Connect with us

Finance

Non-bank financial institutions’ reliance on banks for contingent credit under stress and its consequences

Published

on

In recent years, banks’ credit line exposure to ‘shadow banks’, or non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), has grown significantly faster than exposure to non-financial corporations. Between 2013 and 2023, bank credit lines to NBFIs tripled from $500 billion to $1.5 trillion, and in 2023 over 20% of all bank credit lines were committed to NBFIs (Acharya et al. 2024). How do the growing linkages between banks and NBFIs impact the performance and systemic stability of banks? We answer this question by studying an important leading example of a non-bank financial institution – real estate investment trusts (REITs; Acharya et al. 2025).

REITs are significant investors in commercial real estate (CRE), with over $4 trillion in investments, corresponding to 20% of the CRE market that is currently valued at $21 trillion.
Rising interest rates and an economic slowdown can therefore exert considerable pressure on the CRE sector.
Considering the vast scale of the CRE market, disruptions in the CRE sector can influence the availability of bank credit to households and businesses. Consequently, regulators and policymakers have increasingly focused on the risks associated with CRE loans in recent times. REITs, being large CRE investors, inherit these fundamental economic and financial risks.

Importantly, nearly half of all bank-originated credit lines to public NBFIs are allocated to REITs. As shown in Figure 1, REITs exhibit significantly higher utilisation rates on bank credit lines compared to other NBFIs and non-financial corporates. Moreover, their credit line usage is markedly more sensitive to aggregate market performance, as indicated by the slope coefficients in the figure. Notably, REIT utilisation rates spike during periods of market stress (such as the COVID-19 period), making credit lines to REITs a potentially significant source of systemic risk for banks.

However, despite these factors, the significant exposure of large banks to the CRE sector via their credit lines to REITs is often underappreciated. It is commonly assumed that disruptions in the CRE sector mainly affect smaller banks. Figure 2 illustrates the on-balance-sheet exposure in the form of CRE loans as a proportion of total equity over the past decade for three types of banks: community banks (assets under $10 billion), regional banks (assets between $10 billion and $100 billion), and large banks (assets exceeding $100 billion). The exposure of regional and community banks, when scaled by equity, is approximately four and five times greater, respectively, than that of large banks. As per this exposure measure, there has been a notable increase over the past decade in CRE loan exposure among regional and, especially, community banks, but not among large banks. This might suggest that the CRE stress does not pose systemic risk to the largest banks in the economy.

Figure 1 Average credit line utilisation by borrower group

Advertisement
Notes: This figure plots the average credit line utilisation rate by three groups of borrowers – REITs, NBFIs (excluding REITs), and non-financial companies – versus the S&P 500 return. Each dot indicates the utilisation rate in one of the quarters between 2005Q1 and 2023Q4. The dots for 2008Q4 and 2020Q1 are labelled to highlight the main crisis quarters. The solid blue line indicates the slope of a regression of utilisation rates onto the S&P 500 return for REITs, the dashed red line and the green dotted line indicate the respective slopes of the same regression for NBFIs excluding REITs and non-financial companies. Data are obtained from Capital IQ and CRSP.

However, these figures ignore loans and credit lines provided by banks to REITs. The primary conclusion that emerges from our empirical analysis is that to get a complete picture of bank exposure to CRE risks, it is important to focus not just on the direct CRE exposure of banks but also on the provision of credit, especially by large banks, to REITs. Once the indirect exposure of banks via term loans and credit lines to REITs is accounted for, CRE exposures are concentrated not only in the portfolios of smaller banks but also among the largest US banks. Figure 3 illustrates this fact. In this figure, we categorise bank exposure into direct CRE exposure, indirect exposure via term loans to REITs, and indirect exposure through credit lines to REITs. For large banks, indirect exposure constitutes about a third of their total exposure, whereas for regional banks, the indirect exposure through REITs is considerably smaller, and for community banks, it is practically negligible.

