Finance
Where Does The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation Go From Here?
Confusion has reigned since the EU’s “Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR)” legislation went into force in March 2021. SFDR had highly ambitious objectives—not only preventing fund “greenwashing” but also shifting capital in support of the EU’s “Green Deal” to become carbon neutral by 2050. Three years later, it is worth asking whether SFDR has achieved those objectives. Or whether it has simply become a complex and ever-changing labeling exercise.
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As a starting point, it is still unclear exactly how to categorize a sustainable fund under SFDR. There has been much discussion about what exactly constitutes an Article 8 fund (so-called “light green” since they “promote environmental or social characteristics”) and an Article 9 fund (“dark green” since it goes further and “has sustainable investment as its objective”). The language here is highly ambiguous, particularly since the term “sustainable investment” is used to cover both types of funds, as discussed below. This has created a bonanza for lawyers hired by fund managers to help them substantiate how they are categorizing their funds.
The lack of clarity has created significant confusion in the market. Fund managers have “downgraded” Article 9 funds to Article 8. They have “upgraded” Article 6 funds, which are not claiming any sustainability benefits but still have to report on sustainability risks, to Article 8 and even Article 9. According to Morningstar, in the past quarter 220 funds changed their classification, 190 of these being Article 6 to Article 8.
Very sensibly, on September 14, 2023 Mairead McGuinness, Commissioner for Financial Services, Financial Stability and Capital Markets Union announced “an in-depth three month consultation for stakeholders” to determine “if our rules meet their needs and expectations, and if it is fit for purpose.”
On May 3, 2024 the EU published a Summary Report of this Consultation. It found “Widespread support for the broad objectives of the SFDR but divided opinions regarding the extent to which the regulation has achieved these objectives during its first years of implementation.” Here are some of the key findings:
· “89% of respondents consider that the objective to strengthen transparency through sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector is still relevant today.”
· “94% of respondents agree that opting for a disclosure framework at the EU level is more effective than national measures at Member State level.”
· “77% of respondents also highlighted key limitations of the framework such as lack of legal clarity regarding key concepts, limited relevance of certain disclosure requirements and issues linked to data availability.”
· 84% felt “ that the disclosures required by the SFDR are not sufficiently useful to investors.”
· 58% don’t feel the costs “to be proportionate to the benefits generated.”
· 82% felt “that some of its requirements and concepts, such as ‘sustainable investment ’are not sufficiently clear.”
It also found that 83% of respondents felt that “the SFDR is currently not being used solely as a disclosure framework as intended, but is also being used as a labelling and marketing tool (in particular Article 8 and 9).” That said, there was no consensus on whether to split the categories in a different way than Articles 8 and 9 or to convert them into formal product categories by clarifying and adding criteria to the underlying concepts.
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While the Consultation was clearly useful, it is telling that there is no clear path forward. It is also telling that there is substantial tension around the issue of transparency. The Consultation found strong support for it but that the current amount was insufficient, yet what there is has a questionable cost/benefit ratio. Squaring that circle will be hard, especially since transparency is seen as the key driver of capital allocation. The brutal fact of the matter is that this complex legislation has been overly ambitious in terms of allocating capital. It is time for some soul searching. Among other things, this involves addressing three underlying fundamental issues: (1) the purpose of the legislation, (2) the impacts it is intended to achieve, and (3) how it addresses the need for financial returns.
In terms of purpose, the original legislation is clearly aimed at using fund disclosure as a lever to reallocate capital to address important environmental and social issues. Here the legislative text states, “As the Union is increasingly faced with the catastrophic and unpredictable consequences of climate change, resource depletion and other sustainability‐related issues, urgent action is needed to mobilise capital not only through public policies but also by the financial services sector. Therefore, financial market participants and financial advisers should be required to disclose specific information regarding their approaches to the integration of sustainability risks and the consideration of adverse sustainability impacts.”
