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Pak may borrow $23 bn in next fiscal year to finance development plans

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Pak may borrow  bn in next fiscal year to finance development plans

These nations and international creditors are now dictating their terms due to their unending dependency on them | Photo: Shutterstock


Pakistan has planned to borrow a minimum of $23 billion in the next fiscal year, including the rollover of a bilateral debt of $12 billion, to finance its development plans and meet its external financing requirement which will keep the cash-strapped country’s foreign and economic policies dependent on global financial institutions like the IMF, according to a media report on Thursday.


Budget documents for fiscal year 2024-25 showed that Pakistan would borrow at least $23.2 billion, or Rs 5.9 trillion, which did not include any loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Express Tribune newspaper reported, adding that the International Monetary Fund’s loan will be for balance of payments support.


Out of the $23 billion, the government has included $20 billion in budget documents. It has not made the rollover of $3 billion by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) part of federal books as it is also meant for balance of payments support.

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Details showed that Pakistan would take $19 billion in loans for budget financing and building its foreign exchange reserves. The amount appears colossal, which will keep the country’s foreign and economic policies dependent on the IMF, the World Bank, Saudi Arabia, China, the UAE and the Islamic Development Bank.


These nations and international creditors are now dictating their terms due to their unending dependency on them.


Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has claimed that he has received investment pledges of $15 billion from Saudi Arabia and the UAE but so far these promises have not translated into concrete agreements.


After being unable to acquire new debt from foreign commercial banks, the government has once again budgeted $3.9 billion worth of foreign commercial loans in the new fiscal year. However, in the outgoing year, China rolled over $1 billion of commercial debt.


There was hope that the international credit rating agencies would improve Pakistan’s junk rating under the $3 billion IMF’s standby arrangement. However, political and economic vulnerabilities prevented them from improving Pakistan’s standing.

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Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb said on Tuesday that the rating agencies were waiting for approval of the new Extended Fund Facility of the IMF. In case of further delay in the improvement of the ratings, the government’s plan of raising $4.9 billion through Eurobond and foreign commercial loans would not materialise.


The government had estimated the receipt of $6 billion from sovereign bonds and foreign commercial loans in the current fiscal year. After such deals could not be clinched, the State Bank of Pakistan bought an equal amount from the Pakistani markets.


The government has once again included the rollover of $5 billion in cash deposits from Saudi Arabia. This shows that the country will not be able to return the money out of which $3 billion had been taken in 2019 for just one year.


However, Saudi Arabia has not agreed to extend the oil facility of $1 billion to the next fiscal year, prompting the government to exclude it from the projection of external loan receipts. Similarly, the government has not included any new loan from Saudi Arabia for the import of petrol.


China’s $4 billion in cash deposit has again been added to the rollover queue, of which $2 billion is maturing next month.

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The UAE’s financing has not been added to the federal borrowing plan since the money has been given for the balance of payments support, which will be serviced by the central bank from its profits. Out of the $3 billion, $1 billion is maturing next month.


The government has also estimated a new loan of $500 million from the Islamic Development Bank and $465 million on account of Naya Pakistan Certificates. Around $1.1 billion will be borrowed to finance the federal Public Sector Development Programme, according to the paper.

(Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)

First Published: Jun 13 2024 | 2:19 PM IST

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EfTEN United Property Fund unaudited financial results for the 1st quarter of 2026

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EfTEN United Property Fund unaudited financial results for the 1st quarter of 2026
EFTEN UNITED PROPERTY FUND

In Q1 2026, EfTEN United Property Fund earned 461 thousand euros in net profit (Q1 2025: 703 thousand euros). The decline in profit is primarily related to the Fund’s investment in EfTEN Real Estate Fund AS shares, whose price on the Tallinn Stock Exchange increased 2.9% in Q1 2026 compared with 4.5% in the same period of 2025. In addition, interest income from the investment in the development company Invego Uus-Järveküla OÜ decreased year-on-year, as the development company repaid the principal and interest of the shareholder loan to the Fund in full in mid-March.