Figure 2 Total on-balance-sheet exposure to the commercial real estate market

Notes: This figure shows the total reported on-balance sheet exposure to the commercial real estate market scaled by the total book value of equity of the bank. Data are from the FR Y-C at the quarterly frequency from 2013Q1 to 2023Q4. We split banks into three types: community banks (assets

Figure 3 Total exposure of banks to commercial real estate

Notes: This figure shows the total exposure of banks to commercial real estate (CRE) by stacking their direct exposure through on-balance sheet CRE loans and indirect exposure through banks’ term loans and credit lines to Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Banks are classified as follows: community banks (assets
Advertisement

What, then, are the underlying mechanisms through which credit-line exposure of banks to REITs might pose a system-wide risk? In summary, there is a higher utilisation rate of credit lines by REITs relative to other NBFIs and non-financial corporates, especially when the performance of the underlying real estate assets declines and particularly during periods of aggregate economic stress. This behaviour is associated with a notable decrease in stock returns for banks more heavily exposed to undrawn credit lines extended to REITs, consistent with capital encumbrance imposed by credit line drawdowns impeding banks’ future intermediation activities.

We first tease out why REITs have higher utilisation rates on credit lines, especially during stress. By regulation, REITs are required to pay out at least 90% of their income in the form of dividends, restricting the amount of cash REITs can accumulate.
This leads to a disproportionately large dependence of REITs on bank credit lines for liquidity during stress periods. For example, Blackstone REIT (BREIT) and SREIT (managed by Starwood Capital) relied on their lines of credit during 2022 and 2024 respectively, nearly exhausting their credit line capacity to satisfy investor withdrawal requests.
We show that the findings in these case studies generalise to a broader setting in which we find significant positive correlations between redemptions and credit line drawdowns for all REITs in our sample. We also find that REITs increase investments and dividend payouts and reduce cash in the four quarters after a drawdown. This seems to indicate that they use both their cash and the liquidity from credit lines to acquire properties and pay out dividends. During crises (Global Crisis and COVID-19) however, we find that REITs start building cash buffers and they discontinue investing, i.e. acquiring properties. In fact, 72 cents of each dollar drawn is used to increase cash holdings. In other words, REITs use bank credit lines like ‘working capital’ for business activities in normal times, but to hoard cash during stress times.

We next investigate the impact of higher credit line utilisation by REITs on banks. Unlike term loan exposures that banks report on their balance sheet and fund with capital, and whose potential risks they manage through loan loss provisions, credit lines are off-balance-sheet and funded with equity capital to a much lesser extent until drawn down. Moreover, the risk of simultaneous drawdowns by borrowers during widespread market stress may suddenly constrain bank capital and/or liquidity, thereby reducing the banks’ ability to intermediate effectively. Consistent with these channels, we find that banks with higher undrawn credit line commitments to REITs experience lower stock returns during crises (controlling for banks’ total credit line commitments).

Finally, we document that credit lines to REITs substantially increase banks’ capital requirements during aggregate stress periods. We estimate an expected (market-equity-based) capital shortfall under aggregate market stress (e.g. -40% correction to MSCI Global Index) vis-à-vis a benchmark capital requirement (e.g. 8% of market equity relative to market equity plus non-equity liabilities), by incorporating REIT and non-REIT credit lines in stress test scenarios. We compare three models: one treating all borrowers uniformly, one distinguishing REITs by their unique drawdown behaviour, and one considering direct on-balance-sheet CRE exposure. As of Q4 2023, we estimate that the incremental capital requirement for publicly traded US banks rises by approximately 20% — from $180 billion to $217 billion — primarily due to REIT drawdowns, while CRE exposures add only $2 billion. Notably, over 90% of this additional capital burden falls on large banks. These results highlight the systemic risks posed to banks, and in turn to the real economy, by REIT credit lines, underscoring the need for careful regulatory scrutiny.

While we have focused on publicly traded REITs, this raises broader questions about the growing linkages between banks and NBFIs. Acharya et al. (2024) document that NBFI drawdowns have risen from 25% in 2013 to over 50% post‐COVID, with private NBFIs accounting for nearly 60% of drawdowns by private firms (compared to 30% for public ones). Additionally, credit lines to NBFIs such as business development companies (BDCs) and collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) have increased from 28% to 42% of total bank credit to NBFIs between 2013 and 2023. Given that private NBFIs generally exhibit higher credit line utilisation rates than REITs, stress in their funding conditions could similarly affect banks via the credit line channel. In essence, as NBFIs continue to expand their role in credit intermediation, their continuing reliance on banks for contingent liquidity highlights a critical channel through which risks may be transmitted back to the banking system.

