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The past, present and future of the Electoral College • North Dakota Monitor

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1 year ago

October 31, 2024

The past, present and future of the Electoral College • North Dakota Monitor

The United States’ presidential election system has been a source of contention since the delegates to the Constitutional Convention first debated the matter on June 1, 1787. On that day and several thereafter, the delegates discussed whether “the people” should elect the president. Some steadfastly championed the idea and consequently proposed that a national popular vote determine which person would become president. The following account illuminates why such proposals were defeated, why the Electoral College was adopted instead, and the prospects of a national popular vote in the future.

Opposition to the national popular vote option at the Constitutional Convention

The convention delegates identified three ways to pick the president. A national popular vote, as we have seen, was one option. The other two were to have either national legislators or state officeholders pick the president. Delegates who favored the latter two options opposed a national popular vote for the following reasons.

Some contended that the masses would be unstable, misinformed and easily duped by demagogues. (The counterargument was that, given the slowness of communications and the diversity of the nation, nefarious characters never could beguile the entire county’s sprawling, heterogeneous populace, whereas they could target and intrigue with national legislators or state officeholders. For this reason, of the three options, a national popular vote could be seen as the best safeguard against domestic and foreign foes).

Others claimed that common folk would be unfamiliar with individuals beyond their state or region. (The counterargument was that as time passed and the bonds of union strengthened, more figures with continental reputations would emerge as prospective presidents.)

Still others argued that a small-state resident never would win presidential contests. (This issue could be addressed by having voters cast multiple ballots and establishing requirements concerning how many had to be for a person who resided in a different state than the voter.)

Finally, there were those who observed that southern states would be disadvantaged by a national popular vote because, collectively, one-third of their inhabitants were enslaved Black Americans, who were disenfranchised. (The counterargument was that, for now, southern states ought to acquiesce for the greater good’s sake, and, in the future, they could expect to surpass their northern counterparts in population and possibly affect slavery’s end).

On July 25, the convention voted down by a five-to-six margin (with each state delegation casting one vote) a motion to consider a popular vote system in which each voter would have cast multiple ballots. The narrow defeat arguably marked the closest the U.S. has come to instituting a national popular vote to elect the president. Ultimately, proponents of a national popular vote pushed for what they considered to be the next closest thing, a system which became known as the Electoral College.

The Electoral College at the Constitutional Convention

To win supporters, the architects of the Electoral College leveraged what delegate James Madison often referred to as “expedients” (i.e., features which could be used for outreach and compromise). As a result, the Electoral College offered something to most everyone.

The president would be picked by electors, who themselves would be chosen for that one duty. The people would not directly elevate a person to the presidency, which appeased opponents of a national popular vote.

Each state would be allotted a sum of electors equal to its representation in Congress. Numerically, the Electoral College would be identical to a joint session of Congress. The inclusion of the Senate in the formula for allocating electoral votes among the states advantaged small states. (Even so, among the delegates, the general assumption was that large states would exercise an influence on presidential elections mostly commensurate with the sizes of their respective populations.) The inclusion of the House in the formula advantaged slaveholding states, a benefit derived from the Constitution’s Three-Fifths Clause, which allowed states to count three-fifths of their enslaved residents when determining their haul of House seats. Thus large, free states would be underrepresented in the Electoral College while small states and slaveholding states would be overrepresented. Of the latter two, the advantage accorded to slaveholding states had a greater influence on the nation’s trajectory.

Electors could not be national lawmakers or hold “an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.” This provision was designed to thwart cabal and corruption.

Congress could determine when electors would be chosen. This provision, like those which empowered Congress to establish when electors would assemble and the manner in which their votes would be certified and transmitted to the nation’s capital, aimed to prevent state interference with the system’s operation.

Electors would be appointed in a manner directed by their respective state legislatures. The advocates of a national popular vote wanted electors to be popularly elected; other delegates wanted state lawmakers to select electors. This provision was the politically optimal solution, for it required neither state lawmakers nor the people to pick electors but permitted both to do so.

Each state’s electors would meet and vote on the same day in their respective states. The scattered (and temporary) nature of their work was deemed a security measure in age before instantaneous long-distance communication. Consequently, this provision proved immensely important, even decisive, for it afforded protections against domestic cabal and foreign interference which no other presidential election system could match, a national popular vote notwithstanding.

