHOLY ALLIANCE’ OF SOCIALISTS, RADICALS: ‘HYPOCRITES!’

Ghalibaf: The man at the center of Trump’s claim

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf speaks during a public event in Iran in 2024 (Hossein Beris / Middle East Images / Middle East Images via AFP)

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Trump’s statement that he is speaking to a “top person” has focused attention on one name in particular: Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

The White House is quietly exploring Ghalibaf as a potential interlocutor and even a possible future leader, Axios reported.

A former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander and current parliament speaker, Ghalibaf represents a hybrid figure inside the system, bridging military credentials and political authority.

He was one of the key security figures involved in the crackdown on student protests in July 1999 and has run for president four times since 2005.

IRAN WAR, 11 DAYS IN: US CONTROLS SKIES, OIL SURGES AND THE REGION BRACES FOR WHAT’S NEXT

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Ghalibaf is expected to meet U.S. special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in the capital of Pakistan as early as the end of this week.

Ben Taleblu said: “Those who see the ascendants of someone like Ghalibaf, who is an IRGC veteran, having extended power outside his traditional civilian rule, have missed the decades of how personality, not profession, has been the driving force, has been a driving force in Iranian politics for the past few decades. I would also say those who worry about the IRGC background of the Supreme National Security Council are all that in Iran today, may have missed the fact that the past few Supreme National Security Council Secretaries, Shamkhani, Larijani, Ahmadian, all also had IRGC backgrounds.”

At the same time, Ghalibaf has publicly denied engaging in talks with the United States, and no direct confirmation of negotiations has been provided by either side.

Araqchi: The diplomat carrying messages

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi attends a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister following their talks in Moscow on April 18, 2025. (Getty Images)

Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi remains one of the most visible figures internationally.

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If talks were to take place, Araqchi likely would be part of the Iranian delegation alongside Ghalibaf, Reuters reported.

But analysts caution that his role is limited. He may act as a channel for communication, but does not set policy independently. 

Strategic decisions, particularly on war and negotiations, are still shaped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the broader security establishment.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, the head of the judiciary and Alireza Arafi, deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, attend the meeting of the interim leadership council of Iran in an unknown location, amid the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran, in Iran, March 1, 2026.  (IRIB/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters)

The wider power circle: generals, clerics and enforcers

Beyond the headline figures, a broader group of officials who continue to shape Iran’s direction can be identified.

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These include Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps chief Ahmad Vahidi, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, naval commander Alireza Tangsiri, Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and senior clerical and political figures such as Saeed Jalili and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi.

Each represents a different pillar of the system: military power, regional proxy operations, control of strategic waterways, internal repression and religious legitimacy.

Together, they form what analysts describe as a fragmented but resilient governing network.

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A billboard depicting Iran’s supreme leaders since 1979: (L to R) Ayatollahs Ruhollah Khomeini (until 1989), Ali Khamenei (until 2026), and Mojtaba Khamenei (incumbent) is displayed above a highway in Tehran on March 10, 2026. Iran marked the appointment of Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei to replace his father as its supreme leader on March 9, 2026.  (AFP/Via Getty Images)

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Despite internal divisions, Iran’s leadership remains united on one core objective: survival of the regime.

Kuperwasser described the split: “There are the more pragmatic elites, like Araghchi, Rouhani, and Zarif. There are also the hardliners who have usually held the upper hand … But they are united in one issue — that the regime should survive and stay in power.”
Iran’s U.N. mission did not respond to a request for comment in time for publication. 

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Iran names successor to security chief killed in US-Israeli attack

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Iran names successor to security chief killed in US-Israeli attack

Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, ex-IRGC commander, to replace late Ali Larijani as chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

Iran has named Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a former commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as the successor to Ali Larijani, head of the country’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), who was killed in a US-Israeli air strike earlier this month.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s deputy of communications announced the appointment on X on Tuesday.

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The SNSC, formally chaired by Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy and includes top military, intelligence and government officials, in addition to representatives of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

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Zolghadr, who served in the 1980s war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, went on to become head of the IRGC’s joint staff for eight years and then deputy commander-in-chief of the elite force for another eight years.

In 2005, he was named deputy interior minister for security and police in the government of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a move that was seen at the time as bolstering the IRGC’s influence in politics.

Since 2023, he has been the secretary of the Expediency Council, a powerful body that plays both an advisory and mediating role between Iran’s various power structures and the supreme leader.

Zolghadr’s new position consolidates the IRGC’s growing clout in Iran amid growing uncertainty regarding decision-making at the top of the system. Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since he succeeded his assassinated father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in early March.

Larijani, one of the most prominent non-clerical figures in Iranian politics, was killed last Tuesday in a week that saw the war spiralling throughout the region, upending global energy markets and roiling the world economy.

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On Tuesday, the war showed no sign of de-escalation after US President Donald Trump’s claim that he was speaking to an unidentified “top person”, as he extended by five days a deadline to hit Iran’s power plants.

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said “no negotiations” were under way, accusing Trump of seeking “to manipulate the financial and oil markets”.

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