Despite the decline in profit, EfTEN United Property Fund AS received record owner income from its underlying funds at the beginning of 2026. This forms the basis for the Fund’s first distribution of the year to investors in Q2 2026, in the amount of approximately one million euros. The distribution is based on dividends and income received from all underlying funds, as well as interest from the Invego Uus-Järveküla OÜ and the Menulio 7 office building shareholder loans. The distribution does not include the profit from the Invego Uus-Järveküla development project, which the Fund plans to distribute largely in the second half of the year.

Since EfTEN United Property Fund’s portfolio is diversified across nearly 50 different properties in the Baltic states, developments across all segments of the regional real estate market affect the Fund’s results. There have been no major changes in the Baltic commercial real estate market over the last few quarters. In the residential real estate market, however, sales of new developments have improved in all Baltic states. In Tallinn, monthly sales of new developments grew to approximately 160 units per month in Q1 2026, compared with an average of around 100 units in 2024 and the first half of 2025. The biggest jump in the Baltic states was made by the Vilnius new-development market, where — partly thanks to expectations of funds being released from the second pension pillar — Q1 2026 sales volumes reached all-time highs, at times reaching up to 700 units per month.

The pace of sales also remained strong at the start of the year in Invego Uus-Järveküla OÜ, the development company for the Uus-Järveküla residential district in which EfTEN United Property Fund holds an 80% stake. In the first quarter, 22 units were sold (real rights contracts signed) and reservation agreements were concluded for three terraced houses. As of the end of the quarter, 8 terraced houses in the development remain unreserved. In March, Invego Uus-Järveküla OÜ repaid its entire bank loan and returned the shareholder loan to the Fund in full (1.51 million euros) along with the accrued interest (56 thousand euros). EfTEN United Property Fund invested a total of 3.52 million euros in the Uus-Järveküla development project in 2021 and 2023, and has to date received 4.8 million euros back.

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In the second half of 2026, EfTEN United Property Fund will focus on finding investment opportunities in a new residential development project.

Statement of the comprehensive income

 

1st quarter

 

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2026

2025

€ thousand

 

 

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INCOME

 

 

Interest income

74

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154

Income from underlying funds

58

0

Other financial income

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0

4

Net profit / loss from assets recognised in fair value through profit or loss

402

615

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Investments in subsidiaries

35

90

Investments in underlying funds

367

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525

Total income

534

773

 

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COSTS

 

 

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Operating expenses

 

 

Management fees

-27

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-29

Costs of administering the Fund

-8

-7

Other operating expenses

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-38

-29

Total operating expenses

-73

-65

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Interest expenses

0

-5

Operating profit

461

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703

Profit before income tax

461

703

 

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Net profit for the period

461

703

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Total comprehensive profit for the reporting period

461

703

Increase in the net asset value of the fund attributable to shareholders

461

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703

 

 

 

Ordinary and diluted earnings per share (EUR)

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0.19

0.28

Statement of financial position

 

31.03.2026

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31.12.2025

€ thousand

 

 

ASSETS

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Current assets

 

 

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Cash and cash equivalents

3,287

1,774

Loans granted

2,149

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1,516

Other receivables and accrued income

310

300

Total current assets

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5,746

3,590

 

 

 

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Non-current assets

 

 

Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss

23,929

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23,474

Investments in subsidiaries

3,146

3,111

Investments in underlying funds

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20,783

20,363

Loans granted

0

2,149

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Total non-current assets

23,929

25,623

TOTAL ASSETS

29,675

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29,213

 

 

 

LIABILITIES

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Current liabilities

3

2

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Total liabilities, excluding net asset value of the fund attributable to shareholders

3

2

 

 

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NET ASSET VALUE OF THE FUND

 

 

