Finance
Campaign finance rules and their effects on election outcomes
Cash’s affect on politics has lengthy been the topic of debate.
That is notably true within the US, the place spending on federal elections has greater than tripled in 20 years, from $4.6 billion within the 2000 federal election cycle (adjusted for inflation to 2020 US {dollars}) to $14.4 billion in 2020. However even in Europe, the place marketing campaign spending is much extra modest, there are considerations about cash distorting elections. Cagé and Dewitte (2022) present that within the UK, whereas spending in actual phrases has gone down over the past 150 years, the correlation between spending and profitable has strengthened.
For over a century, however notably for the reason that Sixties, democracies around the globe have instituted reforms to degree their electoral taking part in fields. Some nations, together with Brazil and the UK, have set necessary spending limits. Others, together with Canada, France, Italy, and South Korea, have mixed spending limits with public reimbursement of marketing campaign expenditures – the thought being that the cap might decrease spending by well-resourced candidates whereas reimbursement can increase spending by poorer candidates. The US makes use of a system with extra leeway: candidates for president (and for state workplace in 14 states) can select both to adjust to a spending restrict and be reimbursed for bills as much as a certain quantity, or to not comply and forgo the general public funds. Barack Obama in 2008 grew to become the primary presidential candidate to decide out of public funding with a purpose to spend limitless sums, and all Democratic and Republican presidential nominees since then have achieved the identical.
However what are the consequences of those insurance policies?
The theoretical literature generates two common, opposing predictions on the consequences of marketing campaign financing (see Stratmann 2005 for a overview). Some research counsel that larger spending can sign higher-quality candidates and allow broader dissemination of knowledge very important to voters’ decision-making (e.g. Prat 2002, Coate 2004). Different research counsel that larger spending provides candidates with entry to extra sources an unfair benefit, main them to win elections even when they don’t seem to be larger high quality or extra consultant of voters’ preferences (Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2012, Pastine and Pastine 2012). Per this literature is the priority that unregulated use of marketing campaign cash might result in a wasteful arms race and facilitate the seize of the democratic course of by rich people and curiosity teams (e.g. Baron 1994, Grossman and Helpman 1996).
Whereas many papers have checked out how a candidate’s spending influences their probabilities of profitable (e.g. Bekkouche and Cagé 2019), proof on the causal impression of monetary laws is scarce. Certainly, these guidelines are normally enacted on the nation degree, limiting the variation out there for credible estimates. Two latest papers utilizing quasi-experimental designs discover that spending caps scale back the incumbency benefit and improve competitiveness in Brazil (Avis et al. 2022) and the UK (Fouirnaies 2021).
These research make clear the consequences of spending limits, however no experimental or quasi-experimental analysis up to now has given proof on the consequences of state reimbursement of marketing campaign expenditures. That is an space of explicit curiosity, since reimbursement insurance policies is perhaps thought-about probably the most bold extensively carried out means to cut back cash’s affect in elections.
In a brand new paper, three of us (Broberg, Tricaud, and Pons) take a look at the impression of marketing campaign finance laws in French native elections (Broberg et al. 2022). Utilizing a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we look at electoral districts simply above the inhabitants threshold of 9,000 inhabitants at which spending limits and reimbursements kick in, and evaluate them to electoral districts just under that threshold the place there aren’t any caps or reimbursements however different laws are similar. The outcomes point out that marketing campaign finance laws typically – and state reimbursements of expenditures, specifically – can degree the taking part in subject and considerably lower the incumbency benefit.
An impact, however from spending caps or reimbursements?
Native authorities in France contains completely different elected councils accountable for completely different areas of governance. Departmental councils exert duty over tradition, native improvement, social help, training, housing, transportation, and tourism. They’re made up of particular person representatives of native electoral districts known as cantons. In every district, the highest candidate wins the race within the first spherical in the event that they obtain greater than half the vote – in any other case, the top-two candidates within the first spherical go on to a second spherical, together with all different candidates above a sure vote share threshold.