The language here is telling in the word “impact(s).” It appears 39 times in the 16-page directive. At the same time, the term sustainability risk(s) appears 33 times. “A sustainability risk means an environmental, social or governance event or condition that, if it occurs, could cause a negative material impact on the value of the investment.” There is a fundamental tension here that is not addressed since these are independent variables. A company can be doing a good job of managing its sustainability risks for shareholder value creation, now called “single” or “financial” materiality, while still creating negative impacts on the world, or “impact” materiality. The two combined, as is the case with the European Sinancial Reporting Standards (ESRS) developed by the Sustainability Reporting Board (SRB) of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) for the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), are “double materiality.” As with the CSRD, the EU is expecting a great deal from reporting.
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This begs the question of what is a “sustainable investment?,” as noted above. The term is used 11 times in the directive. It is only defined on the eighth time, halfway through on p. 8:
“‘’sustainable investment’ means an investment in an economic activity that contributes to an environmental objective, as measured, for example, by key resource efficiency indicators on the use of energy, renewable energy, raw materials, water and land, on the production of waste, and greenhouse gas emissions, or on its impact on biodiversity and the circular economy, or an investment in an economic activity that contributes to a social objective, in particular an investment that contributes to tackling inequality or that fosters social cohesion, social integration and labour relations, or an investment in human capital or economically or socially disadvantaged communities, provided that such investments do not significantly harm any of those objectives and that the investee companies follow good governance practices, in particular with respect to sound management structures, employee relations, remuneration of staff and tax compliance.”
This definition makes clear that SFDR is primarily aimed at directing capital to address environmental and social issues, and many are named.
At the same time, there is an added layer—not only must these investments create positive impact, but they must also “not significantly harm any of those [environmental or social] objectives.” This ignores the fact that every company, no matter how well intended, produces negative externalities even when it is diligently operating according to existing laws and regulations. It’s a kind of “have your cake and eat it too” desire. Thrown in at the end is a caveat about good governance which is mentioned three times but never defined. I suspect that most boards of directors, even in Europe, would consider shareholder value creation at the core of good governance. The essence of the message from SFDR is that fund managers should invest in companies that do good, don’t do bad, and have good corporate governance.
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The essential question, then, is whether SFDR has had any real world impact. Has there been a massive reallocation of capital in line with SFDR’s very laudable policy objectives? Although Article 8 funds now account for 55% of European fund assets, Article 9 funds only account for 3.4%. It is safe to say that the increase of Article 8 fund assets has not driven a massive shift in corporate activity to meet the EU’s environmental and social sustainability goals. So is it fair to say that SFDR has not achieved the real world impact that the legislation originally intended? In fact, it’s unclear whether there have been any efforts to actually assess whether SFDR has met the EU’s policy objectives of capital reallocation in service of achieving a more sustainable economy. As the EU revisits SFDR, it will be important to be clear about how to assess the success of any policy objective and what data would be used to measure this.
There is also the important question of how financial returns fit into the SFDR. The answer is “not much.” The term is used exactly one time: “In order to comply with their duties under those rules, financial market participants and financial advisers should integrate in their processes, including in their due diligence processes, and should assess on a continuous basis not only all relevant financial risks but also including all relevant sustainability risks that might have a relevant material negative impact on the financial return of an investment or advice.” So financial return is only discussed in the context of single materiality and completely ignored in the context of impact materiality. It’s as if the legislation assumes no tradeoffs exist. Similarly, the term “value creation” is never used. “Value” is used three times. Twice about sustainability risks and once about insurance products.
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So what should be done? Easy to say but hard to do given the political and economic capital that has been invested in the SFDR. The EU needs to carefully consider what the policy objective of the legislation is, ensure the intended impact is something that is actually achievable through fund disclosure, carefully tailor the legislation to achieve those intended impacts, consider the cost-benefit ratio, and determine how they will measure and assess whether it’s achieving the intended impact. There’s also the important missing piece of returns. Whatever politicians wish capital would do, what it does do is go to where there is the right risk-adjusted return.