Net asset value of the fund attributable to shareholders

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29,672 

29,211 

Total liabilities and net asset value of the fund attributable to shareholders

29,675 

29,213 

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The unaudited 1st quarter 2026 report of the EfTEN United Property Fund is attached to the release and can be found on the Fund’s website: https://eftenunitedpropertyfund.ee/en/reports-documents/

Kristjan Tamla
Managing Director
Phone 655 9515
E-mail: kristjan.tamla@eften.ee

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Tackling Water Bankruptcy: The Role of Governance and Finance – CPI

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Today, 2.2 billion people lack access to safely managed drinking water, and 3.5 billion people live without safely managed sanitation (UNSD, 2024). Action is urgently needed. AIIB’s recent Where the Water Flows report offers clear pathways for addressing these challenges in an increasingly destabilized hydrological environment. Yet, financing remains insufficient: an additional USD 140.8 billion in investment is needed annually to meet SDG targets 6.1 and 6.2 by 2030 (World Bank, 2024). 

Traditional water funding modalities – tariffs, taxes, and transfers – are under strain, jeopardizing sustained investment and potentially widening the funding gap. Innovative governance models and financing solutions have a critical role to play in this evolving landscape. As the World Bank operationalizes its new global initiative Water Forward, there is a growing need for alignment and dialogue on the strategic allocation of capital for water, alongside the potential of new financing and governance models. 

This event, held on the sidelines of the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings, convened water finance practitioners actively leveraging innovative governance and financial approaches to fund water in emerging markets.

Opening remarks were delivered by Zou Jiayi, President and Chair of the Board of Directors, AIIB.

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Speakers included:

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Digital Finance as a Geopolitical Arena: China, Web3, and the Competition Over Africa’s Digital Payments Landscape

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Digital Finance as a Geopolitical Arena: China, Web3, and the Competition Over Africa’s Digital Payments Landscape

A young Nigerian man uses cryptocurrency for peer-to-peer transactions to avoid the challenges of Naira inflation, while thousands of miles away, a farmer in rural Kenya uses her smartphone to access a mobile credit platform for a microloan. These two examples represent just a small sample of how the payments landscape is transforming at a global level.

The rapid evolution of Africa’s financial landscape is being influenced by global and regional forces that are reshaping how money flows through digital systems across the continent. Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as the world’s third-fastest growing crypto market. Widespread digital asset adoption in countries like Nigeria and South Africa highlight Africa’s demand for accessible, efficient, and low-cost financial infrastructure. With Africa’s digital payments industry increasing at an average of more than 8% yearly, digital finance has become a strategic point of competition over influence in setting the technical standards, financial messaging protocols, and digital infrastructure that determines how international and domestic payments are processed. As Chinese investments aggressively enter the region, it is important for African nations to maintain their digital infrastructure sovereignty by adopting digital finance in a manner free from foreign interference.

Fintech, Web3, and the Challenge to Traditional Finance

Africa’s new digital financial infrastructure increasingly relies on Web3 to alleviate cross-border payments friction. Web3 broadly describes an emerging layer of internet-based financial infrastructure built on decentralized blockchain networks. In contrast with traditional financial (tradfi) intermediaries, these systems enable peer-to-peer transactions executed through a decentralized, shared, secure digital record maintained across various computers for accuracy and transparency.

Financial technology (fintech) seeks to disrupt tradfi, with fintech broadly referring to the software and digital platforms designed to improve access to financial services. One of the most successful examples of fintech in Africa is M-Pesa, a mobile money transfer and payment service that allows users to send, receive, and store money through their mobile phones, M-Pesa originated in Kenya, and is now a widely-used, pan-African digital money app.

The Convergence of Digital and Legacy Financial Infrastructure in Africa

In conjunction with the advent of Web3, a new standard for financial transactions called ISO 20022 is bringing greater efficiency, transparency and interoperability to those transactions. On November 22, 2025, the global financial messaging network, SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), retired the legacy message type (MT) messages, and migrated fully to ISO 20022. This new global standard for financial messaging enables financial transactions that can carry more data compared to MTs and brings increased legitimacy and transparency to payments. Together, these changes offer a significant opportunity for the growth of digital payments and financial inclusion across the continent.