Because the Nineties, all districts with over 9,000 residents have spending caps for departmental elections, however the restrict depends upon the dimensions of the district. These caps are strictly enforced; violators can face jail time.
Spending limits apply to the overall spending on the marketing campaign (together with contributions by supporters), however the reimbursements apply solely to the candidate’s private expenditures. What this implies on the bottom is that every one candidates (or all those that can count on to get at the least 5% of the vote) can spend as much as half of the cap degree with their very own cash and be reimbursed for it. Candidates can spend extra – both with their very own cash or utilizing donations from others – however they will not be reimbursed for it, they usually should stay under the cap in any case.
We discover that in French departmental elections:
1. Spending caps and the reimbursement of marketing campaign expenditures make elections extra aggressive. The whole variety of candidates is unaffected, however the odds that any candidate obtains a majority of votes and wins the election within the first spherical lower by 10.9 proportion factors.
2. The laws profit those that have made unsuccessful bids in previous elections, in addition to newcomers to the political scene. The possibilities a earlier runner-up wins the election improve by 5.2 proportion factors, and the probabilities a candidate absent from the earlier election wins improve by 9.2 proportion factors. Total, the incumbent’s re-election likelihood decreases by 14.5 proportion factors. These results consequence from incumbents being much less prone to run for re-election, former challengers extra prone to run, and incumbents being much less possible – and challengers extra possible – to win conditional on working.
3. Polarisation and representativeness of the outcomes are unaffected by the laws. Utilizing a measure of right-left political orientation, we don’t discover that extra excessive candidates are profitable, or that winners are much less consultant of their constituents’ political preferences.
4. Left-wing candidates achieve probably the most from the laws. That is according to the truth that, earlier than reimbursements had been launched, left-wing candidates obtained lower than half of the quantity of personal donations obtained by right-wing candidates, making reimbursements notably worthwhile to them.
These results are pronounced, however do they consequence from the cap or the reimbursement? A quirk in how the laws had been instituted provides us some perception on this query.
The spending caps had been launched in electoral districts above 9,000 residents in 1990, however reimbursements of marketing campaign expenditures weren’t launched till 1995 (additionally in districts above 9,000 residents). That offers us the 1992 and 1994 elections to watch the consequences of the caps alone.
We don’t discover any impact once we look at these elections, suggesting that our important results are pushed by the reimbursement of candidates greater than expenditure ceilings. Within the paper, we give additional help for this interpretation primarily based on the composition of candidates’ contributions earlier than and after the introduction of reimbursements in 1995.
A extra nuanced view of election reform
We additionally studied elections on the municipal degree (the bottom tier of native governance in France) however discovered null results of the laws. There are a few potential causes for this. Municipal elections use a listing system the place voters choose not from particular person candidates however from lists, together with the mayoral candidate and the candidates for the municipal council. Listing voting and different proportional programs are frequent in Europe. They search to make sure that events have illustration in authorities proportional to their membership among the many inhabitants, giving smaller events a lift they lack within the US, the place plurality elections (additionally known as majority or winner-take-all programs) seen within the departmental elections described above are practically common.
Within the checklist system in French municipalities, marketing campaign expenditures could be break up throughout members of the checklist, so sources introduced by fellow candidates might lower the scope for public funding to make a distinction. Additionally, incumbents are in a position to invite allies and rivals alike to affix their checklist, which places them in a extra highly effective place to face up to political events pressuring them to remain out of the race.
All in all, we present that, within the French native system at the least, marketing campaign finance laws, notably state reimbursements of expenditures, can degree the taking part in subject and help newcomers with out reducing the representativeness of elections. Our outcomes counsel that this can be extra true in plurality elections frequent within the US than in proportional elections extra frequent in parliamentary programs.
Our outcomes name for extra analysis on reimbursements to raised perceive wherein contexts they’re simplest. The potential energy of reimbursements to cut back the affect of cash in elections is particularly fascinating given the issues entailed by setting spending caps – it’s typically laborious to find out what restrict would constrain well-resourced candidates sufficient to assist outsiders.
