Islamabad, Pakistan – When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stepped off the plane in Tel Aviv on Wednesday for his second visit to Israel, and the first by any Indian premier since his own landmark trip in 2017, the symbolism was unmistakable.

He was given a red-carpet welcome by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a head of government who is facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant and prosecuting a war in Gaza that much of the world has condemned as genocide.

Yet Modi’s visit signalled not hesitation, but a wholehearted endorsement to expand India’s strategic embrace of Israel.

Days before his arrival, Netanyahu announced at a cabinet meeting what he described as a “hexagon of alliances”, a proposed regional framework placing India at its centre alongside Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian states.

Its declared purpose was to counter what he called “radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis”.

In a region where Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been among Israel’s most outspoken critics, and where Saudi Arabia and Pakistan formalised a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025 – all three Sunni-majority nations – the outline of what Tel Aviv may view as this “axis” is not difficult to discern.

Against that backdrop, India’s deepening alignment with Israel directly impacts – and could reshape – Islamabad’s strategic calculus in an already volatile region, say analysts.

Expanding defence and technology ties

The India-Israel relationship has accelerated sharply since Modi’s 2017 visit. India is now Israel’s largest arms customer, and the agenda this week spans defence, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and cybersecurity.

A new classified framework is expected to open exports from Israel of previously restricted military hardware to India. Among the systems reportedly under discussion is Israel’s Iron Beam, a 100kW-class high-energy laser weapon inducted into the Israeli army in December 2025. Cooperation on Iron Dome missile defence technology transfer for local manufacturing is also under consideration.

For Masood Khan, Pakistan’s former ambassador to both the United States and the United Nations, the visit marks a decisive moment.

“News coming out suggests they are going to sign a special strategic agreement, one that could be seen as a counterpart to the agreement signed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last year,” he said. “Israel already has such special agreements with countries like the US and Germany.”

Masood Khalid, a former Pakistani ambassador to China, pointed to this military dimension.

“We saw how Israeli drones worked in the India-Pakistan conflict against us last year,” he said, referring to India’s use of Israeli-origin platforms during the May 2025 strikes against Pakistan, when the South Asian neighbours waged an intense four-day aerial war. “Public statements from both sides speak of strengthening strategic cooperation – particularly in defence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and AI.”

India’s defence ties with Israel are no one-way street any more. During Israel’s war on Gaza in 2024, Indian arms firms supplied rockets and explosives to Tel Aviv, an Al Jazeera investigation confirmed.

Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, sees the partnership as part of a wider recalibration.

“It is clear that India has entered into a strategic partnership with Israel, and at a time when both governments have been criticised for their actions, this bilateral relationship has become increasingly important for both,” he told Al Jazeera.

Netanyahu’s ‘hexagon’ and Pakistan

Netanyahu’s hexagon proposal remains undefined. He has promised an “organised presentation” at a later date.

While Israel believes it has weakened what the Israeli PM described as the “Shia axis” through its 2024-2025 campaign against Iran-aligned groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the “emerging radical Sunni axis” is less clearly articulated.

Analysts suggest it could refer to states and movements aligned with strands of political Islam and sharply critical of Israeli policy, including Turkiye and countries that have strengthened security ties with Riyadh and Ankara, as Pakistan has. Pakistan is also the only Muslim nation with nuclear weapons – something that has long worried Israel: In the 1980s, Israel tried to recruit India for a joint military operation against a nuclear facility in Pakistan, but backed off the plan after New Delhi abstained.

Karim was convinced about Pakistan’s place in Netanyahu’s crosshairs.

“Absolutely, Pakistan is part of this so-called radical Sunni axis,” he said, arguing that Pakistan’s strategic agreement with Riyadh and its close ties with Turkiye directly affect Israel’s calculations. “In order to counter this, Israel will increase its defence cooperation and intel sharing with Delhi.”

Khalid pointed to longstanding intelligence links.

“Intelligence sharing between Indian RAW and Israeli Mossad dates back to the sixties. So their strengthened interaction in this domain should be of serious concern for us,” he said, referring to the external intelligence agencies of India and Israel.

Others urge caution. Gokhan Ereli, an Ankara-based independent Gulf researcher, argued that Pakistan is unlikely to be an explicit target within Israel’s framing.

“In this context, Pakistan is more plausibly affected indirectly, through the alignment of Israeli, Indian and Western threat narratives, than being singled out as a destabilising actor in its own right,” he told Al Jazeera.

Khan, the former ambassador, agreed.

“I don’t perceive a direct threat, but the latent animosity is there. And when Modi is in Tel Aviv, he will try to poison Netanyahu and other leaders there to think about Pakistan in a hostile way,” he said.

Muhammad Shoaib, assistant professor of international relations at Quaid-i-Azam University, echoed that assessment.

“India’s close relations with Israel are likely to negatively impact Tel Aviv’s perception and statements on Pakistan,” he said.

The Gulf balancing act

Perhaps the most complex arena for Pakistan is the Gulf. For decades, it has relied on Gulf partners for financial support, including rolled-over loans and remittances that form a crucial pillar of its economy.

After signing the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia last September, discussions have intensified about Turkiye joining a similar framework. Yet the United Arab Emirates, one of Pakistan’s closest Gulf partners, signed a strategic agreement with India in January 2026.

Khalid called for deeper economic integration to underpin these ties.

“Pakistan is doing well to strengthen its bilateral ties with key Middle East countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait,” he said, “but apart from GCC, Pakistan also needs to promote regional cooperation, particularly with countries of Central Asia, Turkiye, Iran and Russia. Geoeconomics through greater trade and connectivity should be the basis of this regional cooperation.” The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Complicating matters further is Iran’s central role in current regional tensions. With Washington threatening potential military action against Iran, and Israel pressing for regime change in Tehran, Pakistan has quietly sought to ease tensions by arguing for diplomacy.

“But there are two main parties – Iran and the US – and then, most importantly, Israel, which doesn’t just limit its demands to a nuclear deal,” Khan, the former diplomat said. “It wants to expand to Iran’s missile defence capabilities and regional alliances, and that may well be a sticking point. Pakistan’s aspiration is to contribute to efforts to find a diplomatic solution.”

Strategic contest

Ultimately, Pakistan’s policymakers must assess whether ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye are strong enough to offset the expanding India-Israel partnership.

Modi and Netanyahu frame their security doctrines around countering what they describe as “Islamic radicalism”. New Delhi has repeatedly accused Pakistan of fomenting violence against India.

Yet Khan argued that Islamabad is not without leverage.

“We have built a firewall around us by pushing back Indian aggression in May 2025, and by strengthening our ties with the US over the last year,” he said.