The writer is author of ‘Command’ and the Substack ‘Comment is Freed’
There is a famous joke about a frog on the banks of the River Jordan. A scorpion asks for a ride across. “Why would I do that?” says the frog. “If you get on my back you will sting me.” The scorpion explains that he, too, would drown. Reassured the frog carries him, until halfway, the scorpion stings the frog. “Why?” cries the frog, “Now we are both doomed.” Because, comes back the reply, “this is the Middle East.”
It is now a year since Hamas triggered this latest cycle of violence. For Israel, the stakes have grown as its focus has shifted from Gaza to Lebanon. Last week, it inflicted a major blow by killing Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah made his name in 2006 when the Iran-backed paramilitary group fought Israel to a standstill. His success in exposing Israel’s vulnerabilities made him a hero around the Arab world, with Sunni as well as Shia, assuring him an exalted place among Iran’s partners and strengthening his position as the vital powerbroker in Lebanese politics.
Yet Nasrallah got caught in the tensions between his Iranian and Lebanese roles. He was held responsible by many for Lebanon’s chronic economic misery and political instability while Hizbollah’s position as the most prominent member of the Iranian-orchestrated “axis of resistance” took precedence.
After October 7, Hizbollah, still acting as part of the axis, opened up a second front as Israel began its invasion of Gaza. It was comparatively restrained, although engagements were heavy enough to require civilians to evacuate in large numbers on both sides of the border. It did enough to show solidarity with Hamas but not so much as to trigger a wider war. Israel therefore could concentrate on Hamas and leave Hizbollah until later.
As a result, Hizbollah failed to maximise its military impact at a time when Israel was most exposed, while doing enough to ensure that Israel would turn on them once they got the chance. This new stage in the war came with the elimination of much of the top layers of command, beginning with the notorious pager detonations and culminating in the assassination of Nasrallah himself. Now the IDF has embarked on what it has described as a limited ground incursion into southern Lebanon, to destroy as much as possible of Hizbollah’s military infrastructure.
All this put Iran in a quandary as Israel struck blows against its proxies while it stayed on the sidelines. Back in April, Tehran responded to several senior commanders being killed in an attack on its embassy compound in Damascus by sending large numbers of drones and missiles towards Israel. But most either failed to reach their targets or were shot down. Even after more provocations, including the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh while he was in Tehran, it did nothing.
Hizbollah is supposedly part of Iran’s deterrent threat yet has been methodically dismantled by Israel. Nasrallah’s assassination brought the issue to a head. The recently elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, aware of the parlous state of Iran’s economy and widespread popular discontent, sought continuing restraint. But he is subordinate to the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, backed by the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. For them more restraint was humiliating. And so on Tuesday night, 181 ballistic missiles hurtled towards targets in Israel. Most were caught by air defences, though some got through, including to airfields. After the strike Iran indicated that it wanted no further escalation.
In Israel there was soon talk of the opportunity this creates for a decisive retaliatory attack that could even complete the process of taking apart the whole Iranian axis by going for Iran itself. This has led to speculation about possible targets. If Israel opts for military installations, Iran will be faced with the same dilemma as before — to respond with missiles or take the hit. But Israel has more ambitious options. US President Joe Biden has urged it to avoid nuclear installations but acknowledged that it might attack oil facilities. If it does, Khamenei has promised Iran’s next strikes might target Israel’s energy infrastructure. It could also generate an international oil crisis by closing the Straits of Hormuz.
Nor is Israel in a position to engineer regime change in Tehran. If this happens it will be because of the actions of ordinary Iranians. And while Israel has been able to demonstrate its military superiority, and has severely weakened its regional adversaries, Iran still has a large stock of ballistic missiles. Nor does Israel have unlimited air defence missiles, particularly the long-range Arrow that has played a critical role in thwarting Iran’s previous attacks.
The Lebanese caretaker government, coping with a humanitarian crisis, is desperate for an end to hostilities, but Hizbollah is still firing rockets across the border and inflicting casualties on the IDF as they battle for control of southern Lebanon. Residents cannot get back to their homes. A ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza remains elusive.
The balance of power within Tehran is not conducive to a full strategic reappraisal. Israel, for its part, may feel that while there are targets to hit, it must carry on striking them. Yet it remains unclear how it intends to turn its military success to its political advantage and agree arrangements that might actually bring some long-term stability to its borders. It is not that it is impossible to imagine how this might be done — but this is still the Middle East.