For nations just like the US, the place one election cycle is shortly adopted by fundraising for the following – and France, the place entry to even nonpecuniary sources is the topic of heated debate –a higher data of which regulation can assist degree the taking part in subject might finally strengthen democracy.
References
Avis, E, C Ferraz, F Finan, and C Varjao (2022), “Cash and politics: The consequences of marketing campaign spending limits on political entry and competitors”, American Financial Journal: Utilized Economics, forthcoming.
Baron, D P (1994), “Electoral competitors with knowledgeable and uninformed voters”, American Political Science Evaluation 88(1): 33-47.
Bekkouche Y and J Cagé (2019), “How cash can flip electoral outcomes the wrong way up”, VoxEU.org, 14 September.
Broberg, N, V Pons, and C Tricaud (2022), “The impression of marketing campaign finance guidelines on candidate choice and electoral outcomes: Proof from France”, NBER Working Paper 29805.
Cagé, J, and E Dewitte (2022), “The persistent function of cash in UK politics”, VoxEU.org, 4 February.
Coate, S (2004), “Pareto-improving marketing campaign finance coverage”, American Financial Evaluation 94(3): 628-655.
Fouirnaies, A (2021), “How do marketing campaign spending limits have an effect on elections? Proof from the UK 1885–2019”, American Political Science Evaluation 115(2): 395–411.
Grossman, G M and E Helpman (1996), “Electoral competitors and particular curiosity politics”, The Evaluation of Financial Research 63(2): 265-286.
Iaryczower, M, and A Mattozzi (2012), “The professional-competitive impact of marketing campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections”, Financial Concept 49(3): 591–619.
Pastine, I and T Pastine (2012), “Incumbency benefit and political marketing campaign spending limits”, Journal of Public Economics 96(1-2): 20–32.
Prat, A (2002), “Marketing campaign promoting and voter welfare”, The Evaluation of Financial Research 69(4): 999-1017.
Stratmann, T (2005), “Some discuss: Cash in politics. a (partial) overview of the literature”, Coverage challenges and political responses, 135–156.
Finance
Unlocking Opportunities in the Age of Digital Finance
Emerging technologies like big data, AI and blockchain are reshaping finance. New products, such as platform finance, peer-to-peer lending and robo-advisory services, are examples of this transformation. These developments raise important questions: How concerned should traditional financial institutions be? What strategies can fintech and “techfin” (technology companies that move into financial services) disruptors adopt to secure their place in this evolving landscape?
There are two main threats to the traditional finance industry. The first comes from fintech companies. These firms offer specialised services, such as cryptocurrency-trading platforms like Robinhood or currency exchange services like Wise. Their strength lies in solving problems that traditional banks and wealth managers have yet to address or have chosen not to address given their cost and risk implications.
The second threat comes from techfin giants like Alibaba, Tencent and Google. These companies already have vast ecosystems of clients. They aren’t just offering new technology – they are providing financial services that compete directly with traditional banks. By leveraging their existing customer bases, they are gaining ground in the financial sector.
A common problem for traditional players is their belief that technology is simply a tool for improving efficiency. Banks often adopt digital solutions to compete with fintech and techfin firms, thinking that faster or cheaper services will suffice. However, this approach is flawed. It’s like putting an old product in new packaging. These disruptors aren’t just offering faster services – they’re solving needs that traditional banks are overlooking.
Evolving client expectations
One area where traditional players have fallen short is meeting the needs of investors who can’t afford the high entry costs set by banks. Fintech and techfin companies have successfully targeted these overlooked groups.
A prime example is Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao. It revolutionised stock market participation for millions of retail investors in China. Traditional banks set high transaction thresholds, effectively shutting out smaller investors. Yu’e Bao, however, saw the potential of pooling the contributions of millions of small investors. This approach allowed them to create a massive fund that allowed these individuals to access the markets. Traditional banks had missed this opportunity. The equivalent of Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao in a decentralised ecosystem is robo-advisors, which create financial inclusion for otherwise neglected retail investors.