Oh, and while disclosure is very important, it’s equally important to not expect too much from it alone.
Finance
Supreme Court case could reshape campaign finance — and open new money pathways into Georgia’s biggest races
A major Supreme Court case could upend how money flows into federal elections, and Georgia may feel the first impact.
Republican Party committees are asking the Court to strike down a longstanding limit on how much political parties can coordinate their spending with candidates. If the justices side with them, experts say it would create new pathways for wealthy donors to steer massive checks into individual battleground races — including in Georgia, one of the country’s most competitive political states.
“It would open the floodgates for the biggest donors across the country to funnel money through the parties into specific Senate or House races,” said Eric Petry, counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice. “That problem would get even worse in places like Georgia.”
The Supreme Court heard arguments this week.
What’s at stake: millions in earmarked political spending
Under current federal rules, parties can assist their candidates but only up to capped limits designed to prevent corruption and donor influence.
If those caps disappear, Petry says a single donor could write a check for over $1 million and effectively tell a national party to direct it toward a specific candidate.
“That poses really significant corruption risks,” he said.
Critics warn that political parties could become conduits for wealthy funders seeking to maximize influence in targeted states, especially fast-changing battlegrounds like Georgia.
Why Georgia could become ground zero
Georgia’s U.S. Senate races routinely draw national attention and tens of millions of dollars in outside spending. Metro Atlanta’s rapid political shifts — and fierce competition statewide — make the state an attractive target for national donors.
Already, Georgia saw historic spending in judicial elections last year, with outside groups pouring money into state Supreme Court contests. Weakening federal guardrails could accelerate that trend.
“We already see big donors funneling tens or hundreds of millions into Super PACs,” Petry said. “If they can now funnel money through political parties — and have that money directly coordinate with candidates — that’s a very real concern.”
Such a ruling could also intensify power struggles within Georgia politics. Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger recently criticized the state’s campaign laws, saying current limits give Lt. Gov. Burt Jones an advantage as both eye the 2026 governor’s race.
Though not weighing in on the Raffensperger dispute directly, Petry said candidates nationwide are “pushing the envelope” to find ways around weak or uneven finance rules, especially as federal regulators remain gridlocked.
A broader crisis of trust in elections
Public concern over the influence of money in politics has never been higher. Large bipartisan majorities — often 70% to 80% of Americans — say wealthy donors have too much sway over elected officials, according to polls cited in the Brennan Center analysis.
Petry said a sweeping deregulatory ruling from the Court could deepen that divide.
“If the biggest donors exert even more influence than they currently do, I would expect public confidence in the campaign finance system to continue to decrease,” he said.
But paradoxically, he added, public frustration might also fuel a renewed push for reforms such as transparency rules or public financing.
Could Congress step in? Not anytime soon.
Even if the Court strikes down the limits, Petry says change isn’t likely to come quickly.
“Realistically, there’s not much chance of legislative action before the 2026 midterms,” he said. “Congress has shown that it doesn’t move quickly — if it moves at all — in this area.”
He argues that the only long-term fix may be a constitutional amendment allowing lawmakers to fully regulate campaign spending — something the Brennan Center says has broad public support.
A ruling that could rival Citizens United
If the justices side with the challengers, legal experts say it could become the most consequential campaign finance ruling since Citizens United, the 2010 decision that unleashed unlimited outside spending.
For Georgia — where elections are increasingly decided by razor-thin margins — the consequences could be immediate and far-reaching.
Finance
Breaking down the arguments in Supreme Court campaign finance case
Finance
Originalism’s campaign finance conundrum
Please note that SCOTUS Outside Opinions constitute the views of outside contributors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SCOTUSblog or its staff.
In a recent interview, Justice Amy Coney Barrett shared her view that “originalism became prominent as a theory” as a counterweight to the theory of “living constitutionalism” that “had become dominant” during the courts led by Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. According to Barrett, whereas the living constitutionalism of the Warren-Burger eras put the court in the position of functionally amending the Constitution by updating its meaning, originalism instead aims to understand “how those who ratified the Constitution understood the words.”