Advertisement

References

Acharya, V V, N Cetorelli and B Tuckman (2024), “Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?”, NBER Working Paper.

Acharya, V V, M Gopal, M Jager and S Steffen (2025), “Shadow Always Touches the Feet: Implications of Bank Credit Lines to Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries”, NBER Working Paper No. w33590.

Gupta, A, V Mittal and S Van Nieuwerburgh (2022), “Work from home and the office real estate apocalypse”, Working Paper, NYU Stern School of Business.

Hardin III, W and M Hill (2011), “Credit line availability and utilization in REITs”, Journal of Real Estate Research 33: 507–530.

Jiang, E X, G Matvos, T Piskorski and A Seru (2023), “Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility”, NBER Working Paper.

Advertisement

Mei, J and A Saunders (1995), “Bank risk and real estate: an asset pricing perspective”, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 10: 199–224.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

Finance

Africa’s climate finance rules are growing, but they’re weakly enforced – new research

Published

on

Africa’s climate finance rules are growing, but they’re weakly enforced – new research

Climate change is no longer just about melting ice or hotter summers. It is also a financial problem. Droughts, floods, storms and heatwaves damage crops, factories and infrastructure. At the same time, the global push to cut greenhouse gas emissions creates risks for countries that depend on oil, gas or coal.

These pressures can destabilise entire financial systems, especially in regions already facing economic fragility. Africa is a prime example.

Although the continent contributes less than 5% of global carbon emissions, it is among the most vulnerable. In Mozambique, repeated cyclones have destroyed homes, roads and farms, forcing banks and insurers to absorb heavy losses. Kenya has experienced severe droughts that hurt agriculture, reducing farmers’ ability to repay loans. In north Africa, heatwaves strain electricity grids and increase water scarcity.

These physical risks are compounded by “transition risks”, like declining revenues from fossil fuel exports or higher borrowing costs as investors worry about climate instability. Together, they make climate governance through financial policies both urgent and complex. Without these policies, financial systems risk being caught off guard by climate shocks and the transition away from fossil fuels.

This is where climate-related financial policies come in. They provide the tools for banks, insurers and regulators to manage risks, support investment in greener sectors and strengthen financial stability.

Advertisement

Regulators and banks across Africa have started to adopt climate-related financial policies. These range from rules that require banks to consider climate risks, to disclosure standards, green lending guidelines, and green bond frameworks. These tools are being tested in several countries. But their scope and enforcement vary widely across the continent.

My research compiles the first continent-wide database of climate-related financial policies in Africa and examines how differences in these policies – and in how binding they are – affect financial stability and the ability to mobilise private investment for green projects.

A new study I conducted reviewed more than two decades of policies (2000–2025) across African countries. It found stark differences.

South Africa has developed the most comprehensive framework, with policies across all categories. Kenya and Morocco are also active, particularly in disclosure and risk-management rules. In contrast, many countries in central and west Africa have introduced only a few voluntary measures.

Why does this matter? Voluntary rules can help raise awareness and encourage change, but on their own they often do not go far enough. Binding measures, on the other hand, tend to create stronger incentives and steadier progress. So far, however, most African climate-related financial policies remain voluntary. This leaves climate risk as something to consider rather than a firm requirement.

Advertisement

Uneven landscape

In Africa, the 2015 Paris Agreement marked a clear turning point. Around that time, policy activity increased noticeably, suggesting that international agreements and standards could help create momentum and visibility for climate action. The expansion of climate-related financial policies was also shaped by domestic priorities and by pressure from international investors and development partners.

But since the late 2010s, progress has slowed. Limited resources, overlapping institutional responsibilities and fragmented coordination have made it difficult to sustain the earlier pace of reform.

Looking across the continent, four broad patterns have emerged.

A few countries, such as South Africa, have developed comprehensive frameworks. These include:

  • disclosure rules (requirements for banks and companies to report how climate risks affect them)

  • stress tests (simulations of extreme climate or transition scenarios to see whether banks would remain resilient).

Others, including Kenya and Morocco, are steadily expanding their policy mix, even if institutional capacity is still developing.