These examples show that disruptors aren’t just using new technologies. They are changing the game entirely. By rethinking how financial services are delivered, fintech and techfin firms are offering access, flexibility and affordability in ways traditional institutions have not.
What can traditional players do?
For traditional financial institutions to remain competitive, they need to change their strategies. First, they should consider slimming down. The era of universal banks that try to do everything is over. Customers no longer want one-stop-shops – they seek tailored solutions.
Second, instead of offering only their own products, banks could bundle them with those of other providers. By acting more as advisors than product pushers, they can add value to clients. Rather than compete directly with fintech or techfin firms, banks could collaborate with them. Offering a diverse range of solutions would build trust with clients.
Finally, banks must stop demanding exclusivity from clients. Today’s customers prefer a multi-channel approach. They want the freedom to select from a variety of services across different platforms. Banks need to stop “locking in” clients with high exit fees and transaction costs. Instead, they should retain clients by offering real value. When clients feel free to come and go, they are more likely to stay because they know they’re receiving unbiased advice and products that meet their needs.
This would require taking an “open-platform” approach that focuses more on pulling customers in because they are attracted by the benefits of the ecosystem than locking them in or gating their exit. It is akin to Microsoft’s switch from a closed-source to an open-source model.
Do fintech and techfin have the winning formula?
While traditional players face their own challenges, fintech and techfin companies must also stay sharp. Though they excel at creating niche services, these disruptors often lack a broader understanding of the financial ecosystem. Many fintech and techfin firms are highly specialised. They know their products well, but they may not fully understand their competition or how to position themselves in the larger market.
For these disruptors, the key to long-term success lies in collaboration. By learning more about traditional players – and even partnering with them – fintech and techfin companies can position themselves for sustainable growth. Whether through alliances or by filling service gaps in traditional banks, fintech and techfin firms can benefit from a better understanding of their competitors and partners.
Learning from disruption
In a world of rapid technological change, financial professionals are seeking structured ways to navigate this evolving landscape. Programmes like INSEAD’s Strategic Management in Banking (SMB) offer a mix of theory and practical experience, helping participants understand current trends in the industry.
For example, SMB includes simulations that reflect real-world challenges. In one, participants work through a risk-management scenario using quantitative tools. In another, they engage in a leadership simulation that focuses on asking the right questions and understanding the numbers behind a buy-over deal. These experiences help bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical application.
Equally important are the networks built through such programmes. With participants coming from traditional banks, fintech and techfin firms, the environment encourages collaboration and mutual understanding – both of which are crucial in today’s interconnected financial world.
The next big wave in finance
Looking ahead, the next wave of disruption is unlikely to come from more advanced technology. Instead, it will likely stem from changing relationships between banks and their clients. The competitive advantage of traditional institutions will not come from technology alone. While price efficiencies are necessary, they are not enough.
What will set successful banks apart is their ability to connect with clients on a deeper level. Technology may speed up transactions, but it cannot replace the trust and human connection that are central to financial services. As behavioural finance continues to grow in importance, banks can move beyond managing money to managing client behaviour. Helping clients overcome biases that hinder their financial decisions will be key.
In the end, it’s not just about how fast or how efficient your services are. The future of finance lies in blending innovation with the timeless principles of trust, advice and human insight. Both traditional players and disruptors will need to find that balance if they hope to thrive in this new era.
Finance
U.S. Housing Finance Support At A Crossroads
If the incoming Trump Administration picks up where it left off, the last unfinished business of the 2008 financial crisis may soon be addressed. That business? Reforming a housing finance system that has been stuck in a sort of high-functioning limbo for more than 16 years.
Housing received considerable attention in the recent election, but that focus was on increasing supply, lowering prices, and providing downpayment help. Absent was a discussion about the federal agencies and programs that ensure ready access to loans for homeownership.