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SWIFT’s transition to the ISO 20022 standard represents one of the most significant efforts to date to standardize Africa’s financial markets. First introduced in 2004, ISO 20022 standardization has been slow because adherence to such standards requires significant infrastructure investment, which is typically challenging for emerging economies to afford. That’s why several African countries have only recently transitioned to ISO 20022. For instance, South Africa’s Reserve Bank announced its adoption of ISO 20022 in late 2022. Nigeria’s central bank mandated adherence to ISO 20022 only on August 25, 2025, just two months prior to the discontinuation of MT messages. Ghana transitioned even later, in September 2025.

At the same time that governments are spending to upgrade digital financial infrastructure, tradfi is also becoming more expensive. In late September 2025, while the Parliament of Ghana sought to regulate cryptocurrency activities, the Bank of Ghana directed all commercial banks to charge a 5% fee on dollar cash withdrawals, creating new friction in transactions.

If effectively implemented, Web3 native payment rails such as central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) may be able to circumvent such friction. Africa is already emerging as a hotbed of such technologies, including stablecoins, a type of cryptocurrency designed to maintain a stable value. Stablecoins rely on Web3 to carry structured, data-rich, auditable transactions. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) formed a task force in late October 2025 to study its population’s embrace of stablecoin adoption. SWIFT has also recognized the popularity of stablecoins by including South Africa-based Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) and FirstRand Bank with 32 other banks in a September 2025 blockchain-based pilot focused on cross-border payments.

As African financial institutions upgrade their systems to accommodate Web3 payment rails and comply with ISO 20022, governments must decide how to modernize legacy banking infrastructure while also determining how to integrate emerging technologies alongside traditional financial systems. These choices will not only shape the future-state development of Africa’s digital infrastructure, but they will also influence geopolitical dynamics, with secondary effects on the US standing against global competitors in resource-rich Africa.

China’s Digital Statecraft in Africa

Amidst the growth of digital finance across the continent, China has exhibited a keen interest in shaping Africa’s digital financial infrastructure, building on its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through a parallel effort in Africa, the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China is playing a key role in everything from the region’s telecommunications services to centralizing blockchain infrastructure through the Blockchain Service Network (BSN), a Chinese-backed digital infrastructure platform that allows governments and institutions to run blockchain applications akin to a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model.

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More foundationally, China is playing an increasing role in Africa’s digital payments scene. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) went live with South Africa-based Standard Bank Group in early December 2025, better enabling RMB (which stands for Renminbi, the official currency of China)-denominated clearing services to other African banks. This, along with region-wide initiatives like the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Digital Silk Road, in addition to local efforts like Nigeria’s Ogun-Guangdong free trade zone and the China-Congo Industrial City, highlight China’s increasing role in building Africa’s digital infrastructure. Taken together, these initiatives highlight a broad effort to create a parallel financial ecosystem reliant on Chinese standards and technology, aimed at securing strategic influence and infrastructure dominance.

This environment also attracts gray-zone actors and illicit networks, especially as cryptocurrency takes hold across the continent. In early 2024, at the same time that the state-owned Ethiopian Investment Holdings announced a $250 million data mining partnership with a subsidiary of Hong-Kong based West Data Group, Chinese Bitcoin miners were reported to be moving to Ethiopia en-masse to avoid Chinese legislation banning cryptocurrency and to take advantage of low electricity costs. In August 2025, the Interpol-coordinated Operation Serengeti 2.0 recovered nearly $100 million in proceeds from criminal activities throughout Africa, including a variety of cryptocurrency-focused scams. Among those arrested were 60 Chinese nationals accused of illegally validating blockchain transactions to generate cryptocurrency.

