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NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ADVANCE SHEETS
317 NEBRASKA REPORTS
STATE EX REL. SPUNG v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 800
reenfranchisement upon being “restored to civil rights.” But
unlike some state constitutions, the Nebraska Constitution does
not expressly grant the power to restore civil rights to any of
the three branches, nor does it specify the method or criteria by
which civil rights in general, or voting rights specifically, are
to be restored. 32 This is significant for two reasons.
First, because article VI, § 2, establishes the constitutional
policy that a felon’s right to vote can be restored, but does
so without prescribing the means or method to carry that
policy into effect, the reenfranchisement provision is not
self-executing. 33 And when a constitutional provision is not
self-executing, it is generally understood that the Legislature
32 Compare, e.g., N.J. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ 7 (providing that felony conviction
deprives persons of right to vote but “[a]ny person so deprived, when
pardoned or otherwise restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall again
enjoy that right”); Ky. Const. § 145 (providing that felony conviction
operates to exclude suffrage rights but those excluded “may be restored
to their civil rights by executive pardon”); Utah Const. art. IV, § 6
(providing that any person convicted of felony may not be permitted to
vote until such right “is restored as provided by statute”); N.C. Const.
art. VI, § 2 (providing that no person adjudged guilty of a felony “shall
be permitted to vote unless that person shall be first restored to the rights
of citizenship in the manner prescribed by law”); Or. Const. art. II, § 3
(providing that “privilege of an elector, upon conviction of any crime
which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be forfeited,
unless otherwise provided by law”); Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4 (providing that
“any disqualification from voting arising from a felony conviction shall
terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon completion of all terms
of sentence including parole or probation”).
33 See, e.g., State ex rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 260 Neb.
1000, 620 N.W.2d 763 (2001); In re Applications A-16027 et al., 242
Neb. 315, 495 N.W.2d 23 (1993), modified on denial of rehearing 243
Neb. 419, 499 N.W.2d 548; Indian Hills Comm. Ch. v. County Bd. of
Equal., 226 Neb. 510, 412 N.W.2d 459 (1987); State, ex rel. Walker, v.
Board of Commissioners, 141 Neb. 172, 3 N.W.2d 196 (1942). See, also,
Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403, 21 S. Ct. 210, 45 L. Ed. 249 (1900)
(recognizing rule that constitutional provision “is not self-executing when
it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of
which those principles may be given the force of law””).