The U.S. housing finance system has largely recovered from the 2008 financial crisis, when the housing market collapsed. Contributing factors in the years leading up to the crisis included unsustainable home price increases, relaxed lending requirements, and an influx of subprime mortgages. Loosened lending was enabled by an increasingly sophisticated set of finance tools—mortgage-backed securities and related derivative products—used by lenders and Wall Street firms. That dynamic led to an expansion of mortgage availability that drove unsustainable house price increases.[1]
Rising prices led to a belief they would continue to rise, further inflating prices. All was well until prices peaked, and then declined, as high-risk borrowers found it difficult to refinance or sell to settle mortgage debts. Falling prices accelerated as default-driven homes for sale flooded the market. Weakened mortgage lenders then began defaulting on their own lines of credit. Wall Street quickly lost its appetite for risky mortgages and credit markets began to freeze. By late 2008, the seismic impacts of the U.S. housing downturn were being felt across the global economy.
In Washington D.C., policymakers authorized and executed on a series of legislative, regulatory, and operational reforms—often intended as triage-like treatments to stabilize the system—to ensure continued strong mortgage market liquidity. A complete market meltdown was prevented.
Since then, however, the system has progressed without a cohesive and comprehensive reconsideration. Instead, mortgage guarantee agencies and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have adapted their operations and processes to meet evolving market circumstances, but only on the margin. That could change if the incoming administration decides to continue efforts the first Trump Administration initiated in 2019 to overhaul the system.
Beyond addressing housing finance, there is also a need to expand the supply and affordability of housing by making it easier to provide more types of housing in places where people want to live. A common thread through the nation’s housing affordability crisis is the fact that the supply of homes built has been insufficient to keep up with demand. While a healthy finance system is critical, that alone is insufficient to expand the nation’s supply of housing to meet current and future needs. That said, the rest of this essay focuses on housing finance.
Is A Bigger FHA Here To Stay?
Many of the stabilization measures enacted in response to the 2008 crisis (such as the Troubled Assets Relief Program) were wound down as the economy recovered. But that was not the case at the Federal Housing Administration, the main U.S. agency that guarantees loans made by lenders to homebuyers. FHA dramatically expanded its role as private lending rapidly receded, precisely the countercyclical role envisioned for the agency at its founding in 1934. In fact, FHA’s market share jumped from less than 4% in 2006 to a quarter of all home purchases during the crisis.
Today, the agency continues to back mortgages at elevated, though moderated, levels. Its portfolio of loan guaranties continues to grow and, according to a 2023 report issued by Arnold Ventures (which I authored), rose 171% in inflation-adjusted terms from 2007 to 2023. While a growing portfolio poses potential risks to taxpayers, loans originated since the crisis have performed much better than those made previously. FHA has improved its lending guidelines and adopted improvements such as risk-based underwriting.
Budgetarily, FHA’s single family mortgage insurance programs were projected to result in savings each year from 2000 to 2009. Premium revenues were forecast to far exceed payments on claims. However, after the 2008 crisis, it became clear loans made in those years cost (rather than saved) billions of dollars. Making matters worse, those savings that never materialized were spent elsewhere (showing the danger of mixing cash and accrual budgeting concepts).
Since then, and even with substantial increases in lending volumes, performance has been more in line with forecasts and has, at times, exceeded expectations. Based on supplemental data contained in the 2025 Budget, increasingly reliable forecasts have reflected more in savings than were realized before the crisis. Nevertheless, risks remain that could impact taxpayers in a significant economic downturn.
But FHA’s role in the housing finance system has proven beneficial during and after the financial crisis. While there is no compelling need for reform, legislative efforts to refresh the GSEs could pull FHA (and its sister agency Ginnie Mae) into the fray to ensure roles are harmonized.
Will Fannie/Freddie Conservatorship End?
The primary function of the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is to facilitate liquidity in the U.S. mortgage finance system. They purchase home loans made by banks and other lenders—known as conforming loans since they must meet strict size and underwriting standards— and pool those loans into mortgage-backed securities, which are then sold to investors. Those securities are favored because the GSEs guarantee full principal even if the underlying mortgages default. The GSEs typically finance more than half of all mortgages originated.