This dangerous combination of state-backed economic statecraft and transnational organized crime mediated through digital financial infrastructure is not only challenging the stability of African institutions, but by limiting economic access, fostering illicit activities, and shifting geopolitical alignments, China’s increasing influence over Africa’s digital infrastructure could also challenge American security and economic interests in the region.

Safeguarding Digital Sovereignty

In the face of both the opportunities that new technologies offer to African enterprises and individuals, and the challenges to sovereignty and stability that accompany China’s interventions, it is important for countries across the region to put in place robust regulatory frameworks for digital transactions. The experience of the Central African Republic offers a cautionary tale in the risks of adopting new technologies in the absence of such regulations. In 2022, the Central African Republic made history as the first African country to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. In the aftermath, however, accusations of corruption via digital assets have clarified the potential for crypto to promote criminal activity and expose gaps in regulatory oversight and enforcement capacity.

With African countries already facing significant difficulties for tradfi standards adoption and the increasing prevalence of cybercrime, misguided efforts to adopt Web3 to facilitate digital financial transactions could increase corruption, organized crime, and digital dependencies. This could take the form of enabling illicit financial flows and sanctions evasions via cross-border transactions, reduced central bank control over monetary policy through widespread stablecoin usage, and overdependence on foreign-built digital infrastructure. Such an environment could end up undermining economic stability for the region as a whole through reliance on potentially corruptible financial systems, thereby reducing national control over financial data, transaction visibility, and regulatory enforcement. For the US, reduced visibility into cross-border financial flows limits the effectiveness of economic tools such as sanctions and risks diminishing influence over the very standards and systems that currently underpin the global financial system.

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A better alternative is for digital asset usage to have not only clear regulatory guidance and approval, but also product-market fit to ensure long-term sustainability. This clearest example of the consequences of a lack of such a fit is Nigeria’s late 2021 debut of the eNaira CBDC. Despite what CBN Governor Godwin Emefiele characterized as “overwhelming interest,” transaction numbers remain relatively low, with the eNaira being seen by many as a failed initiative, in part because Nigerians have found greater utility in stablecoins.

Ghana has taken a more deliberate approach. One month after its transition to ISO 20022, Ghana’s Parliament approved a Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill, which created a legal framework to regulate and legalize cryptocurrency activities within the country. By providing legislation that enables the Bank of Ghana to oversee and license exchanges and wallet providers, Ghana is able to increase its legitimacy in both the cryptocurrency and traditional financial markets.

As strategic competition in Africa’s digital realm intensifies, maintaining sovereignty will require African countries to foster growth and innovation through robust regulatory frameworks and financial technologies tailored to their local markets.

Conclusion

Global leaders must recognize that digital payment rails are now critical instruments of national power. As global standards like ISO 20022 converge with Web3-native payment rails, African nations have a rare opportunity to leapfrog over legacy systems while still pursuing digital growth on their own terms. Understanding and responding to the influence of China’s Digital Silk Road will be critical for African nations to maintain digital sovereignty while embracing innovation.

With this in mind, African nations can strengthen their digital sovereignty by implementing comprehensive regulatory frameworks, investing in local fintech ecosystems, and promoting partnerships with trustworthy international players to ensure security and transparency. As they do so, the US can play a supportive role by offering technical assistance, facilitating knowledge-sharing initiatives, and encouraging private-sector investments that align with Africa’s strategic interests. These actions could ensure that African countries embrace financial and technological innovation, while safeguarding their digital sovereignty.

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Author Bio: Hugh Harsono’s research interests focus on emerging technologies’ impact on international security, technology policy, and strategic competition. Hugh received his graduate and undergraduate degrees from the University of California, Berkeley.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main image: Street scene in Freetown, Sierra Leone by Random Institute on Unsplash.

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This article is a Focus Area self-published piece, and the content has not undergone standard editorial review. IWI hosts these pieces to facilitate rapid dialogue among practitioners, but the analysis, research, and original thought within the article remain the sole responsibility of the author.

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