Advertisement

Some, such as Nigeria and Egypt, are moderately active, with a focus on disclosure rules and green bonds. (Those are bonds whose proceeds are earmarked to finance environmentally friendly projects such as renewable energy, clean transport or climate-resilient infrastructure.)

Finally, many countries in central and west Africa have introduced only a limited number of measures, often voluntary in nature.

This uneven landscape has important consequences.

The net effect

In fossil fuel-dependent economies such as South Africa, Egypt and Algeria, the shift away from coal, oil and gas could generate significant transition risks. These include:

  • financial instability, for example when asset values in carbon-intensive sectors fall sharply or credit exposures deteriorate

  • stranded assets, where fossil fuel infrastructure and reserves lose their economic value before the end of their expected life because they can no longer be used or are no longer profitable under stricter climate policies.

Addressing these challenges may require policies that combine investment in new, low-carbon sectors with targeted support for affected workers, communities and households.

Advertisement

Climate finance affects people directly. When droughts lead to loan defaults, local banks are strained. Insurance companies facing repeated payouts after floods may raise premiums. Pension funds invested in fossil fuels risk devaluations as these assets lose value. Climate-related financial policies therefore matter not only for regulators and markets, but also for jobs, savings, and everyday livelihoods.

At the same time, there are opportunities.

Firstly, expanding access to green bonds and sustainability-linked loans can channel private finance into renewable energy, clean transport, or resilient infrastructure.

Secondly, stronger disclosure rules can improve transparency and investor confidence.

Thirdly, regional harmonisation through common reporting standards, for example, would reduce fragmentation. This would make it easier for Africa to attract global climate finance.

Advertisement

Looking ahead

International forums such as the UN climate conferences (COP) and the G20 have helped to push this agenda forward, mainly by setting expectations rather than hard rules. These initiatives create pressure and guidance. But they remain soft law. Turning them into binding, enforceable rules still depends on decisions taken by national regulators and governments.

International partners such as the African Development Bank and the African Union could support coordination by promoting continental standards that define what counts as a green investment. Donors and multilateral lenders may also provide technical expertise and financial support to countries with weaker systems, helping them move from voluntary guidelines toward more enforceable rules.

South Africa, already a regional leader, could share its experience with stress testing and green finance frameworks.

Africa also has the potential to position itself as a hub for renewable energy and sustainable finance. With vast solar and wind resources, expanding urban centres, and an increasingly digital financial sector, the continent could leapfrog towards a greener future if investment and regulation advance together.

Success stories in Kenya’s sustainable banking practices and Morocco’s renewable energy expansion show that progress is possible when financial systems adapt.

Advertisement

What happens next will matter greatly. By expanding and enforcing climate-related financial rules, Africa can reduce its vulnerability to climate shocks while unlocking opportunities in green finance and renewable energy.

Continue Reading

Finance

'There Could Be A Whole Other Life He's Living' 'The Ramsey Show' Host Says After Wife Finds $209K Debt Behind Her Back

Published

on

'There Could Be A Whole Other Life He's Living' 'The Ramsey Show' Host Says After Wife Finds 9K Debt Behind Her Back
A hidden financial discovery exposed the scale of debt inside a long-running marriage. Anne, a caller from Pittsburgh, reached out to “The Ramsey Show” for guidance after uncovering $209,000 in credit card balances. Married for 19 years and now in her 50s, she said the balances accumulated without her knowledge. She said her husband managed nearly all household finances. Anne added that her name was not on the primary bank account. She had no online access, and both personal and business expense
Continue Reading

Finance

Will Trump’s US$200 Billion MBS Purchase Directive Reshape Federal National Mortgage Association’s (FNMA) Core Narrative?

Published

on

Will Trump’s US0 Billion MBS Purchase Directive Reshape Federal National Mortgage Association’s (FNMA) Core Narrative?
In early January 2026, President Donald Trump directed government representatives, widely understood to include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to purchase US$200 billion in mortgage-backed securities to push mortgage rates and monthly payments lower. Beyond its housing affordability goal, the move highlights how heavily the administration is leaning on government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae to influence credit conditions and the mortgage market’s structure. With this large-scale…
Continue Reading

Trending