There is no doubt that decisions from the Warren and Burger courts are now open to question by a solid majority of originalist justices; the court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holding that there is no constitutional right to an abortion, is only the most noteworthy example of this. But many other precedents from that same era have not yet received comparable scrutiny, prominent among these being the court’s seminal campaign finance decision in the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo.
When the Supreme Court hears oral argument in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission this morning, Tuesday, Dec. 9, it will confront fundamental questions about the First Amendment and money in politics. But the case also presents an underappreciated puzzle: How should originalists think about Buckley, which created much of our constitutional framework around campaign finance?
What Buckley did
In the early 1970s, Congress crafted legislation aimed at addressing the soaring cost of political campaigns and reducing the perceived influence of wealthy interests. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 passed with bipartisan supermajorities in both chambers. President Richard Nixon signed it into law, noting that “the goal of controlling campaign expenditures was a highly laudable one.” When Congress amended FECA in 1974, which, among other things, further limited the amounts that could be contributed to federal candidates, President Gerald Ford proclaimed: “The unpleasant truth is that big money influence has come to play an unseem[ly] role in our electoral process. This bill will he[l]p to right that wrong.”
Nevertheless, in Buckley – which turns 50 next month – the Supreme Court struck down most of FECA’s core provisions. The court functionally equated spending money in politics with “the freedom of speech” itself, concluding that limits on campaign spending “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” While the court upheld limits on direct contributions to federal candidates as a guard against quid pro quo corruption, it invalidated all limits on expenditures by campaigns or independent groups.
Buckley runs to a remarkable 144 pages in the U.S. Reports — the longest majority opinion the court has ever produced. Yet nowhere in those 144 pages does the court engage in any sort of originalist analysis of the core questions in the case. There’s no sustained examination of what “the freedom of speech” originally entailed, no investigation of how the founding generation would have understood campaign finance regulation, and no inquiry into which institution they expected to resolve such questions.
A methodological resemblance
Indeed, Buckley emerged during a period when originalism was not the court’s dominant mode of constitutional interpretation, and the decision bears striking similarities to other cases that originalists have criticized for lacking grounding in the Constitution’s original meaning. Three examples are especially pertinent.
First, in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice William O. Douglas famously identified a constitutional right to privacy prohibiting states from banning contraception for married couples. He derived this from “penumbras, formed by emanations” of various Bill of Rights provisions, a move which originalists have condemned for creating rights without any clear textual foundation. Buckley took similar leaps, deriving the concept of unlimited campaign spending from the First Amendment’s “freedom of speech” without any consideration of this amendment’s original meaning.
Second is Miranda v. Arizona, decided in 1966, which prescribed specific warnings that police officers must give to individuals in custody. In that case, the court provided no textualist or originalist grounding in the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause. For that reason, originalists have long derided the decision as “inconsistent with the original understanding of the right against self-incrimination” and “a usurpation of legislative and administrative powers, thinly disguised as an exercise in constitutional exegesis[.]” Buckley likewise creates detailed rules constraining democratic choices about campaign finance without any obvious textual commands.
Last is 1973’s Roe v. Wade, which created an elaborate trimester framework that, according to originalists, resembled legislation far more than constitutional interpretation. Like Roe, Buckley constructed a detailed architecture — distinguishing contributions from expenditures, applying different levels of scrutiny to each, and creating categorical rules about corruption — that looks far more legislative than interpretive.
None of this necessarily means that Buckley – or any of the cases cited above – reached the wrong result as a matter of policy. But it does raise questions about methodology. If these forms of reasoning were problematic to originalists in Griswold, Roe, and Miranda, what makes them acceptable in Buckley?
The “who decides” question
Recent originalist scholarship reveals an even deeper problem with Buckley, however. Stanford law professor Jud Campbell’s path-breaking research on the founding era has shown that recovering original meaning requires an understanding of not just what rights the Founders recognized, but which institution they expected to resolve disputes about those rights.
