The Kurds’ Washington Dilemma

The Kurds are once again confronting a dilemma in their relationship with the United States. This time it is in Iran. Reports indicate that Washington may be exploring ways to train and support Iranian Kurdish forces for a potential ground offensive inside Iran, as U.S. and Israeli strikes continue to target the regime’s military and security infrastructure from the air. President Donald Trump even said it would be “wonderful” if the Kurds launch such an offensive.

For the Kurds, the situation revives a long-standing calculation: Aligning with Washington offers opportunities but carries the risk of abandonment, but refusing cooperation may prove even more costly in a volatile region.

It may seem natural for Iranian Kurds to align with Washington as the clerical regime in Tehran crumbles. After all, the Kurds, who make up roughly 10 percent in a country of 92 million, long have been among the most marginalized communities in Iran. Their cultural rights are restricted, political representation nonexistent, and Kurdish regions neglected economically. The regime treats even modest efforts to promote Kurdish language and culture have as security threats, with activists and teachers facing arrest and imprisonment. This systematic repression has turned the Kurds into a cohesive bloc of opposition to the Iranian regime.

Moreover, the Kurds in Iran, like in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, are largely secular and pro-American. Their willingness to work with Washington is not merely an act of opportunism aimed at benefiting from a superpower. Rather, many Kurdish political movements view partnership with the United States as aligned with their broader aspiration for democratic governance and a secular political order. Ordinary Kurds generally hold a strong affinity for America.

Repressive policies across the region have contributed to the emergence of a survival mechanism among the Kurds, most evident in their highly disciplined and organized military mindset. It is mainly for this reason that Washington has often relied on Kurdish forces to undertake some of the most difficult tasks that even conventional militaries sometimes struggle to accomplish. It has created a unique partnership to which American commanders working with Kurds, particularly in Syria, can readily attest.

Yet both distant and recent episodes of Kurdish partnership with the United States send mixed signals to the Kurds, especially now in Iran, about whether a military alignment with Washington would serve their long-term strategic interests.

This is a paradox. American policies have shaped both the major gains and setbacks experienced by the Kurds at different historical stages. The losses suffered by Kurds and the status they enjoy in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Syria, are in large part the result of American intervention and protection. The U.S.-Kurdish partnership, therefore, is far from black and white; it is complex and unfolds across multiple national borders.

Part of this asymmetrical partnership with the United States is the Kurds’ lack of sovereignty. Without a state of their own, the Kurds remain not only subject to the shifting priorities of different U.S. administrations, but also lack the institutional tools needed to formalize and sustain a long-term partnership with Washington.

But Washington has the tools to recalibrate its relationship with Kurds across the region. It remains the primary power shaping developments the Middle East. And as a new regional order seems to be emerging, it is critical for the United States to maintain more partners who are aligned with its vision. Particularly in Iran, if the current war leads to regime change, having a reliable partner such as Kurds could offer Washington important strategic leverage to shape the country’s future governance.