The recently released bipartisan report into the assassination attempt on Donald Trump details several damning failures of the United States’ Secret Service (USSS), from organizational miscommunications to technological difficulties experienced on-site.

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) report discusses the July 30 testimony of Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director of the USSS, who informed the committee that the assassination attempt was a result of “a failure on multiple levels.”

The USSS testimony was regarding the assassination attempt on Donald Trump at a Pennsylvania rally on July 13 which left two people, including the 20 year-old shooter Thomas Matthew Crooks, dead, and the former President injured.

The HSGAC report details the multiple missteps taken by the USSS, as noted by Acting Director Rowe. It also details other testimonies given to the HSGAC and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Per the report, the committee found: “USSS failures in planning, communications, security, and allocation of resources for the July 13, 2024 Butler rally were foreseeable, preventable, and directly related to the events resulting in the assassination attempt that day.”

The committee identified five key failures. They said the USSS:

1. Failed to clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13 rally.
2. Failed to ensure the AGR Building from which Crooks shot was effectively covered.
3. Failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement.
4. Failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have enhanced security.
5. Failed to communicate information about the suspicious person to key personnel and to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump.

The report then goes into its twelve detailed findings about what went wrong on the day of the attempted assassination. These range from interdepartmental miscommunications, a failure to communicate with other law enforcement agencies, and technological difficulties.

The report shows several communication failures within the USSS and between the USSS, local law enforcement, and the FBI.

Per the report the: “USSS personnel were notified of a suspicious person with a range finder around the AGR building approximately 27 minutes before the shooting.” However, USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart told the committee that this information was not relayed to them, and they did not know of the suspicious person on the roof.

They also claimed that local officers lost track of the individual before the shots were fired. They were then only informed of a shooter on the AGR Building roof that Crooks was on two minutes before shots were fired.

On top of that, despite seeing local law enforcement running toward the AGR Building, a USSS countersniper did not alert Donald Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage.

The USSS and the FBI were also not on the same page regarding the threat posed by Crooks. Countersnipers from the USSS were at the rally due to “credible intelligence” of a threat at the event. However, the FBI said Crooks was not known to them.

Additionally, despite the Butler Emergency Services Unit telling the USSS that they did not have enough manpower to lock down the AGR Building, the USSS failed to take responsibility for the building as it was on the “outer perimeter,” and failed to send agents to cover the building.

To make communications matters worse, there were two communication centers at the event, one center run by the USSS and a separate center run by local law enforcement. They communicated with each other via cellphone, and were at least 120 yards apart.

The report states that the two camps also operated on separate radio channels, and where the local channels were recorded on July 13, USSS radio transmissions were not recorded.

There were also several technological failures at the event including the Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) which experienced technical problems to the point that the agent responsible for the C-UAS—who only had three months of experience working with the equipment—had to call a toll-free 888 tech support hotline “to start troubleshooting with the company.”

And, as well as working on separate radio frequencies, at one point USSS agents reported technical difficulties with their radios. These agents were a USSS Hercules 1 counter sniper who was unable to pick up a local radio because he was too busy fixing his own radio, and the USSS Special Agent In Charge (SAIC) who had no radio after giving his to the Lead Advance Agent whose radio was not working.

The report also notes that within these failures was a lack of accountability across the USSS, and blame deflection across the chain of command.

When asked for comment, Anthony Guglielmi, U.S. Secret Service Chief of Communications told Newsweek: “We have reviewed the interim report on the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump. The weight of our mission is not lost on us and in this hyperdynamic threat environment, the U.S. Secret Service cannot fail.

“Many of the insights gained from the Senate report align with the findings from our mission assurance review and are essential to ensuring that what happened on July 13 never happens again.”

Guglielmi added: “Former President Donald Trump is receiving the highest level of protection that the U.S. Secret Service can provide, and we will continue to evaluate and adjust our specific protective measures and methodology based on each location and situation.”

Guglielmi also said that the USSS is cooperating with Congress, the FBI, the DHS Independent Review, DHS Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office.

Additionally Guglielmi said the USSS is working transparently and in good faith with Congress, and has given them more than 3,300 pages of documents since July 13, and more than 50 hours of transcribed interviews.

He said: “The U.S. Secret Service has implemented changes to our protective operations including elevating the protective posture for our protectees and bolstering our protective details as appropriate in order to ensure the highest levels of safety and security for those we protect.”