Based on this understanding, and as relevant to Buckley, a key question isn’t merely whether political speech was valued at the founding (it certainly was) – but whether courts were expected to micromanage legislative efforts to address corruption or preserve electoral integrity. And Campbell’s research demonstrates that there was no such view. Instead, the Founders believed that representative institutions could regulate liberty in the public interest – speech included – provided that the people consented through their elected representatives. As Campbell has explained, there is “no evidence that the Founders denied legislative authority to regulate expressive conduct in promotion of the public good — a principle that runs contrary to countless modern decisions.”
Of course, the Founders did expect courts to enforce some constitutional limits. But they expected judges to defer to legislative judgments unless a constitutional violation was clear beyond dispute. Aggressive judicial review using heightened scrutiny is a 20th-century innovation, not a founding-era practice.
But Buckley considered none of this.
Citizens United and beyond
In 2010, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission extended Buckley’s framework, holding that corporations and other entities have a First Amendment right to make unlimited independent expenditures in elections. In doing so, the court struck down longstanding federal restrictions on corporate campaign spending and overruled precedents upholding such limits. The reasoning was pure Buckley: vigorous judicial review, equation of spending with speech, and dismissal of legislative concerns about corruption unless narrowly defined as quid pro quo arrangements. For this reason, Citizens United has also been critiqued as a non-originalist decision.
The court has only continued this pattern. When Montana sought to apply its century-old ban on corporate expenditures – a law rooted in the state’s particular history with corporate domination of politics – the court summarily reversed in a one-paragraph, unsigned opinion. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the majority struck down aggregate limits on individual contributions. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, the court invalidated Arizona’s public financing scheme. Each decision further entrenched the court as the nation’s primary campaign finance regulator, with democratic bodies relegated to implementing the court’s commands.
The contrast with other constitutional areas is striking. In economic regulation, national security, and countless other domains, the court defers to legislative fact-finding and policy judgments. But campaign finance is apparently different. Here the court insists on its own assessment of empirical questions: What constitutes corruption? When does money create the appearance of improper influence? Will such appearance “cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy”?
Implications for NRSC v. FEC
As the court considers NRSC v. FEC, it once again faces a choice about how seriously to take originalism when it comes to campaign finance. The case involves federal contribution limits and party coordination rules – specifically, whether limits on how much political parties can spend on campaign advertising that is coordinated with the party’s candidate for office are consistent with the First Amendment. These are technical questions, but they are rooted in the same framework as Buckley.
An originalist approach would ask not only what the understanding of free speech was at the time of the founding (as Buckley failed to do), but whether campaign finance was understood to be an area of vigorous judicial oversight or legislative primacy. As for the latter concern, the founding generation’s answer seems clear. They valued political speech but expected elected representatives to make judgments about how to structure democratic processes.
Defenders of Buckley might respond that political speech occupies a unique constitutional position, or that judicial protection is essential regardless of original understanding. These are serious arguments. But they represent a departure from originalist methodology rather than an application of it. They prioritize judicial assertiveness over the founding generation’s institutional assumptions.
The question, then, is whether originalism’s principles apply consistently across subject areas, or whether campaign finance represents a special case in which other considerations override originalist constraints. If the latter, the court should say so explicitly rather than leaving the tension implicit.
This doesn’t prejudge how NRSC should come out. The court might conclude (unlike in Dobbs) that stare decisis counsels retaining Buckley despite originalist doubts concerning it. Or it might begin the process of unwinding Buckley’s framework, returning campaign finance to democratic processes while maintaining a limited judicial role. Or it might articulate why campaign finance truly is exceptional in ways the Founders would have recognized. But it is high time that the court confronts this tension directly rather than allow Buckley to further distort its approach to such a vital area of the democratic process.
Disclosure: American Promise filed an amicus brief in support of neither party in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission.
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