The GSEs are private companies created by the U.S. government. During the financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie were placed into conservatorship by their then-newly created regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. While not at that point insolvent, their earnings and capital were deteriorating as house prices fell and their capacity to absorb further losses was in doubt. A driving concern was that if they failed due to substantial defaults on their insured mortgage portfolios or an inability to issue debt to finance themselves, the crisis would have escalated dramatically.
Conservatorship is an odd legal place for any organization to reside for an extended period—with a third party (in this case FHFA) in operational control. Conservatorship was expected to last only a short time. Then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson dubbed the move a “time out” to give policymakers an interval to decide their future. But the GSEs have remained there for more than 16 years, with occasional changes to conservatorship terms. In recent years, the Biden Administration has shown little interest in resolving the matter.
If actions during the first Trump presidency are any indicator, the incoming administration will be more assertive in tackling the issue. A memorandum issued by President Trump on March 27, 2019, stated that “The lack of comprehensive housing finance reform since the financial crisis of 2008 has left taxpayers potentially exposed to future bailouts, and has left the Federal housing finance programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development potentially overexposed to risk and with outdated operations.” The memo goes on to point out that reforms are needed “to reduce taxpayer risks, expand the private sector’s role, modernize government housing programs, and make sustainable home ownership for American families our benchmark of success.”
The Treasury Secretary was directed to develop a plan to end the conservatorship, facilitate competition in housing finance, operate the GSEs in a safe and sound manner, and ensure the government is properly compensated for any backing. Under the direction of then-Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Treasury published such a plan in September 2019 proposing both legislative and administrative reforms. FHFA and Treasury then began carrying out the parts of the plan that could be done administratively.
Former FHFA Director Mark Calabria wrote about those actions in his 2023 book Shelter from the Storm. Plans were being made “to bring the conservatorships to an end, restructure the balance sheets, and end the illegal line of credit, while preserving stability in the mortgage market.” But those plans were pushed until after the election to avoid any market disruptions that might occur, particularly given risks posed to the economy by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Consequently, some key actions were completed while others remained on the drawing board. The GSEs were allowed to build capital by retaining earnings and, in a related move, FHFA established a post-conservatorship minimum capital rule. The outgoing administration left a blueprint for reform to end the conservatorship, compensate taxpayers, and allow the GSEs to raise third-party capital.[2]
The Need For Congressional Action
While the new administration can take steps to reform and release the GSEs from conservatorship, a transformed and well-coordinated housing finance system will require legislative action as well. The activities of housing finance agencies like FHA and the GSEs should complement each other. Roles need to be clearly defined, overlap avoided, and taxpayer risks minimized.
The new Congress and incoming administration must explicitly determine those roles. While objectionable levels of risk have accrued in the past, the housing finance system has operated much more soundly in recent years. Legislation should be structured to lock in the operational and financial improvements since the financial crisis and to codify reforms to further strengthen the system.
The nation’s housing market depends on a robust and dynamic housing finance system. While maintaining the status quo follows a path of least political resistance, it will be interesting to see if a second Trump Administrations picks up its past pursuit of comprehensive reform.
[1] For a fuller explanation of the conditions that led to the crisis, see Subprime Mortgage Crisis, by John V. Duca, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November 22, 2013.
[2] For a detailed explanation of events during and after conservatorship see: The GSE Conservatorships: Fifteen Years Old, With No End in Sight, by former Freddie Mac CEO Donald H. Layton, September 5, 2023.
Finance
COP29 Summit Enters Final Stretch With Nations Far Apart on Finance
Nearly 200 nations at United Nations talks in Azerbaijan are haggling over a climate finance deal for developing economies, with negotiators trying to find consensus on annual goals ranging from $200 billion to $1.3 trillion.
The wide gap in those potential targets is just one of many unsettled issues as the COP29 summit in Baku enters its final days.
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