Electors would cast two ballots for president, one of which had to be for a resident of another state. This provision served three purposes: it increased the likelihood that a small-state resident would be elected president ; it countenanced nationalism; and it abetted majoritarianism (if electors cast one ballot, so the reasoning went, presidential contests likely would end with a large-state resident finishing first with a plurality of electoral votes, whereas if electors cast two ballots, it would increase the chances that one or more persons would receive votes from at least half of the electors).

The person who received the most electoral votes would become president if a majority of electors had cast a ballot for that person, in which case the person with the second-most electoral votes would become vice president. If no person received a majority of electors’ votes, the House would choose the president from among the top-five electoral vote-getters, with each state delegation casting one vote. These provisions further increased the chances that a small-state resident would become president.

Given the political realities at the convention, this complex arrangement, reflected delegate Abraham Baldwin, was “not so objectionable when well considered, as at first view.”

The Electoral College’s defining traits

The Electoral College originally had six defining traits.

It promoted democracy. It was the closest thing to a national popular vote politically possible, for it included the potential for the people’s participation in presidential elections.

It promoted nationalism. Nationalism was countenanced to the extent that the president was rooted in the people. Moreover, the system was explicitly interstate in design. Finally, safeguards protected it from state interference.

It promoted national security. Whatever delegates thought about the system’s democratic and nationalistic traits, virtually all acknowledged that, compared to having national legislators or state officeholders pick the president, it provided unmatched defenses against domestic cabal and foreign interference, which many if not all regarded as vital to the republic’s survival. The primacy of shielding the system from enemies may have been the one thing upon which the delegates agreed.

It advantaged slaveholding states.

It advantaged small states, principally by increasing the likelihood that a small-state resident would be elected president.

It satisfied delegates who wanted state legislatures to direct electors’ manner of appointment.

These traits abetted the Electoral College’s approval at the Constitutional Convention and subsequent state ratifying conventions.

The Electoral College in 2024

The Electoral College’s current output mostly bears the opposite character of that which it originally was designed to produce.

It does not promote democracy. It violates one of democracy’s essential features (political equality) and can violate another essential feature (majority rule).

It does not promote nationalism. It effectively renders Americans in non-competitive states spectators and it inhibits the formation of interstate affinities.

It does not promote national security. It is, in fact, a vital security risk: instead of having to influence many votes across the entire U.S., foes may target relatively few votes in competitive states alone.

It modestly advantages small states, principally through the inclusion of the Senate in the formula for allocating electoral votes, whereas the size of the state from which a would-be president hails is of comparatively little to no importance.

It still accords state legislatures the power to direct the manner in which their respective electors are appointed.

Ironically, the last of these was not something the system’s leading lights had desired, but rather was a necessary accommodation designed to win over other delegates.

The Electoral College’s future

There is little doubt that the Electoral College’s principal architects would have preferred a national popular vote, just as polling has long shown it to be the people’s preference. What are the chances that a national popular vote ever will be affected? That subject merits an analysis of its own. But, for now, three observations warrant brief consideration.

First, state legislatures’ power to direct electors’ manner of appointment, which constitutes a surviving trait of the system’s original design, is the primary instrument for instituting the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), a binding agreement between states which, if put into operation, effectively would result in a national popular vote.

Second, since its conception in 2006, the NPVIC has been adopted by 18 jurisdictions (specifically, 17 states and the District of Columbia). These 18 jurisdictions currently control 209 electoral votes (meaning the NPVIC is 61 electoral votes short of the 270 required to make it operational).

Finally, the NPVIC’s durability and accomplishments make it uniquely positioned for future success. According to a to-be-published national study which I oversaw in September 2024, it’s the preferred option among a plurality of Americans under age 50 and it draws in roughly equal measures from Republicans, Democrats and independents. Its base, in short, is broad, balanced and young. Thus the NVPIC movement arguably has brought the nation as close as it’s been to a national popular vote since the one-vote defeat of a motion to that effect at the Constitutional Convention on July 25, 1787, and it is poised to bring it still closer.

The NPVIC movement may crash upon the shoals of opposition, atrophy and perish. Or it may secure 61 more electoral votes and, assuming it is subject to a legal challenge, the approval of five Supreme Court justices. If such should be the case, finally might the people pick the president.

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